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CHAPTER 11 
Torts 
JAMES W. SMITH• 
A. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
§11.1. Introduction. The 1973 judicial year was highly productive 
in the area of tort law. Under the decisions of the Supreme Judicial 
Court and the Appeals Court: owners and occupiers of property were 
charged with a duty of ordinary care to all lawful visitors on the 
premises,l although no change was made in the lesser duty of care owed 
to trespassers;2 loss of consortium was recognized as a compensable harm;8 
liability for medical malpractice on a breach of warranty theory was 
recognized under exceptional circumstances;' the state immunity doc-
trine was slightly eroded with the Supreme Judicial Court also suggesting 
legislative abolition of the doctrine of state and municipal immunity;11 
the liability of occupiers of premises to plaintiffs slipping on foreign 
substances was clarified,6 as was the liability of owners or possessors of 
automobiles who allow the automobile to be driven by an unlicensed 
or unfit operator;7 the responsibility of a master for the intentional torts 
• JAMES W. SMITH is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§11.1. 1 Mounsey v. Ellard, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 871, 297 N.E.2d 43. See §11.17 infra 
for a discussion of Mounsey. 
2 In a 1974 decision, Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245, 
308 N.E.2d 467, the court carved out an exception to the general rule regarding tres-
passers (duty to avoid wilful and wanton conduct) holding that where a known tres-
passer is physically entrapped in a position of peril, the owner or possessor of the 
property involved owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury or further 
injury to him and this includes, if necessary, the duty to take reasonably affirmative 
action. A complete discussion of the Pridgen case will appear in the 1974 Annual 
Survey of Massachusetts Law. 
s Diaz v. Eli Lilly 8c Co., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1263, 302 N.E.2d 555. See §11.19 infra 
for a discussion of Diaz. 
4 Sullivan v. O'Connor, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 753, 296 N.E.2d 183. 
II Morash 8c Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 785, 296 N.E.2d 461. 
See §ll.2 infra and §11.18 infra for discussions of Morash. 
6 Oliveri v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Auth., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 319, 292 N.E.2d 863. 
See §11.3 infra for a discussion of Oliveri. 
7 Leone v. Doran, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 141, 292 N.E.2d 19. See §11.4 infra for a dis-
cussion of Leone. 
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of his servant was also clarified;S owners or occupiers of premises were 
held not obligated to take special precautions to avoid interfering with an 
adjoining landowner's peculiar use of his property;9 and a husband was 
barred from recovering from a negligent third party his wife's medical 
expenses which he had paid since his negligence had contributed to the 
injury.1o 
§11.2. Immunity: Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Until recently, 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts enjoyed complete immunity from 
tort liability except to the extent permitted by statute.1 In Putnam 
Furniture Building, Inc. v. Commonwealth,2 the court stated: "It is 
axiomatic that the Commonwealth can be answerable in its own courts 
only to the precise extent and in the precise manner to and in which 
it has submitted itself to their jurisdiction by statute." Further, there is 
no comprehensive legislation imposing tort liability on the state govern-
ment similar to the Federal Tort Claims Act at the federal level.3 
In a 1973 decision, Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth,4 the Supreme 
Judicial Court created the first exception to this common law rule by 
holding that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is liable in damages 
for creating or maintaining a private nuisance which causes injury to 
the real property of another. 
Morash is significant not only for its holding but for certain observa-
tions made by the court in the opinion relative to the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity generally and its likely future abolition. The court, 
while pointing out that there are persuasive reasons for the abolition of 
state and municipal immunity, stated that such a sweeping change can 
be better accomplished by the Legislature than the court.6 
There are several reasons why legislation is the preferable way to 
abolish governmental immunity. As a casual reading of the Federal 
Torts Claims Act discloses, many considerations are involved in the 
exposure of government to tort liability. Exceptions and limitations on 
8 Miller v. Federated Dep't St., Inc., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1497, 304 N.E.2d 573. See 
§11.5 infra for a discussion of Miller. 
9 Lynn Open Air Theatre, Inc. v. Sea Crest Cadillac-Pontiac, Inc., 1973 Mass. App. 
Ct. Adv. Sh. 199, 294 N.E.2d 473. See §11.6 infra for a discussion of Lynn Open Air. 
10 Dane v. Cormier, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1327, 285 N.E.2d 451. See §11.7 infra for a 
discussion of Dane. 
§11.2. 1 "It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence, that the Common-
wealth cannot be impleaded in its own courts, except by its own consent clearly mani-
fested by act of the Legislature ..•. " Troy & G.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 127 Mass. 
43, 46 (1879). 
2 323 Mass. 179, 185, 80 N.E.2d 649, 653 (1949). 
s See 28 U.S.C. §§1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 24ll, 2412, 2671 et seq. 
(1970). 
4 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 785, 296 N.E.2d 461. The case is more fully discussed at 
§11.18 infra. 
li Id. at 795-96, 296 N.E.2d at 468. 
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liability, based upon considerations of justice and public policy, can 
best be expressed in a comprehensive plan, a mode not available to the 
court. The Legislature also has the machinery for giving all interested 
parties the opportunity to raise their particular and perhaps unique 
problems; the court hears only those claims and points of view voiced 
by the attorneys for the litigants with only occasional assistance of an 
amicus brief. Finally, the prospective effect of legislation working such 
a sweeping change is to be preferred over retroactive judicial law. 
Some parallel may be perceived between the court's opinion in Morash 
and events leading up to the recent legislative exposure of charities to 
tort liability.8 Unlike the opinion in Colby v. Carney Hospital,' the 
court in Morash does not overrule prospectively the governmental immu-
nity doctrine;8 reminiscent of the court in Colby, however, it does use 
language w~ich can reasonably be read only as an indication to the 
Legislature that it has the first opportunity to make this change.' 
§ll.3. Slip and fall cases: Foreign substances. The facts of the 1973 
case of Oliveri v. Massachusetts Transportation .A.uthority1 involved a 
plaintiff who fell down a 8ight of stairs on the defendant's premises when 
she stepped on a foreign substance on the stairs. A companion of the 
plaintiff testified that the substance was dirty and that when she tried 
to remove it by kicking it with her foot, the substance did not move. 
All of the other steps appeared clean. Neither the substance nor its 
identity was introduced in evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court sus-
tained the defendant's exceptions to the denial of its motion for a directed 
verdict and ordered judgment entered for the defendant. , 
A plaintiff who is injured as the result of slipping on a foreign sub-
stance on the defendant's premises must establish that the defendant or 
his servants either knew of the presence of the substance2 or that the 
substance was there for a sufficient period that he or his servants should 
have known of its presence.8 In the latter situation where the nature 
of the foreign substance is known, proof of the time element may be 
8 See G.L c. 2!11, §85K providing that charitable organizations may be liable in tort 
up to $20,000. 
T !156 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969). 
8 See discussion of the Colby opinion and its aftermath in Smith, Medical Mal-
practice, 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.!1, at !170. 
II "We believe the Legislature should be afforded an opportunity to do this by a 
comprehensive statute!' 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 795, 926 N.E.2d at 468. ''We have no 
doubt as to the advisability of abolishing the rule of governmental immunity as 
applied to the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions, and we have no doubt 
as to our power to abolish that doctrine. We refrain at this time, not merely because 
we have accepted the doctrine for many years, but because the comprehensive approach 
available to the Legislature is the preferable course." Id. at 796, 296 N.E.2d at 468. 
§11.!1. 1 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. !119, 292 N.E.2d 86!1. 
2 Young v. Food Fair, Inc., !1!17 Mass. !12!1, 149 N.E.2d 219 (1958). 
a Deagle v. Great Atl. Be Pac. Tea Co., M!l Mass. 26!1, 265, 178 N.E.2d 286, 288 (1961). 
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established by inference in some cases by proof that the substance was 
in a decayed state and that it was in a place where the defendant's em-
ployees should have seen it.' Where, however, the nature of the substance 
is not known, and there is thus no way of knowing the effect of time 
on its appearance, no inference is warranted that the substance was on 
the floor long enough for the defendant or his servants to have seen it.11 
For this reason the court also pointed out that the mere stickiness or 
adherence of the substance to the step is not such a quality as, in com-
mon knowledge, establishes the time element.6 
Oliveri is noteworthy principally because the court wrote a compre-
hensive opinion, discussing and categorizing numerous Massachusetts 
decisions involving the liability of owners or occupiers of premises to 
persons slipping on foreign substances. The opinion should be very 
helpful to attorneys and judges in future "foreign substance" cases. 
§11.4. Automobiles: Negligent entrustment. G.L. c. 90, §12 provides 
in part that: 
No person shall allow a motor vehicle owned by him or under his 
control . to be operated by any person who has no legal right so to 
do, or in violation of this chapter. 
In Fitiles v. Umlah,t the Supreme Judicial Court held that allowing an 
unlicensed person to drive one's automobile is a violation of this statute 
even though the owner or person in control of the automobile is unaware 
that the operator is unlicensed. Violation of this statute is evidence of 
negligence. In a 1978 case, Leone v. Doran,2 the plaintiff claimed that 
the defendant allowed a motor vehicle under his control to be operated 
by a person who had a reputation for driving recklessly and for driving 
after drinking. The plaintiff's declaration alleged negligence on the basis 
of a claimed violation of G.L. c. 90, §12, on the theory that allowing a 
person with such a reputation to operate one's motor vehicle constituted 
4. 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at !121·22, 292 N.E.2d at 865, citing Kelleher v. Dini's Inc., 
331 Mass. 217, liB N.E.2d 77 (1954). 
II DiAngelo v. United Mkts. Inc., 319 Mass. 143, 148-149, 64 N.E.2d 619, 621-22 (1946); 
Foley v. Hotel Touraine Co., 326 Mass. 742, 743-44, 96 N.E.2d 698, 699 (1951). 
6 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at !124, 292 N.E.2d at 867. On the particular facts of Oliveri, 
this latter point is at least debatable. The evidence indicated that the plaintiff fell 
several hours after the steps had been swept ·by defendant's cleaning man; the 
weather was damp and so was the stairway; a companion of plaintiff described the 
substance on which plaintiff fell as hard, dirty, muddy, and about two or three inches 
long, two inches wide and one-half inch high. It did not move when kicked. Con-
sidering the short time interval between the sweeping of the stairs and the plaintiff's 
fall together with the rigid adherence of the substance to a damp surface, a jury could 
reasonably conclude that the substance was present on the stairway when swept and 
was ignored by the cleaning man. 
§11.4. 1 322 Mass. 325, 77 N.E.2d 212 (1948). 
2 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 141, 292 N.E.2d 19. 
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allowance of the motor vehicle to be driven in violation of "this chapter," 
i.e., of chapter 90. 
The court, rejecting the applicability of G.L. c. 90, §12 to the plain-
tiff's evidence, indicated that, apart from the unlicensed operator situ-
ation, criminal responsibility under the statute can attach to the owner 
or person in control of a motor vehicle only if the evidence warrants 
the conclusion that, at the time he permitted the use of the automobile, 
he was aware of circumstances which made it inevitable that the auto-
mobile would be operated in violation of chapter 90.8 An example of 
such a situation would be present, where the owner or person in control 
of the motor vehicle allows it to be operated by an intoxicated person, 
whom he knew to be intoxicated. On the issue of defendant's knowledge, 
the court held that where plaintiff shows only that the operator's repu-
tation made a violation of G.L. c. 90 conceivable or even probable, a 
finding of a violation of G.L. c. 90, §12 is not warranted. 
While holding G.L. c. 90, §12 inapplicable to the plaintiff's evidence, 
the court allowed a new trial which would include the issue of common 
law negligence, provided the declaration was appropriately amended. 
In the Leone opinion, the court had pointed out that the owner or one 
in control of a motor vehicle could be held liable, even apart from 
G.L. c. 90, §12, on a theory of negligent entrustment. Such a person, for 
example, could be held liable for common law negligence for permitting 
the vehicle to be driven by a visibly intoxicated person or by a person 
whom he knows to be suffering from lack of sleep or whom he knows to 
be inexperienced or otherwise unfit to operate the vehicle.4 This view 
has been taken by many other jurisdictions.~~ 
Incompetence or unfitness of the operator may be established by prior 
incidents involving the operator, such as proof of prior criminal convic-
tions for violations of the motor vehicle laws.6 Knowledge by the defen-
dant-owner of such incompetence or unfitness may be established by direct 
evidence or by inference, including in some limited instances evidence of 
the operator's reputation.7 
§11.5. Respondeat superior: Liability of master for intentional tort 
of servant. Cases in Massachusetts have long held that a master under 
some circumstances may be held liable for his servant's intentional tort. 
3 Id. at 147, 292 N.E.2d at 27. 
• Id. at 150, 292 N.E.2d at 28. 
II For a listing of such cases, see W. Prosser, Law of Torts §104, at 678 (4th ed. 1971). 
6 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 152, 292 N.E.2d at 29. 
7 As the court explained: 
It is possible that the reputation of the operator could be shown to be of such a 
specific nature, and known in such a particular segment of the community, as to 
constitute some evidence that the defendant owner had knowledge of the opera-
tor's incompetence at the time of the entrustment of the vehicle. 
Id. at 151, 292 N.E.2d at 29. 
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For example, where the servant is hired to perform services which are 
commonly accompanied by the use of force, the master is liable if the 
servant uses force where no privilege exists,1 or where he uses unreason-
able force in a privileged situation. Liability of a master for a servant's 
intentional tort is not, however, limited to such situations. Liability has 
been imposed where the act of the servant was done in the course of his 
doing the master's work and for the purpose of accomplishing it.2 A recent 
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court, Miller v. Federated Department 
Stores, Inc.s has refined that test somewhat. Simply stated, the issue in 
Miller was whether the master is liable for an assault and battery com-
mitted by his servant solely on the basis that at the time of the tort 
the servant was engaged in performing his master's business and that the 
commission of the tort was related to such performance. The Supreme 
Judicial Court held that such a showing alone was insufficient to establish 
liability. 
In Miller, the plaintiff, a customer in defendant's store, had earlier 
been bumped by a servant's receptacle cart. At a later time, the plaintiff 
and servant met again and had an argument during which the servant 
assaulted the plaintiff. It was injuries resulting from this assault that 
underlay plaintiff's claim. Reasoning that the servant's assault was not 
in response to conduct of plaintiff which was presently interfering with 
the servant's ability to successfully perform his duties, the court held 
the defendant not liable. According to the court, the test of a master's 
liability for his servant's intentional tort is not a purely subjective one 
of whether the servant at the time of the assault intended to further, 
and believed he was furthering, his master's business. More important 
than the question of the servant's subjective intent is whether the assault 
was committed as in response to the plaintiff's conduct, which at the time 
of the assault was interfering with the servant's ability to satisfactorily 
do his job.' This interference may be in the form of an affirmative attempt 
to prevent the servant from carrying out his assignmentll or in the failure 
§ll.5. 1 Fanciullo v. B.G. Be S. Theatre Corp., 297 Mass. 44, 8 N.E.2d 174 (1937) 
(theatre usher ejecting patron). 
2 Rego v. Thomas Bros. Corp., 340 Mass. 334, 164 N.E.2d 144 (1960) (construction 
foreman striking plaintiff in dispute over boulders that had rolled onto property 
abutting construction site); Hobart v. Cavanaugh, 353 Mass. 51, 228 N.E.2d 439 (1967) 
(truck driver striking plaintiff because of plaintiff's delay in fueling truck); Suckney v. 
Bert P. Williams, Inc., !55 Mass. 62, 242 N.E.2d 416 (1968) (delivery truck driver strik-
ing innocent bystander in presence of picketting drivers, seen as display of intimidation 
furthering master's deliveries). 
3 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1497,304 N.E.2d 573. 
4 Id. at 1507, 304 N.E.2d at 580. 
ll See Levi v. Brooks, 121 Mass. 501 (1877) (defendant's servants striking the plain-
tiffs, delinquent debtors, when the plaintiffs attempted to prevent them from re-
possessing furniture which their master had instructed them to remove); Rego v. 
Thomas Bros. Corp., 340 Mass. !J!J4, 164 N.E.2d 144 (1960) (see note 2 supra). 
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to do acts necessary to enable the servant to begin or continue his assign-
ment.6 "Assaults arising in either of these contexts constitute acts com-
mitted within the scope of employment, in that they stem from and 
directly relate to the frustration of the ability to perform on the assign-
ments for which the employee is presently responsible."T 
§11.6. Nuisance: Priority of occupation: Peculiar use of property. 
When the conduct of a defendant in a nuisance action is neither negli-
gent, reckless, nor ultrahazardous, liability will be determined on the basis 
of whether his conduct was "reasonable." The word "reasonable" as used 
in this context does not mean the same as "absence of negligence."l 
Rather, it has reference to a balancing of interests: the nature, .extent, 
and frequency of harm is weighed against such factors as the character 
of the area wherein the defendant is engaged in the complained-of activ-
ity,2 the time of day or night that such activity is taking place,s and the 
utility and social value of the activity. As regards the character of the 
surrounding area, a recent Massachusetts decision makes it clear that in 
the absence of any wrongful motive, an occupier of property is under 
no obligation to take special precautions to avoid interfering with an 
adjoining landowner's peculiar use of his property, despite the fact that 
the adjoining landowner commenced his activity many years prior to the 
defendant's use and even at a time when the defendant's use might not 
have been consistent with the character of the surrounding area. 
In Lynn Open Air Theatre, Inc. v. Sea Crest Cadillac-Pontiac, Inc.,• 
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant's use of Hood lights around 
its automobile sales area which were interfering with the quality of the 
screen projection at the plaintiff's open air drive-in theatre. The master 
found that when the plaintiff located its drive-in theatre many years 
6 See Hobart v. Cavanaugh, !15!1 Mass. 51, 228 N.E.2d 4!19 (1967) (see note 2 supra). 
7 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1507, !104 N.E.2d at 580. 
§11.6. 1 Actionable nuisance has been defined as an invasion of a person's interest 
in use and enjoyment of land which is either "(a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) 
unintentional and otherwise actionable under the principles controlling liability for 
negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §822 at 22 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971). The unreason-
ableness of unintentional behavior (clause (a) supra) derives from the degree by which 
the gravity of harm caused by the behavior outweighs its social utility. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §822, comment k, at 2, and §826, at 3·4 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972). 
2 See Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 488-89, 104 N.E. !171, !173-74 
(1914). While the zoning of a particular area is important on the issue of reasonable-
ness, it is not controlling. See Tortorella v. H. Traiser &: Co., Inc., 284 Mass. 497, 188 
N.E. 254 (1933). 
3 Considerable noise taking place in the early morning may be actionable (Shea v. 
National Ice Cream Co., 280 Mass. 206, 182 N.E. 30!1 (1932) ), while noise of the same 
intensity taking place during normal working hours may not be actionable (Tortorella 
v. H. Traiser &: Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933) ). 
4 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 199, 294 N.E.2d 473. 
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before, it was the only occupier and user within many hundreds of feet, 
but that the neighborhood had become a highly developed commercial 
area located on a heavily traveled public way. He also found that the 
other occupiers of this area were mainly commercial in nature and were 
well lighted at night and that the use of lights in the evening was normal 
in the defendant's business and was only harmful to the plaintiff's busi-
ness because of a drive-in theatre's unique high sensitivity to light. The 
superior court dismissed the plaintiff's bill of complaint and the plaintiff 
appealed. 
In affirming the dismissal of the bill of complaint, the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court held that injury to a particular user of specially sensitive 
characteristics does not render the lights an actionable nuisance.11 Citing 
Prosser,e the court stated: "'The plaintiff cannot, by devoting his land to 
an unusually sensitive use, such as a drive-in motion picture theatre 
easily affected by light, make a nuisance out of conduct of the adjoining 
defendant which would otherwise be harmless.' "7 
The position taken in Lynn Open Air Theatre follows the general 
rule of other jurisdictions.s It is also consistent with a 1971 decision of 
the Supreme Judicial Court, Richmond Brothers, Inc. v. Hagemann,9 
although no reference is made in the opinion to that decision. In Rich-
mond Brothers, the court held that where there was no showing of spite 
or duress or use without benefit to defendants in erecting structures on 
their land adjacent to plaintiff's radio broadcasting station, plaintiff could 
not claim a nuisance on the basis that such structures interfered with its 
broadcasting signal beamed over the defendant's premises. A contrary 
result would amount to a condemnation of the defendant's premises to 
a servitude in favor of the plaintiff. 
§II.7. Consequential damages: Wife's medical expenses. In the case 
of injury to a married woman, future medical expenses are not recover-
able by the husband, even though he has a legal obligation to pay them;1 
they are reeoverable solely by the wife. This is because a recovery by the 
husband would provide no assurance that the funds would be used for 
the wife's medical expenses. He would not hold them in trust; they would 
be part of his estate at his death available to his creditors.2 The past, 
as distinguished from the future, medical expenses of a married woman 
are recoverable by the spouse who paid them or incurred the obligation 
II ld. at 474, 294 N.E.2d 474. 
6 W. Prosser, Law of Torts §87, at 579 (4th ed. 1971). 
7 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 199, 200, 294 N.E.2d 478, 474. 
s See, e.g., Amphitheatres, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 886, 198 P.2d 847; 
5 A.LR. 2d 6!10 (1948); Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Hwy. 
Comm'n, 84 Ill. 2d 544, 216 N.E.2d 788 (1966). 
o 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 588, 268 N.E.2d 680. 
111.7. 1 Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168 N.E. 169 (1929). 
2 Id. at 59, 168 N.E. at 170. 
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to pay them.8 However, when either the husband's or the wife's own 
negligence has contributed to the wife's injury, further problems arise. 
Clearly, the wife's contributory negligence affects recovery irrespective 
of which spouse is the suing party.4 A recent case, Dane v. Cormier/• 
presents the situation where the husband's negligence contributed to 
the wife's injury. 
In Dane, the husband and the defendant were the drivers of auto-
mobiles involved in a collision; both drivers were negligent and the wife, 
a passenger in her husband's automobile, was injured. The Supreme 
Judicial Court, reversing the trial court, held that the negligent husband 
was barred from recovering his wife's past medical expenses, which he had 
paid.6 Apparently, had the wife paid these expenses, or bound herself 
to pay them, she would have recovered in full. In summary then, under 
present Massachusetts law, a married woman's negligence will always 
bar or limit recovery for her past medical expenses no matter who pays 
and then seeks to recover them; her husband's negligence will do so only 
when he, rather than she, attempts recovery. Consequently, well-advised 
plaintiffs in the Dane situation will arrange to have the wife, rather than 
the husband, pay for past medical expenses. 
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in the well known case of 
Patusco v. Prince Macaroni, Inc.,1 reached a result directly contra to 
Dane. The Patusco court held that the wife may recover the expenses 
of her own medical treatment, without regard to whether she or the 
husband incurred the expenses.s Payment by the husband is treated as 
a collateral source, having no effect on recovery by the wife. By dicta, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court further intimated that a husband's negli-
gence should not bar or diminish even his recovery of damages for medi-
cal expenses paid by him for his wife's injury. To bar recovery, the court 
said, would "penalize the wife, for . . . her overall experience depends 
on her husband's exchequer."9 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
in Dane squarely rejected these intimations. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the result reached in Dane has its 
merits in the present state of Massachusetts tort law. Full recovery by 
the negligent husband seems unfair. The Dane approach when combined 
with the subsequently enacted comparative negligence statute1° still 
8 Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 484, 186 N.E. 632, 634 (1933); Saltzberg v. 
Lumbennen's Mut. Cas. Co., !126 Mass. 351, !154, 94 N.E.2d 269, 271 (1950). 
4 Brazinskos v. A. S. Fawcett, Inc., 318 Mass. 263, 61 N.E.2d 105 (1945). 
II 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1327, 285 N.E.2d 451. 
6 The facts of Dane occurred prior to the enactment of the original Massachusetts 
comparative negligence statute, G.L c. 231, §85. 
7 50 N.J. 365, 235 A.2d 465 (1967). 
s 50 N.J. at !173, 235 A.2d at 469. 
9 Id. 
10 G.L. c. 2!11, §85. 
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allows up to a fifty percent recovery by a negligent husband. To reject 
Dane is to place the entire burden upon a defendant who, because of 
interspousal immunity, prc;>bably cannot even recover contribution from 
the husband in a third party action.u , 
Dane however puts an unwarranted premium on a matter which can 
easily be arranged: all a family need do to avoid the effects of a husband's 
negligence which contributed to his wife's injury is to have the wife pay 
her own medical bills. Only the ill-informed need suffer from the hus-
band's negligence. Dane has a further weakness due to the interspousal 
immunity doctrine. Since that doctrine precludes the husband's liability 
insurance policy from covering his wife's injury, some or all of the medi-
cal expenses have to be paid out of the family finances unless medical 
insurance is present. The non-negligent wife as well as her negligent 
husband suffers. If the husband happens to pay the wife's medical bills 
and was more negligent than the third party, the negligent third party's 
insurer escapes liability entirely. 
Ultimately, the most desirable solution is to abolish the doctrine of 
interspousal immunity. The injured wife will then join her husband and 
the third party in a negligence action. If the wife sued only the third 
party, the third party could implead12 the husband for contribution.13 
Absent such a change in the law, the Patusco result, it is submitted, is 
more equitable than that reached in Dane. Recovery for a married 
woman's past and future medical expenses should be by the wife alone. 
If the husband pays the past medical expenses, such payment ought to 
be treated as a collateral source, having no effect on the wife's right to 
recovery.14 
B. LEGISLATION 
§ll.S. Introduction. Legislation significantly changed Massachusetts 
tort law in 1973 both in the procedural and substantive spheres. Proce-
durally, chapter 1114 of the Acts of 1973 facilitated the adoption of new 
rules of civil, trial and appellate procedure. The Rules will simplify the 
disposition of tort cases in many respects. For example, the motion for 
11 This exact point has not yet been decided by tbe Supreme Judicial Court. 
However tbe Massachusetts contribution statute (G.L. c. 231B, §l(a)) allows contribution 
"where two or more persons become jointly liable in tort for tbe same injury •••• " 
The immunity doctrine precludes a husband from being liable in tort to his wife. In an 
earlier case, O'Mara v. H.P. Hood Be Sons, Inc., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 553, 268 N.E.2d 
685, tbe court raised tbe issue of tbe effect of intrafamily immunity on contribution 
but declined to answer tbe question. 
12 See tbe recently adopted Mass. R. Civ. P. 14 for impleader procedure. 
18 See G.L c. 231B. 
14 See Goldstein v. Gontarz, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 357, 367, 309 N.E.2d 196, 202·03. 
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summary judgment,! previously limited to certain contract cases, is now 
available in tort actions; discovery has been expanded to include the 
existence and contents o£ liability insurance policies;2 and pleadings have 
been simplified to serve a notice function rather than the function of 
reducing the number of issues for trial.8 
In the substantive realm, public school teachers, principals and nurses 
have been granted immunity from liability arising from acts or omissions 
while rendering good faith emergency first aid or providing transportation 
to an injured or incapacitated student;4 the tort statute of limitations 
has been increased from two to three years;11 a compensatory wrongful 
death statute has supplanted the punitive statute;6 a new comparative 
negligence statute, correcting the deficiencies of its predecessor, has been 
enacted;1 the defense of assumption of risk in negligence cases has been 
abolished;8 the right to privacy has been granted legislative recognition;& 
the arbitrary notice requirement in snow and ice accidents has been 
sensibly modified;10 and the lessor of goods has joined the manufacturer, 
seller and supplier as a person potentially liable for injury to consumers 
and third persons from defective products on a warranty theory, despite 
the absence of privity.u 
§11.9. Immunity for public school employees: Rendering emergency 
aid to students. Over the past several years, Massachusetts has enacted 
various statutes establishing immunity for certain classes of individuals 
rendering emergency treatment provided they act in good faith. Initially, 
doctors rendering emergency treatment were protected;1 nurses were then 
included.2 In 1970, a statute was enacted which granted immunity to ski 
patrol members for good faith emergency treatment.3 Legislation enacted 
in 1973 extended immunity from civil liability to include acts or omis-
sions o£ a public school teacher, principal, or nurse, who, in good faith, 
renders emergency first aid or provides transportation to a student who 
has become injured or incapacitated in a public school building or on 
the school grounds. 4 
§ll.8. 1 Mass. R. Civ. P. 56. 
2 Mass •. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(2). 
a Mass. R. Civ. P. 8. 
4 Chapter 660 of the Acts of 1973. See §11.9, infra. 
II Chapter 777 of the Acts of 1973. See §11.10, infra. 
6 Chapter 699 of the Acts of 1973. See §ll.ll, infra. 
T Chapter 1123 of the Acts of 1973. See §11.12, infra. 
8 Chapter 1123 of the Acts of 1973. See §11.13, infra. 
9 Chapter 941 of the Acts of 1973. See §11.14, infra. 
10 Chapter 1085 of the Acts of 1973. See §11.15, infra. 
11 Chapter 750 of the Acts of 1973. See §11.16, infra. 
§11.9. 1 G.L. c. 112, §12B, as added by chapter 217 of the Acts of 1962. 
2 G.L c. 112, §12B, as amended by Acts of 1967, c. 374. 
a G.L. c. 231, §851, as added by chapter 349 of the Acts of 1970. 
4 G.L. c. 71, §55A, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 660. 
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These statutes are salutary; perhaps their enactment points up the 
inequities inherent in an unfair common law rule which holds the Priest 
and the Levite legally blameless while compelling the Good Samaritan 
to pay for his good faith but negligent efforts. At a time when the law 
of Massachusetts is moving in the direction of finding relationships upon 
which to base a duty to acts the legislature should consider the enact-
ment of blanket legislation which would provide at least limited protec-
tion to all persons rendering emergency care in good faith. This is 
preferable to the present piecemeal pattern which merely responds to 
groups who feel sufficiently threatened by the common law to announce 
a prospective refusal to render emergency aid.8 Other states have the 
broader, more intelligent approach.T 
§11.10. Statute of limitations: Tort. For over two decades, the limita-
tions period for most tort actions and actions of contract to recover for 
personal injury has been two years.1 Effective as to causes o£ action arising 
on or after January 1, 1974, the limitations period for these actions has 
been extended to three years.2 The wrongful death statute8 was also 
amended so as to have the three year statute of limitations period. 
§11.11. Wrongful death: A new "compensatory'' statute. In 1848 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied the existence of a common 
law action for wrongful death;1 this result was followed in most other 
states. The legislatures of most states responded by enacting compensatory 
wrongful death statutes. The Massachusetts Legislature, in contrast, ehose 
to treat wrongful death legislation as quasi-criminal in nature,2 mea-
suring the recoverable damages by a punitive standard with a maximum 
II See Newman v. Redstone, lJ54 Mass. lJ79, 2lJ7 N.E.2d 666 (1968) (master has a duty 
to render aid to a servant who becomes hurt and helpless while acting within the scope 
of his employment); Pridgen v. Boston Housing Auth., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245, lJ08 
N.E.2d 467 (occupier of land owes a duty of reasonable care, including the taking of 
affirmative action, to prevent injury or further injury to a trespasser he discovers 
physically entrapped in a position of peril). Pridgen will be discussed in detail in the 
1974 Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law. 
8 See 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 577-79. 
T New Mexico for example provides by statute (N.M. Stat. Ann. §12-12-lJ (1968)) 
that: "No person who shall administer emergency care in good faith at or near 
the scene of an emergency ••. shall be held liable for any civil_ damages as a result 
of any action or omission by such person in administering said care, except for gross 
negligence • • • ." 
§11.10. 1 See G.L. c. 260, §12A, 2B, 4. 
2 See chapter 777 of the Acts of 197lJ, amending G.L. c. 260, §§2A, 2B, 4. 
8 See chapter 957 of the Acts of 197lJ, amending G.L c. 229, §2. 
§11.11. 1 Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (I Cush.) 475 (1848). The opinion in 
Carey gave no reasons for the decision except that it had been so held in England in 
the case of Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campb. 49lJ, 170 Eng. Rep. lOSS (K.B; 1808). Carey was 
recently overruled in Gaudette v. Webb, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. lllJl, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229. 
2 See Arnold v. Jacobs, 516 Mass. 81, 84, 54 N.E.2d 922, 92lJ (1944). 
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recovery provision which has been increased over the years. This punitive 
standard, inappropriate in an insurance-oriented society, has been criti-
cized in numerous writings and by the courts of sister states, some of 
which have refused to apply the Massachusetts statute where the states' 
then prevailing conflict of laws rule would have called for its application. a 
Chapter 699 of the Acts of 1973 completely revamped the Massachusetts 
Wrongful Death Statute. The new statute incorporates the following 
changes: 
I. It eliminates the "degree of culpability" standard for the assessment 
of damages and substitutes a compensatory standard based upon "the 
fair monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive 
the damages recovered ... including but not limited to compensation 
for the loss of the reasonably expected net income, services, protection, 
care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, and 
advice .... " 
2. It eliminates the minimum and maximum recovery provision. 
3. It provides for the recovery of damages for funeral and burial ex-
penses. 
4. It provides for the recovery of punitive damages in an amount of 
not less than $5,000 where the decedent's death was caused by the mali-
cious, wilful, wanton or reckless conduct of the defendant or by the 
gross negligence of the defendant. 
5. It expressly provides that recovery will be allowed under the statute 
where the decedent's death was caused by injuries which resulted from 
the defendant's breach of warranty arising under Article 2 of G.L. c. 106; 
prior law did not allow recovery for wrongful death on a breach of 
warranty theory.4 
This statute took effect on January I, 1974 and applies to causes of 
action arising on or after that date. Since a cause of action for wrongful 
death does not arise until death occurs,3 presumably the new statute 
applies where death occurs on or after January I, 1974 even though the 
injury which caused the death occurred before that date. 
The conversion to a compensatory wrongful death statute may change 
the law set out in cases decided in whole or in part on the punitive theory 
of the old statute. For example, the rule that joint liability did not exist 
in an action for wrongful death was based upon the concept that each 
defendant was liable for damages based upon his culpability, irrespective 
of the culpability of other defendants in the case.6 Under a compensatory 
a See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 
133 (1961). 
4 Necktas v. General Motors Corp., Pontiac Div., 357 Mass. 546, 259 N.E.2d 234 
(1970). 
II Wall v. Massachusetts N.E. St. Ry., 229 Mass. 506, 118 N.E. 864 (1918). 
6 "The statute, following a pattern familiar in criminal and penal provisions, limits 
the penalty that can be imposed upon one person for causing one death. It does not 
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statute joint liability exists, with rights of contribution among the defen-
dants, just as in a personal injury case. Another issue, the earlier resolu-
tion of which was based upon the punitive theory of the old statute, is 
whether a release of the personal injury claim executed by the decedent 
bars a subsequent wrongful death action. In Wall v. Massachusetts 
Northeastern Street Railway Co.,' the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
such a release did not bar recovery under the old Massachusetts statute 
principally because recovery under the statute was penal whereas the 
release related to a claini for compensation. Elements of recovery under a 
compensatory death statute might overlap with elements of damages of 
a personal injury claim; for example, loss of support, which can be re-
covered in a death claim, is merely the permanent version of loss of 
earning capacity, which can be recovered in a personal injury claim.s 
Further, it may be argued that the language of the death statute itself 
as amended ("under such circumstances that the deceased could have 
recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted, 
... ")precludes recovery if the deceased had previously executed a release 
for personal injuries; other jurisdictions have disagreed on the effect of 
similar language.8 
The changes in the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Statute should have 
no effect on two other death-related areas involved in recent case-law: 
the holding that recovery for wrongful death is a common law right and 
that therefore the statute of limitations expressed in the Wrongful Death 
Statute bars only the remedy and not the right;to the decision that re-
covery for wrongful death is proper even where the negligence and injury 
occurred prior to the birth of the decedent (in fact even before viability), 
limit the amount that can be oollected from a number of wrongdoers for one death. 
Logically, as in aiminal law, each wrongdoer may be made to suffer the maximum 
penalty no matter how many are guilty." Arnold v. Jaoobs, 816 Mass. 81, 84, 54 
N.E.2d 922, 928 (1944). 
T 229 Mass. 506, 118 N.E. 864 (1918). 
8 In Montellier v. United States, 815 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1968), the United States 
Court of Appeals followed Wall even though punitive damages cannot be reoovered 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Court held that since the release was in-
effective under Massachusetts law, it was ineffective in a death action under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act as the result of an accident occurring in Massachusetts. See 
1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §6.6, at 84. 
9 See Southern Bell Tel. &: Tel. Co. v. Cassin, 111 Ga. 575, 86 S.E. 881 (1900) (action 
barred); Rowe v. Richards, 85 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001 (1915) (action allowed). The 
principal argument advanced for allowing the action despite the derivative language 
of the wrongful death statute is that such language refers only to the existence of 
wrongful oondpct toward the decedent (e.g., battery, negligence, etc.) and to substantive 
defenses (e.g., oontributory negligence), not to the cause of action itself. 
10 Gaudette v. Webb, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 11!11, 284 N.E.2d 222. In so holding in 
Gaudette, the oourt allowed the general tolling provisions, which heretofore had been 
held inapplicable to the statute of. limitations set out in the wrongful death statute, 
to operate on such statute of limitations. 
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provided the child was born alive.11 Neither of these cases relied upon 
the punitive concept of the old statute. 
The conversion of the Massachusetts Death Statute to a compensatory-
type statute does create a problem encountered in other states, namely, 
how to instruct a jury on the assessment of compensatory damages for 
the wrongful death of a child.1s 
§11.12. Comparative negligence: Recent amendments. The original 
Massachusetts comparative negligence statute took effect on January I, 
1971.1 It abolished the long-standing rule that the defense of contributory 
negligence always operated as a complete bar to recovery in a negligence 
action; it allowed in many cases a limited recovery to the negligent plain-
tiff. While the comparative negligence statute has appeared to work well 
in practice, several deficiencies existed in the statute.1 These have been 
corrected by a recent amendment.8 
The changes in the statute are as follows: 
Under the original statute, the jury was required to return a special 
verdict stating (I) the amount of damage which would have been recover-
able if there had been no contributory negligence; and (2) the degree of 
negligence of each party expressed as a percentage. This mandatory 
special verdict has been eliminated. Obviously, as in other cases, the 
trial judge may require the jury to return a special verdict; this is in 
accord with Rule 49(a) of the new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which are effective July I, 1974. 
Under the original statute, no damages were recoverable by the plain-
tiff unless his negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person 
against whom recovery was sought. Under the amendment, the plaintiff 
will be completely barred from recovery only where his negligence is 
greater than the negligence of the person or persons against whom re-
covery is sought. Thus, under the amended version the plaintiff may be 
fifty percent negligent and still recover; such was not the case under the 
original version. 
Under the original version of the statute, several questions were left 
unanswered which arose in situations where the plaintiff was suing joint 
tortfeasors. It was not clear, for example, whether the plaintiff could re-
cover from a joint tortfeasor whose negligence was less than the plaintiff's 
negligence, although the plaintiff's negligence was less than the combined 
negligence of all the defendants (for example, the plaintiff might be 
11 Torigian v. Watertown News Co., !152 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967). 
11 For two out-of-state cases discussing the problem, see Wycko v. Gnotk.e, !161 Mich. 
!1!11, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967). 
§11.12. 1 See G.L. c. 2!11, §85, as amended by Acts of 1969, c. 761. 
s For a discussion of the original Massachusetts oomparative negligence statute, see 
1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.1. 
a See G.L. c. 2!11, §85, as amended by Acts of 197!1, c. 112!1. 
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forty percent negligent while each of two defendants were thirty percent 
so). The amended version of the statute provides that the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence will not operate as an absolute bar to recovery: 
if such negligence was not greater than the total amount of negligence 
attributable to the person or persons against whom recovery is sought 
... in determining by what amount the plaintiff's damages shall be 
diminished ... the negligence of each plaintiff shall be compared to 
the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought. 
The combined total of the plaintiff's negligence taken together with 
all of the negligence of all defendants shall equal one hundred ·per 
cent. 
It appears reasonably clear under the amended version of the comparative 
negligence statute that in an action against joint tortfeasors, as long as 
the plaintiff's negligence does not exceed 50% of the negligence of himself 
and all defendants combined, he may recover his damages diminished in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to him despite the 
fact that the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the negligence of one or more 
of the joint defendants considered separately. Thus, if the plaintiff's 
damages are $100,000 and his negligence is 40% and the negligence of 
each of the two defendants is 30%, the plaintiff will be entitled to 
$60,000 in damages. 
Perhaps the most significant change brought about by the amended 
statute is the abolition of the defense of assumption of risk in negligence 
cases. This change is discussed in the next section.' 
The amended version of the statute makes it clear that while the 
violation of a criminal statute, ordinance, or regulation by a plaintiff 
which contributed to the injury, death or damages, shall be considered 
as evidence of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, such violation shall 
not, as a matter of law and for that reason alone, serve to bar a plaintiff 
from recovery. 
The amended version of the statute makes it clear that the burden 
of alleging and proving negligence which serves either to diminish a 
plaintiff's damages or bar recovery under the statute shall be upon the 
person who seeks to establish such negligence, and the plaintiff shall be 
presumed to be in the exercise of due care. The amended statute took 
effect on January 1, 1974 and applies to all causes of actions occurring 
on or after said date. 
Consideration might be given to further amendment of the compara-
tive negligence statute so as to make it operate, where otherwise appli-
cable, in breach of warranty actions.11 While the Supreme Judicial Court 
4 See §11.111 infra. 
II See G.L c. 106, §2-lllS, as recently amended by Acts of 19711, c. 750 and Acts of 
1974, c. 15ll. 
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has not yet had occasion to rule on the issue whether contributory neg-
ligence is a defense in a breach of warranty action, other states have 
allowed certain types of contributory negligence to operate as defenses in 
warranty actions. Thus, where the plaintiff, with knowledge of the defect 
in the product, unreasonably continues to use it, the defense of contribu-
tory negligence is generally available. a Since a warranty action does not 
require a showing of negligence on the part of the defendant, application 
of the principle of comparative negligence to warranty actions will require 
a change in the title to the statute. 
§ll.l3. Assumption of risk: Recent statutory abolition thereof. One 
of the most anomalous doctrines of tort law is the defense of assumption 
of risk. In essence it denies recovery to the plaintiff who voluntarily 
exposes himself to a known and appreciated risk.l While the application 
of the doctrine has in many cases rendered "unnecessary an analysis which 
might determine whether the ultimate ground of denial of recovery is 
absence of duty or breach of duty, want of proximate causal relation, or 
contributory negligence,"2 it does operate as a defense independently 
of contributory negligence.8 Under this defense, a plaintiff may be denied 
recovery for his injuries solely on the basis that he voluntarily exposed 
himself to the known and appreciated risk which was created by the 
defendant's negligent conduct despite the fact that his exposure may 
have been reasonable under the circumstances. Several states have recently 
rejected the doctrine in certain situations.' 
The lack of logic or justice inherent in the defense of assumption of 
risk was cast in stark relief by the enactment in Massachusetts of a com-
parative negligence statute.G Since the comparative negligence statute 
8 The general approach in other jurisdictions in products liability cases (whether 
denominated as breach of warranty or strict liability in tort) is to bar recovery only 
where the plaintiff has either misused the product, which fact contributed proximately 
to his injury, or where the plaintiff discovers the defect, and with knowledge of the 
danger involved, proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product. See Williams v. 
Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Dl. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d !105 (1970). Such conduct has been referred 
to as an unreasonable assumption of risk. On the other hand, mere failure on the part 
of the plaintiff to discover the defect, or to guard against the possibility of its existence 
does not. affect the plaintiff's recovery. Id., citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
§402A, comment n and other cases. See generally, W. Prosser, Law of Torts §102 (4th 
ed. 1971). 
§1I.l3. 1 Pouliot v. Black, 341 Mass. 531, 53!1, 170 N.E.2d 709, 710 (1960). 
2 Hietala v. Boston Be A.R.R., 295 Mass. 186, 190-191, !I N.E.2d !177, !180 (19!16). 
8 Miner v. Connecticut River R.R., 15!1 Mass. !198, 26 N.E. 994 (1891). 
4 Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wash. 2d !110, !17!1 P.2d 767 (1962) (employer-
employee relationship); McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 
!174, 11!1 N.W.2d 14 (1962) (motor vehicle operator-passenger relationship). 
G For a discussion of the Massachusetts comparative negligence statute, see §11.12 
supra. 
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only compared the defendant's negligence with the plaintiff's contributory 
negligence,assumption of risk remained a complete defense.6 
Chapter .I 123 of the Acts of 1973, which amended the Massachusetts 
comparative negligence statute, T abolished the defense of assumption of 
risk in negligence cases. The change is an excellent one. Henceforth, 
when the plaintiff's voluntary assumption of the risk created by the 
defendant's negligence is reasonable, he will be entitled to a full recov-
ery; when it is unreasonable, it will constitute contributory negligence 
and will be governed by the comparative negligence statute. 
§11.14. Invasion of the right of privacy:- A new cause of action. 
While the action for invasion of the right of privacy has received wide 
national judicial recognition, no recovery of damages has yet been had 
in Massachusetts based upon this tort. In Frick v. Boyd,l the Supreme 
Judicial Court, while rejecting the plaintiff's claim for invasion of pri-
vacy on the particular facts of the case, stated that it would deal with 
the difficult questions presented by the assertion of such a right "when 
and if we are confronted with some substantial, serious, or indecent 
intrusion upon the private life of another."2 
In Commonwealth v. Wiseman,s the Supreme Judicial Court enjoined 
the showing of the film entitled "Titticut Follies" to general audiences in 
Massachusetts. The film was made at the Massachusetts Correctional Insti-
tution at Bridgewater, an institution to which insane persons charged with 
crime and defective delinquents may be committed. The film showed the 
inmates, including their faces, in humiliating conditions and circum-
stances; many of the scenes showed the inmates in a state of nudity. The 
court refused to order the destruction of the film and held that it could 
be shown to audiences of a s~alized or professional character (e.g., 
social.workers, sociologists, psychiatrists, legislators, etc.) for whom the 
film would be instructive in dealing with the problems of custodial care 
and mental infirmity. While the court in Wiseman indicated, with citation 
to Frick v. Boyd,• that it need not discuss to what extent in Massachu-
setts violation of privacy gives rise to tort liability, it did appear to 
recognize a right to privacy at least for purposes of injunctive relief. 
Chapter 941 of the Acts of 1973, amending G.L. c. 214 by the addition _ 
of section IB, provides that a person shall have a right against un-
reasonable, substantial or serious interferences with his privacy.ll It also 
6 See 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.6 (recommending abolition of the defense of 
assumption of risk). 
T See §11.12 supra. 
§11.14. 1 !150 Mass. 259, 214 N.E.2d 460 (1966). 
2 Id. at 264,214 N.E.2d at 464. 
B !156 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969). 
• !150 Mass. 259, 214 N.E.2d 460 (1966). 
ll G.L c. 214 §1B was amended by chapter 19!1 of the Acts of 1974, making the 
effective date of the statute July 1, 1974. 
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provides that the superior court shall have jurisdiction to enforce such 
right by equitable relief and by the award of damages. 
The action for invasion of privacy actually encompasses four distinct 
wrongs. These have been categorized in the following manner: 
I. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude. 
2. Publication of private matters violating ordinary decencies. 
3. Putting the plaintiff in a false position in the public eye as by 
signing his name to a letter attributing to him views that he does not 
hold. 
4. Appropriation of some element of plaintiff's personality for com-
mercial use.e 
The first category recognizes that in an industrial and densely popu-
lated society, some intrusions into one's private sphere are inevitable; 
it thus proscribes gravely offensive intrusions unsupported by palpable 
social or economic excuse or justification.7 Many of the cases in this 
area will involve the question of the propriety of a defendant's investi-
gatory techniques. 
The second category listed above involves principally the issue of 
whether the matter that has been published is private or is newsworthy. 
In Kelley v. Post Publishing Co.,8 the court upheld the dismissal of 
the plaintiff's claim where the complaint alleged an invasion of privacy 
as the result of a picture appearing in the defendant's newspaper show-
ing the body of the plaintiff's daughter in a deformed and hideous 
manner. In an earlier case, Thermo v. New England Newspaper Publish-
ing Co.,9 the court had held that if the right of privacy exists in Massa-
chusetts, it does not extend to the protection of one from having his 
name or his likeness appear in a newspaper where there is a legitimate 
public interest in his existence, his experiences, his words, or his acts. 
The third category listed above, putting the plaintiff in a false position, 
is similar to the tort of defamation. Unlike defamation however, the 
false position need not be of a defamatory nature.1o 
The fourth category listed above is the subject matter of a Massa-
chusetts statute, enacted in 1970, which prohibits the unpermitted appro-
priation of a person's name or likeness for commercial purposes. G.L. 
c. 214, §3A, with a few exceptions, provides that any person whose name, 
portrait or picture is used within the C01;nmonwealth for advertising or 
trade purposes without his written consent may maintain an action in 
the superior court to prevent such use and to recover damages sustained 
by such use. If the defendant knowingly uses such person's name, portrait 
6 See W. Prosser, Law of Torts §117 (4th ed. 1971). 
7 See e.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, !107 
N.Y .S.2d 647 (1970). 
8 !127 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951). 
9 !106 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 75!1 (1940). 
·1o See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. !174 (1967). 
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or picture in such manner as is prohibited or unlawful, the court in its 
discretion may award the plaintiff treble the amount of damages sus-
tained by him. 
The new Massachusetts statute, G.L. c. 214, §lB, appears sufficiently 
broad to deal with the four above listed categories.11 It is however so 
general in its language that the precise scope of the tort of invasion of 
privacy in Massachusetts is today, as it was before the statute, largely 
a matter of judicial law. 
§11.15. Snow or ice accidents: Notice. G.L. c. 84, §18 requires that 
a person injured as the result of a defect upon the public way shall within 
thirty days thereafter, give to the county, city, town, or person by law 
obliged to keep said way in repair, written notice of the name and place 
of residence of the person injured, and the time, place and cause of said 
injury or damage. While a county, city or town is not liable for injury 
or damage sustained upon a public way by reason of snow or ice, if the 
place of the accident was otherwise reasonably safe,1 said county, city 
or town may be liable where the injury or damage resulted from a defect 
upon the public way even though the presence of ice or snow on the 
public way was a contributing factor in causing the injury or damage.2 
The thirty day notice requirement established by G.L. c. 84, §18 was 
incorporated by reference into G.L. c. 84, §21 relating to actions against 
private persons for injury or damage resulting from the defective con-
dition of their premises or of adjoining ways, when caused by or con-
sisting in part of snow or ice resulting from rain or snow and weather 
conditions. 
The thirty day notice requirement has been strictly applied. Thus, in 
Souza v. Torphy,3 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a cause of action 
for personal injury against the owner of certain premises based on an 
accumulation of ice never came into existence where the notice was not 
given and thus allegations of waiver or estoppel were meaningless. In 
Smith v. Hiatt,4 the court held that the failure to give the required notice 
barred the action even where the defendant was present when the acci-
dent occurred and thus knew of it. 
G.L. c. 84, §18 has been amended so as to add the following sentence: 
"Failure to give such notice for such injury or damage sustained by 
reason of snow or ice shall not be a defense under this section unless 
11 G.L. c. 214, §3A, dealing with the unpermitted appropriation of a person's name 
or likeness for commercial purposes, was unaffected by the enactment of G.L. c. 214, 
§lB, and thus still controls where applicable. 
§11.15. 1 G.L. c. 84, §17. 
2 See Sheehan v. City of Lynn, 269 Mass. 571, 572-73, 169 N.E. 411, 412 (1930). 
3 336 Mass. 584, 147 N.E.2d 157 (1958). 
4 329 Mass. 488, 109 N.E.2d 133 (1952). 
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the defendant proves that he was prejudiced thereby."11 While the 
amendatory language uses the words "under this section" it appears 
reasonably clear that G.L. c. 84, §21 incorporates the language of this 
amendment. No reason appears, relative to this provision, for distin-
guishing between accidents occurring on the public ways and accidents 
occurring on private premises or adjoining ways. To make this point 
clear, however, similar language should perhaps be added to section 21. 
§11.16. Liability of lessor of goods: Warranty despite absence of 
privity. Chapter 670 of the Acts of 1971 amended G.L. c. 106, §2-318 
so as to provide that lack of privity between a plaintiff and a defendant 
shall be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer, 
seller or supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, 
expressed or implied or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not 
purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person 
whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably have ex-
pected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. A manufacturer, 
seller or supplier cannot exclude or limit the operation of the section. 
G.L. c. 106, §2-318 was further amended in 19731 so as to make the 
statute expressly applicable to lessors of goods and to provide that the 
plaintiff's failure to give notice shall not bar recovery under the statute 
unless the manufacturer, seller, supplier or lessor of the goods proves 
that he was prejudiced by the lack of notice. 
G.L. c. 106, §2-318 was again amended in 1974 so as to extend the 
statute of limitations period from two years to three years "next after 
the date the injury or damage occurs."2 This change makes the statute 
of limitations period under G.L. c. 106, §2-318 consistent with the general 
three year period for tort actions and actions of contract to recover for 
personal injury.s 
STUDENT COMMENTS 
§Il.I7. Tort liability of occupien of land: Duty of reasonable care 
established for lawful entrants: M~ey v. Ellt.wd.1 On June 6, 1973, 
the Supreme Judicial Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Tauro, 
abandoned its adherence to the traditional common law distiction in 
II See Acts of 1973, c. 1085. 
§11.16. t Acts of 1973, c. 750. 
2 Acts of 1974, c. 153. 
8 G.L c. 260, 1§2A, 2B, 4, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 777. See discussion 
of chapter 777 at §11.10 supra. 
§11.17. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 871, 297 N.E.2d 43. 
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negligence cases between invitees and licensees and established in its 
place a general duty of reasonable care owed by a land occupier to all 
lawful visitors.2 
The case involved a negligence action brought by a Concord police 
officer who fell on ice while leaving the defendant's premises after deliver-
ing a criminal summons for a parking violation. The Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that the trial court had correctly directed verdicts for the 
defendants as to the several counts of the complaint which had alleged 
gross negligence and wilful, wanton or reckless conduct by the co-owners 
of the premises, because the plaintiff's opening statement had failed to 
include any facts which could substantiate such a finding.8 However, 
in a highly significant move, the Supreme Judicial Court overruled the 
trial court's directed verdicts as to the plaintiff's two counts alleging 
ordinary negligence.4 The trial court had based these latter directed 
verdicts on the traditional common law rules that a policeman is con-
sidered to be a licensee and that a land occupier owes the licensee only 
the duty of refraining from wilful, wanton or reckless conduct. Ordinary 
negligence on the part of the occupier is not sufficient to warrant re-
covery by a licensee, according to traditional common law rules.11 
The court conceded that it could have based its decision on a finding 
that the plaintiff, a police officer, was an implied invitee6 or a member 
of a sui generis category.T However, such a narrowing of focus by the 
court, while it would have resolved the case at hand, would have per-
petuated the myth that the common law distinction between invitees 
2 Id. Throughout this note, the term "land occupier" refen to a person who owns 
or controls real estate. 
8 Id. at 872, 297 N.E.2d at 44. 
4 Id. at 888, 297 N.E.2d at 53. 
II Id. at 872, 297 N .E.2d at 44. 
6 Since the plaintiff was a police officer, the court could have based its decision on 
narrow grounds by holding that a police officer in the pursuit of his duty is an "implied 
invitee" to whom the occupier owes a duty of reasonable care to keep safe the route of 
access to the premises. Id. at 876-78, 297 N.E.2d at 46-47. But the court rejected this 
approach, which would have changed the boundaries of the invitee category, calling it 
an "illogical legal fiction." Id. at 879, 297 N.E.2d at 48. The court preferred to view the 
police officer's entry as it was in reality: "[Police officen] are not invitees because the 
occupier or owner does not have the freedom of choice to admit or exclude them which 
is ordinarily considered an essential element of the invitee classification." Id. at 880, 
297 N.E.2d at 48. 
7 Another option which the court considered and finally rejected was to treat police-
men (and firemen) as sui generis. Id. at 880-81, 297 N.E.2d at 49. In essence that would 
mean creating a fourth category, limited to policemen and firemen; and the land 
occupier would have the duty of reasonable care to the members of that category. 
Such a solution would circumvent the conceptual problem inherent in classifying as an 
"invitee" the plaintiff in this case, who was present on the land to deliver a criminal 
summons. However, as the court notes, this approach tacitly admits the validity and 
viability of the traditional classification system, and the Mounsey court was not ready 
to concede that validity and viability. Id. at 881, 297 N.E.2d at 49. 
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and licensees in negligence actions is still a workable judicial tool. 
Instead, the court chose to sweep away the traditional mechanical system 
of categorization and therefore HELD: "[W]e no longer follow the com-
mon law distinction between licensees and invitees and, instead, create 
a common duty of reasonable care which the occupier owes to all lawful 
visitors.''& The principal result of the decision is to make the criterion 
for judging negligence actions brought against land occupiers by lawful 
visitors the same as the generally applied criterion in negligence cases, 
that of ordinary care. By this decision, Massachusetts no longer grants a 
privileged position in the law of negligence to the land occupier vis-a-vis 
his lawful visitor. 
This note will discuss the significance of the Mounsey decision by 
examining in detail the common law distinctions which the court in: 
Mounsey largely repudiated and by establishing the exact parameters of 
the decision itself. Because so much of the court's holding is dependent 
upon historical analysis, the history of the invitee-licensee-trespasser 
distinction in the law of negligence will be discussed at some length. 
Various qualifications and modifications which have been employed to 
temper the harshness of the traditional classifications will then be con-
sidered, together with the ever-increasing volume of criticism, from the 
bench and in scholarly publications, of the whole system of simplistic 
categories. Finally, the statutes and judicial decisions in other jurisdic-
tions which wholly or partially reject the traditional system will be 
examined and compared with the holding of the Supreme Judicial Court 
in Mounsey v. Ellard. 
The common law system was a deceptively simple one according to 
which the degree of care owed to any entrant upon the land was cor-
relative to what legal type of visitor he was. The land occupier owed to 
the trespasser (i.e.1 "a person who enters or remains upon land in the 
possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's 
consent or otherwise"9) only the duty of refraining from wilful, wanton 
or reckless conduct.1o Similarly the land occupier owed the licensee (i.e.1 
8 Id. at 885, 297 N.E.2d at 51. It should be noted that this language avoids ex-
tending the duty of reasonable care to trespassers, who by definition are not lawful 
visitors. Id. at 885 n.7, 297 N.E.2d at 51 n.7. 
9 Restatement (Seoond) of Torts §!129 (1965). 
10 This is the mle in Massachusetts. See, e.g., Chronopoulos v. Gil Wyner Co., !134 
Mass. 59!1, 1!17 N.E.2d 667 (1956). 
Numerous exceptions and qualifications of this general mle ooncerning liability to 
the trespasser have developed in several jurisdictions; these exceptions and qualifica· 
tions involve, for example, frequent trespassers on a limited area, dangerous activities 
oonducted by the occupier, the disoovered trespasser, and the attractive nuisance doc· 
trine. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §§58, 59 (4th ed. 1971). It should 
be noted that the "attractive nuisance" doctrine has not been reoognized in Massachu-
setts. Smith v. Eagle Cornice Be Skylight Works, 341 Mass. 1!19, 167 N.E.2d 6!17 (1960). 
On liability to trespassers· generally, see Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Com· 
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"a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of 
the possessor's consent"11) only the duty of refraining from wilful, wanton 
or reckless conduct.12 Because a social guest has traditionally been clas-
sified as a licensee,1a regardless of how cordial the invitation, the con-
sequences of this rule of law, in terms of protecting land occupiers from 
negligence actions, have been far-reaching. No less a man and jurist 
than Justice Holmes once summarized the rights of the bare licensee 
in words which, although written without satirical intent, strike the 
modem reader as almost a caricature of a distorted system of justice: 
"No doubt a bare licensee has some rights. The landowner cannot shoot 
him."14 Finally, according to the traditional approach, the land occupier 
owed the invitee (i.e., a person who enters or remains on land as a con-
sequence of a public invitation or who is a business visitor111) the duty 
of ordinary care.1e The duty is an affirmative one: the land occupier 
must protect the invitee from dangers of which he (the occupier) is 
aware and from those which he can discover through the exercise of 
reasonable care. As a result, it has been crucial in most negligence ac-
tions for the plaintiff-entrant to prove that he was an invitee.1'l Various 
parative Survey and Revaluation, 68 Yale LJ. 6!1!1 (1959); James, Tort Liability of 
Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 6!1 Yale L.J. 144 (195!1): Eldredge, 
Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 Temp. L.Q. !12 (19!17). 
11 Restatement (Second) of Torts §!ISO (1965). 
12 An illustrative Massachusetts case is Colbert v. Ricker, !114 Mass. 1!18, 49 N.E.2d 
459 (194!1). On the general question of the licensee's status, see W. Prosser, supra note 
10, §60; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and 
Invitees, 6!1 Yale L.J. 605 (1954); Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, 
Licensees and Trespassers, 69 LQ. Rev. 182, !159 (195!1). 
18 This is the rule of Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. &: N. 247, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 
1856). A typical Massachusetts case following the rule is Comeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 
578, 189 N.E. 588 (19!14). See James, supra note 12, at 611-12. 
14 Reardon v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 267, 268, 21 N.E. 269, 270 (1889). Holmes here 
reflects rather accurately the legal, sociological and moral Zeitgeist of the nineteenth 
century. 
111 (1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor. 
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a 
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public. 
(!I) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a 
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor 
of the land. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §!1!12 (1965). 
16 This was the general rule in Massachusetts prior to the Mounsey decision. See, e.g., 
Huska v. Clement, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 695, 281 N.E.2d 225; Schallinger v. Great Atl. 
&: Pac. Tea Co., !1!14 Mass. !186, 1!15 N.E.2d 655 (1956). 
17 The term "business invitee" is used in some jurisdictions. In Massachusetts, as in 
most jurisdictions, a social guest is treated as a licensee, even though "invited" by the 
land occupier. In Massachusetts, until the instant decision, a land occupier owed his 
social guest only the duty of refraining from gross negligence (except in wrongful death 
actions). See, e.g., Palter v. Zarinsky, !1!18 Mass. 256, 155 N.E.2d 158 (1959); Holiday v. 
First Parish Church, !1!19 Mass. 692, 162 N.E.2d 48 (1959). 
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"tests" have been proposed by scholars and adopted by the judiciary 
for the purpose of determining who was and who was not an invitee.1s 
During the waning years of the feudal epoch, when the common law's 
basic principles were being established, the social and political position 
of the landowner was especially privileged.t9 The power of the Crown 
was far from absolute even over the lands technically beneath its sway; 
like the medieval barons, the landowners in post-medieval times retained 
a real, albeit limited, sovereignty over their land This socially sanctioned, 
privileged position of the land occupier was still very much a reality in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the fundamental axioms 
of our modem law of negligence were first formulated. As a result, there 
developed a series of remarkable immunities which, by substantially 
limiting the degree of care owed by the land occupier to certain classes 
of visitors, shielded him in large measure from the duty of reasonable-
care-under-the-circumstances which the law of negligence imposed on 
most of the rest of society. Professor Bohlen has well described the process 
whereby the privileged status of the land occupier came to be the great 
anomaly in the law of negligence: 
The King's law stopped at the boundary of the owner's sovereign 
territory except in felonies and in trespass actions . . . . When the 
comparatively modern law of negligence reached the relations of 
landowners to persons entering his property, it found the field oc-
cupied by this concept of the owner's right as sovereign to do what 
he pleased on or with his own property. The history of this subject 
is one of conflict between the general principles of the law of negli-
gence and the traditional immunity of landowners.2o 
It is important to emphasize the historical circumstances in which the 
immunities of the land occupier developed, because the basic ratio 
18 See text at notes !19-47 infra. 
19 Concerning the privileged position of the land occupier in the common law and 
the infiuence of that socially sanctioned privilege on the establishment of the invitee, 
licensee and trespasser categories, see Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 
725, 7!15-40 (19!17). Bohlen's article is cited twice by the Supreme Judicial Court in the 
instant case. 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 87!1, 879, 297 N.E.2d at 45, 48. The use made by the 
Mounsey court of the work of Bohlen and other scholars represents a good example of 
the role of historical research in jurisprudence. The court's opinion does not deny that 
the licensee-invitee distinction may once have been a judicially and socially valid ap· 
proach. The court says only that it is not now valid, because it simply does not make 
adequate provision for the complexities of modem society. Id. at 884, 297 N.E.2d at 51. 
Although the court does not discuss the point, perhaps it could be observed that not 
only has the organization of society evolved from an earlier, simpler model, but 
society's perceptions as to what constitutes "justice" have evolved as well. See also Note, 
25 Vand. L. Rev. 62!1, 62!1-26 (1972); Note, Ill St. Louis U.L.J. 449, 450·51 (1969); Com-
ment, 4 VilL L Rev. 256, 257·58 (1958·59). See generally Marsh, supra note 12. 
20 F. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts 16!1 (1926). 
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decidendi of Mounsey is that the circumstances are no longer the same. 
The values of our society are not exactly the same as those of England 
or America of one hundred years ago.21 Society's perceptions change, 
and its values as reflected in its laws vary accordingly. The "almost reli-
gious emphasis on property rights" has yielded to a growing awareness 
that everyone, including the land occupier, has a duty of reasonable care 
towards his "legal neighbors."22 Chief Justice Tauro's opinion in Mounsey 
reflects this relativistic28 and evolutionary view of the common law: 
Perhaps, in a rural society with sparse land settlement and large 
estates, it would have been unduly burdensome to obligate the owner 
to inspect and maintain distant holdings for a class of entrants who 
were using the property "for their own convenience" . . . but the 
special immunity which the licensee rule affords landowners cannot 
be justified in an urban industrial society.24 
It should be emphasized that the leading English and American cases 
which established the immunities of the land occupier and the entrant 
classification system were chronologically prior to the advent of negli-
gence as the principal theory of liability for unintentional torts.25 The 
cases which introduced the crucial distinction between the invitee and 
other lawful entrants are Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal Co.,2o decided in 
21 See, e.g., Long, Land Occupant's Liability to Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 
31 Tenn. L. Rev. 485, 486 (1964): 
The rule of immunity [of the land occupant] developed in a day when the land-
owning class, because of its great wealth, power, and prestige was able to impose 
an almost religious emphasis on property rights and the protection of the success-
ful. 
22 See Lord Atkin's definition in Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (Scot.), 
quoted in note 30 infra. 
23 "Relativistic" is used here to characterize the awareness that a judicial holding, 
however correct and just it may be on the day the case is decided, will not necessarily 
remain valid for all time. As circumstances change and as society's values and expecta-
tions change, the rules of law should be expected to change accordingly. As Justice 
Holmes cogently put it: "[C]ertainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny 
of man .... We do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration 
upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 
10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 466 (1897). 
24 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 884, 297 N.E.2d at 51. 
25 See Comment, 22 Mo. L. Rev. 186, 189 (1957). On the development of the law of 
negligence in general, see W. Prosser, supra note 10, §§28, 52; Gregory, Trespass to 
Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1951); Winfield, Duty in Tortious 
Negligence, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 41 (1934); Winfield, The History of Negligence in the 
Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. Rev. 184 {1926); Note, 13 St. Louis U.L.J. 449, 449-51 (1969). 
26 113 Eng. Rep. 400 (Ex.. 1839). Parnaby established the principle that a duty of 
ordinary care is owed to the business invitee. See Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 
26 Minn. L. Rev. 573, 576 (1942). 
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1889; Southcote v. Stanley,21 decided in 1856; Indermaur v. Dames,28 
decided in 1866; and, in the United States, Sweeny v. Old Colony b New-
port R.R.,29 decided in 1865. It was not until 1883 that the basic prin-
ciples which still govern modern theories of negligence were enunciated 
in the English case of Heaven v. Pender . .ao 
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position 
with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did 
think would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care 
and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he 
would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, 
a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.at 
Rather than follow the full implications of the Heaven v. Pender for-
mula, which would abrogate any special immunities for the land oc-
cupier and would obviate the theoretical basis of what one judge has 
termed "the invitee-licensee-tresspasser trinity,"a2 the English and Amer-
ican courts preferred to accommodate the law of negligence to the landed 
class's expectation of special immunities. The tripartite classification 
scheme (invitee-licensee-trespasser) was the means whereby extensive im-
munities from negligence actions were conferred upon land occupiers. 
As a result, the principal issue in negligence actions against a land oc-
cupier was the legal status (invitee, licensee or trespasser) of the entrant-
27 1 H. Be N. 247, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856). Southcote held that a social guest 
was not to be oonsidered an invitee at law. See Prosser, supra note 26, at 577; Comment, 
22 Mo. L. Rev. 186, 187-89 (1957). 
28 1 LJ.C.P. 272, aff'd, 2 L.J.C.P. !Ill (Ex. 1867). This leading case held that an 
occupier has a duty towards his business invitees to protect them from dangers of 
which he is aware or which he might disoover with reasonable care. See Prosser, supra 
note 26, at 579. 
29 92 Mass. (10 Allen) !168 (1865). Sweeny introduced the tripartite distinction into 
American law. See Prosser, supra note 26, at 581. Sweeny is discussed in Mounsey, 197!1 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 87!1-75, 880, 884, 297 N.E.2d at 45-46, 48, 51. 
30 [188!1] 11 Q.B.D. 50!1, 509 (C.A.). Cf. Le Lievre v. Gould, [189!1] I Q.B. 491 (C.A.). 
See 2 F. Harper Be F. James, Law of Torts 1017 (1956); W. Prosser, supra note 10, §5!1; 
Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 5!1 U. Pa. L Rev. 209, 
!1!17 (1905). 
Another very influential case for the development of ooncepts of negligence and of 
the scope of duty owed is Donoghue v. Stevenson, in which Lord Atkin proposed a 
definition of one's legal neighbor: 
Who, then, in law is my neighbor? The answer seems to be-persons who are so 
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in 
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omis-
sions which are called in question. 
[19!12] A.C. 562, 580 (Soot.). 
81 [188!1] 11 Q.B.D. at 509. 
32 This sardonic expression is Judge Bazelon's. See Daisey v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 
!1!11 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
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plaintiff rather than the degree of care exercised by the land occupier 
in the circumstances. Mounsey represents a movement away from this 
tradition of determining liability on the basis of the visitor's status and 
the introduction into land occupier-entrant relations of the general stan-
dard of reasonable care, as it was originally enunciated in the landmark 
case of Heaven v. Pender. The decision is a good example of the judi-
ciary's examining the common law to eliminate anomalies, which, even 
if justifiable at an earlier point in history, are neither relevant nor de-
fensible in the conditions of modem society. Seen from this historical 
perspective, Mounsey is not an out-of-hand rejection of tradition, but 
an example of the vitality of the common law as manifested by its capacity 
to alter some of its rules as the rules become no longer adequate for a 
society in evolution. 
As one might suspect, the land occupiers' immunities and the "invitee-
licensee-trespasser trinity" were developed and preserved not merely be-
cause of an historical accident, but, in addition, because the English and 
American judiciary quite consciously wished to shield the land occupier 
from the vexation of negligence suits. Bohlen's influential article em-
phasizes the historical and sociological context in which the tripartite 
classification and the attendant immunities developed: 
The English common law from which our American law is derived 
was part and parcel of a social system of which the landholders were 
the backbone. The judges were drawn from the landowning classes 
or hoped to found a landowning family. It was inevitable that in 
such an atmosphere supreme importance should be attached to 
proprietary interests.33 
By means of the tripartite classification system, the courts were able to 
shield land occupiers from the vast majority of negligence suits. Unless 
the plaintiff-entrant fell into the restricted invitee class, he could not 
benefit from the duty-of-ordinary-care standard which had been estab-
lished as the general norm in negligence cases. By thus focusing attention 
on the status o£ the entrant, the key question became not whether the 
land occupier had exercised the ordinary care of a reasonable man, but 
whether the entrant was or was not an "invitee." It frequently was the 
judge who would determine as a matter of law the category to which 
the plaintiff belonged. But even if that determination was left to the 
jury, the focus of attention was still on the plaintiff's legal status, rather 
than on the defendant's acts or omissions. In effect, then, except for 
the limited class of invitees, the jury was prevented from performing 
· its normal role of evaluating the alleged negligence in the light of con-
temporary community standards. The assumption which underlies this 
33 Bohlen, supra note 19, at 735. See also Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. 
Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 Mich. L. Rev. 495 (1923). 
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complex system is, of course, that juries would tend be plaintiff-oriented 
in negligence actions against land occupiers. In the course of his thorough 
historical study, Marsh observed: 
Even if the judges had been mentally prepared to assess the liability 
of the landowner towards visitors simply by reference to the conduct 
of the reasonable man, they would not have been willing to leave 
the landowner to the verdict of a jury belonging, as a general rule, 
to the class of potential visitors to property rather than to that of 
landowners. One would not expect to find this very often or explicitly 
stated; it must be largely a matter of inference from the social history 
of the time.M 
The traditional classification system is an example of what might be 
termed "mechanical jurisprudence." Once the plaintiff's status is deter-
mined, the duty of care owed him is then measured by consulting the 
pre-existing rules-the rules serve the function of legal logarithmic 
tables: to each status category there corresponds a quantum of care owed. 
The "invitee-licensee-trespasser trinity" came to be viewed as an almost 
metaphysically necessary statement of the nature of things. It possessed 
the advantage of symmetry; it protected the interests of the propertied 
classes; and it made for judicial efficiency by obviating the necessity of 
examining the specific circumstantial facts in many negligence actions 
involving land occupiers. Perhaps the most enthusiastic recorded en-
dorsement of the traditional categories is that of Lord Dunedin, who 
observed: 
What I particularly wish to emphsize is that there are the three 
different classes-invitees, licensees, trespassers .... 
Now the line that separates each of these three classes is an abso-
lutely rigid line. There is no half-way house, no no-man's land 
between adjacent territories.acs 
8' Marsh, supra note 12, at 185. Cf. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 
II, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 255, 271 n.56 (1929): 
The negligence formula of reasonable care was slow in taking form; it was vague 
at best. When applied to the infinite situations of the landowner towards persons 
ooming on his land, it seemed to place far more power in the hands of a jury than 
the judges of the middle 1800's were willing to pass over to them •••• 
In this formative period of negligence theory judges found that by classifying 
the persons into various classes they oould more effectively oontrol the power of 
the jury. 
u Robert Addie Be Sons, Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358, 371 (Scot.). 
Contrast this attitude with the view of the Land Reform Committee, the group which 
England's Lord High Chancellor charged with the task of examining the oommon law 
oonceming occupier-entrant liability and whose studies eventually led to the Occupiers' 
Liability Act. The Committee stated: 
There is a certain air of reasonableness in the oonventional distinction [between 
invitee and licensee] when applied to the two simple "stock" examples of a cus-
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Such a system does allow for the facile disposition of many negligence 
cases; however, as a growing number of courts have come to realize, the 
facile disposition of cases cannot always be equated with the just disposi-
tion of cases. The courts became aware that the classic trichotomy was not 
a perfectly adequate or just tool in all circumstances. While not rejecting 
the trichotomy itself, they developed numerous qualifications and excep-
tions in an attempt to soften the rigors of the status system.86 Thus, for 
example, many jurisdictions came to require that the land-occupier who 
is conducting "active operations" on his land must exercise reasonable 
care for the protection of his licensees, and in many jurisdictions he is 
held responsible to make himself aware of the licensee's presence.87 More-
over, the favored invitee class has been artificially widened in many juris-
dictions through the adoption of liberal tests to determine who is an 
invitee at law.ss 
An example of the complexity which resulted from adherence to the 
basic trichotomy is furnished by the dispute between the partisans of the 
economic benefit theory of defining the invitee class and the proponents 
of the invitation theory.s9 The economic benefit theory maintains that 
the basic test for distinguishing between an invitee and a licensee is 
whether the visitor is present on the land to confer an economic benefit 
on the land occupier; if the visitor is there for the occupier's real or 
potential economic benefit, then he is a business invitee and the land 
occupier owes him the duty of reasonable care.4o 
The invitation test, on the other hand, is based on the premise that 
when a land occupier invites the public to enter upon his property there 
is an implied assurance on his part that he has exercised reasonable care 
to see to it that the premises will be suitable for the purposes for which 
the invitation is extended. According to this view, to determine who is 
an invitee, there is no need to inquire as to whether or not the visitor 
tomer entering a shop and a person allowed purely for his own convenience to take 
a short cut across a field. But can it rationally be maintained as a universal distinc-
tion applicable to the whole range of almost infinitely variable circumstances in 
which one person may come upon the premises of another? 
Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. No. 9305, 'II 63 (1954). The Committee 
answered its own question in the negative and called for the abolition of the distinc-
tion between invitee and licensee. Id. 
86 Concerning the various exceptions, see Annot., 32 A~.R.3d 508, 515-20 (1970); 
Note, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 623, 627-29 (1972); Note, 18 DePaul L. Rev. 852, 853-60 (1969); 
Comment, 13 St. Louis U.L.J. 449, 454 (1969); Note, 14 VilL L. Rev. 360, 361-62 (1969). 
87 See W. Prosser, supra note 10, §60, at 279-80. 
ss See Note, 25 Vand. L Rev. 623, 627-29 (1972). 
89 See W. Prosser, supra note 10, at 386-91; Prosser, supra note 26; Comment, 4 Vill. 
L Rev. 256, 258-61 (1958-59). 
40 See note 16 supra. 
30
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/14
§11.17 TORTS 335 
was conferring an economic benefit on the· occupier; it is necessary only 
to establish whether or not the premises were opened to the public.4t 
The first Restatement of Torts followed the economic benefit test and 
was widely criticized as a result.42 The second Restatem~nt in essence 
adopted the public invitation theory.4s 
Massachusetts, although it at one time adhered to the public invitation 
theory,44 has since 1892 used economic benefit as the basic criterion for 
distinguishing between invitee and licensee.411 Further, prior to the deci-
sion in Mounsey, Massachusetts applied the economic benefit test rather 
strictly.46 "There must be a real or apparent intent on the part of the 
invitor to benefit in a business or commercial sense .... "47 
These numerous exceptions, tests, and subcategories produced a highly 
complex, yet still clearly artificial, system. The subcategories and the 
technical verbiage did represent attempts by the courts to free themselves 
from the bondage of an outmoded system, but they were reforms within 
the framework of the common law categories, rather than a bold rejection 
of the categories themselves as inherently unworkable and unjust in a 
modern society. In an important decision, Kermarec v. Compagnie Gen-
erale Transatlantique,48 in which the United States Supreme Court 
declined to introduce the invitee-licensee distinction into maritime law, 
Justice Stewart portrayed the complexities and subtleties of the entrant 
classification system in these words: 
The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee 
and invitee were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, 
a culture which traced many of its standards to a heritage of feudal-
ism. In an effort to do justice. to an industrialized urban society, 
with its complex economic and individual relationships, modern com-
mon-law courts have found it necessary to formulate increasingly 
subtle verbal refinements, to create subclassifications among tradi-
41 However, the social guest is usually classified as a licensee, even in jurisdictions 
which follow the invitation theory. The rationale for this is apparently the lack of an 
implied assurance to the social guest as to the safety of the premises. See W. Prosser, 
supra note 10, §60, at !178-79; Comment, 7 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 31!1 (1966). 
42 Prosser, supra note 26, at 57!1-74, citing Restatement of Torts §3!12 (1932). 
43 See Comment, 7 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. !11!1, !116-17 (1966), citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §3!12 (1958). 
44 Sweeny v. Old Colony & Newport R.R., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368, !174 (1865). 
45 Huska v. Clement, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 695, 281 N.E.2d 225; Comeau v. Comeau, 
285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588 (19!14); Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426, 31 N.E. 128 (1892). 
46 In Bums v. Turner Constr. Co., 402 F.2d !132, !1!15 (1968), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit noted the strictness of the Massachusetts standard for 
determining the status of an invitee. 
47 Zaia v. "Italia" Societa Anonyma di Navigazione, 324 Mass. 547, 549, 87 N.E.2d 
183, 184 (1949). 
48 !158 u.s. 625 (1959). 
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tional common-law categories, and to delineate fine gradations in 
the standards of care which the landowner owes to each .... Through 
this semantic morass the common-law has moved, unevenly and with 
hesitation, towards "imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty 
of reasonable care in all the circumstances."49 
But, apart from the "semantic morass" which they produced, the various 
attempts to mollify the harshness of the common law system were fated 
to prove unsatisfactory, because they represented tacit reaffirmation of the 
essential validity of the classification system itself. The inescapable defect 
of that system was its attempt to force vital reality into predetermined 
molds. Chief Justice Tauro, in Mounsey, speaks of "procrustean efforts 
to fit the circumstances of contemporary life into this archaic and rigid 
classification system."5° As laudable as were these attempts to make the 
classification system less harsh, they all avoided calling into question the 
system itself. 
The frequently absurd or tragic results which the traditional system 
produced were warning signs of the system's inappropriateness to the 
conditions of modern life. For example, the same individual could pass 
from one status to another in the course of a single visit to another's 
property. In a 1963 case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
following the traditional theory, was forced to conclude that a customer 
in a restaurant (and as such an invitee) was transformed into a licensee 
when she left her seat to play the piano, with permission, and subsequently 
fell while leaving the bandstand. 51 A more amusing example of the bizarre 
metamorphosis which a visitor could undergo in the course of a single 
visit to another's property is provided by Braun v. Vallade,o2 a California 
case, in which the plaintiff had been injured by falling through a trap-
door in a saloon. He had entered the saloon to use its toilet facilities, and 
at that point was a mere licensee. However, upon leaving the toilet, "not 
wishing ... to use the convenience of any place without some return,"lis 
the plaintiff ordered a beer; at that point, the former licensee was trans-
formed without further ado into a business invitee to whom the de-
fendants owed the duty of ordinary care. As a result, the plaintiff, who 
was injured after becoming an invitee, had only to prove a breach of that 
duty on the part of the defendants, whereas if he had fallen a short time 
49 Id. at 630-31, quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 245 F.2d 
175, 180 (2d Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion). 
110 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 881, 297 N.E.2d at 49. 
51 West v. Tan, 322 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1963). The disadvantage of a result like this 
one lies not in that the restaurant should have been presumptively considered liable, 
but in that, by the mechanical operation of the categorization system, the jury was 
not allowed to consider all the facts of the case in the light of the reasonable-care-under-
the-circumstances criterion. See Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 426, 430 n.35 (1969). 
112 33 Cal. App. 279, 164 P. 904 (lst App. Dist. 1917). · 
113 Id. at 280, 164 P. at 905. 
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earlier in the very same place, his task would have been much greater. 
Lord Denning has commented ironically on this kind of legal conceptual-
ism: 
A canvasser who comes on your premises without your consent is a 
trespasser. Once he has your consent, he is a licensee. Not until you 
do business with him is he an invitee. Even when you have done 
business with him, it seems rather strange that your duty towards 
him should be different when he comes up to your door from what 
it is when he goes away. Does he change his colour in the middle of 
the conversation? What is the position when you discuss business 
with him and it comes to nothing? No confident answer can be given 
to these questions. Such is the morass into which the law has foun-
dered in trying to distinguish between licensees and invitees.ll4 
That there has long existed a trend away from the common law cate-
gories and towards the application of the standard of reasonable-care-
under-the-circumstances, even in the area of land occupier liability, has 
often been noted.1111 As early as 1937, a commentator described in pic-
turesque terms the slow struggle of the reasonable-care-under-the-circum-
stances criterion to assert itself against the traditional privileges of land 
occupiers: 
During the last half of the nineteenth century and down to the 
present a developing law of negligence has battered continually at 
the gates guarding the immunities of possessors of land Compromise 
after compromise has been effected between the social value of human 
life and the social value of the unrestricted use of land,ll& 
The battering at the gates of which Eldredge spoke has been carried on 
both by the courts of several jurisdictions and by legal writers. Of the 
judicial criticism of the traditional approach, none is more telling nor 
more felicitously worded than that of the United States Supreme Court 
in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, quoted at length 
above.li7 But the Supreme Court has not been the only tribunal to voice 
dissatisfaction with the classification system. Courts in several jurisdictions 
came to realize that the category approach, even with extensive modifica-
tions and exceptions, failed to produce just results in many instances, 
and several judges have criticized the traditional system and its apparent 
symmetry.118 
114 Dunster v. Abbott, [195!1] 2 All E.R. 1572, 1574 (C.A.). 
lili See F. Harper&: F. James, supra note SO, §27.1; Hughes, supra note 10, at 6~!1, 6!14; 
James, supra note 10, at 146; Note, 47 Cornell L.Q. 119, 126 (1961); Comment, 1!1 St. 
Louis U.LJ. 449, 45!1·55 (1969); Comment, 4 Vill. L Rev. 256, 26!1-68 (1958-59). 
118 Eldredge, supra note 10, at !14. 
liT See text at note 49 supra. See also Jones v. United States, !162 U.S. 257, 266 (1959). 
liS See, e.g., Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955), where the oourt, although 
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However, the surest indication of judicial discontent with the tradi-
tional trichotomy is the complicated system of subclassifications, excep-
tions, qualifications and refinements which various courts have super-
imposed on the pristine symmetry of the original three categories. The 
Mounsey court mentions as one of the bases for its holding these endless 
attempts to harmonize the categories with a reality that is by definition 
resistant to categorization: 
Instead of challenging the efficacy of a classification that establishes 
immunities from liability which no longer comport with modern 
accepted values and common experience, many courts have carved 
out special exceptions to the licensee rule or made procrustean efforts 
to fit the circumstances of contemporary life into this archaic and 
rigid classification system.G9 
Even more acerbic than the judicial criticism of the entrant-classifica-
tion scheme has been the massive assault by scholarly writers on both the 
theoretical foundation and the practical application of the traditional 
system.60 The following statement is representative of the views expressed 
in numerous law review articles and treatises: 
It is submitted that the true test of the possessor's liability should 
be based on foreseeability of harm to others without regard to the 
terms, "trespasser," "licensee" or "invitee." They tend only to add 
exceptions and confusions to the law . . . . It is time to abolish 
these outdated classifications, and to allow the general principles of 
negligence law to determine the liability of possessors of land on an 
objective case-to-case basis. 61 
The critics are in general agreement that the tripartite classification 
system is a relic of an era whose social organization and values were 
radically different from our own. Although there are divergent views as 
to the relevance and utility of the trespasser category, there is virtual 
unanimity among the scholars that the licensee-invitee distinction is 
counterproductive in that it frequently prevents the reasonable care 
standard from being applied in cases of alleged negligence. 
maintaining the traditional rule that a social guest is to be treated as a licensee, noted 
nonetheless that it does not view the traditional system as "so inflexible as to preclude 
recovery where the facts merit an exception." Id. at 451. See also Fernandez v. Consoli-
dated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 7! (1950), where the traditional ap-
proach is described as "unrealistic, arbitrary and inelastic." Id. at 96, 219 P.2d at 76. 
69 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 881, 297 N.E.2d at 49. 
60 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 10; McDonald &: Leigh, The Law of Occupiers' 
Liability and the Need for Reform in Canada, 16 U. Toronto L.J. 55 (1965); Comment, 
25 Vand. L. Rev. 62! (1972); Comment, 1! St. Louis U.LJ. 449 (1969); Comment, 4 Vill. 
L Rev. 256 (1958-59); Note, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 599 (1958); Comment, 22 Mo. L. Rev. 
186 (1957). 
61 Note, 18 DePaul L. Rev. 852, 861 (1969). 
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However, not until the late 1950's did the first breakthrough occur. 
In England, as a result of growing dissatisfaction with judicial decisions 
based on the traditional distinctions, the Law Reform Committee was 
charged with studying the whole question of the land occupier's liability 
to a visitor to his property. The Committee concluded that the licensee-
invitee distinction was counterproductive and should be abolished: "[The 
categories of licensee and invitee] tend to embarrass justice by requiring 
what is essentially a question of fact to be determined by reference to an 
artificial and irrelevant rule of law."82 As a result of the Committee's 
report, Parliament enacted, in 1957, the Occupiers' Liability Act,ea the 
most essential provisions of which state: 
(1) An occupier of premises owes the same duty, the "common 
duty of care", to all his visitors .... 
(2) The common duty of care is a duty to take such care as in all 
the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor 
will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for 
which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there.84 
The effect of the statute was to abolish the common law distinction 
between licensees and invitees, at least insofar as those categories were 
automatically determinative of the degree of care owed the entrant.81i 
The fact that the social guest has been considered a licensee has been 
the most criticized aspect of the invitee-licensee, either-or approach to 
negligence. However, in this country only one state has chosen to change 
the status of the social guest through legislation. In 1963, Connecticut 
enacted the foll9wing statute: "The standard of care owed to a social 
invitee shall be the same as the standard of care owed to a business 
invitee."88 One wonders why other state legislatures have not enacted 
similar, or even more sweeping, measures to obviate the great problems 
occasioned by the common law classification scheme. Whatever may be 
the explanation for this legislative inactivity, in the United States it has 
been the courts of several jurisdictions, and not their legislatures, which 
82 Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cm.d. 9!105, 'd 7!1 (1954). 
88 5 Be 6 Eliz. 2, c. !II (1957). The Act became effective on Jan. 1, 1958. For oomments 
on the Act, see Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 Modern L Rev. !159 (1958); 
McDonald Be Leigh, supra note 60, passim; Note, 14 Viii. L Rev. !160, !16!1-65 (1969). 
84 5 Be 6 Eliz. 2, c. !11, 12 (1957). 
8li The Occupiers' Liability Act has had an influence on several American jurisdic-
tions. It is cited, for example, in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 44!1 P.2d 561, 
568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968); and in Mounsey, 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 885-86 n.8, 
297 N.E.2d at 52 n.8. 
88 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §52-557a (Supp. 1969). 
By virtue of a judicial holding rather than a statute, Louisiana in 1957 determined 
that IIOciaJ. guests are owed the same duty of care as are business invitees. Alexander v. 
General Fire Be Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 7!10 (La. 1st Cir. Ct. App. 1957). 
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have "battered continually at the gates guarding the immunities of 
possessors of land."8T 
Although it is an admiralty case and without precedential value for 
the law of negligence of the several states, the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Kermaree v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique88 
has served as an important catalyst in the movement away from the com-
mon law distinctions; it is almost invariably cited in the decisions abrogat-
ing those distinctions.8D Kermarec was a negligence action brought by the 
social guest of a crew member aboard a vessel berthed in New York City. 
The guest fell on one of the ship's stairways and alleged in his complaint 
that his fall and resultant injuries were caused by a defect in the stair-
way.To Applying the substantive law of New York, the District Court for 
the Southern District of New York instructed the jury that Kermarec 
was a gratuitous licensee and that he could recover only if he proved the 
defendant had prior actual knowledge of the defect and had failed to 
warn the plaintiff thereof. The jury found for the plaintiff, but the trial 
judge set aside the verdict and dismissed the complaint on the grounds 
that there was no proof of prior knowledge by the defendant of the 
dangerous condition. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court 
ruled that the case would be decided by the standards of maritime laW' 
and that the licensee-invitee distinction of the common law should not 
be imported into maritime law. Rather, the standard should be one of 
due care under the circumstances. n Accordingly, the Court remanded 
the case to the District Court 'With instructions to reinstate the jury's 
verdict for the plaintiff. Kermarec can be said to have sounded the death 
knell for the traditional immunities of the land occupier. 
In 1963, the Supreme Court of Washington, while specifically avoiding 
the general question of whether or not to abolish the traditional catego-
ries-approach, held that an occupier has a duty of reasonable care to avoid 
injuring one on the land with the occupier's permission and of whose 
presence the occupier is (or should be) aware.T2 That case involved a 
social guest of the occupier-defendant who was injured by a golf club 
swung by the defendant. TS The trial court had found a lack of ordinary 
87 Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 Temp. L.Q. 82, ll4 (19!17). 
88 858 u.s. 625 (1959). 
89 See, e.g., Moumey, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 881, 886, 297 N.E.2d at 49, 52: Smith v. 
Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 100-01 (D.a Cir. 1972): Peterson v. Balach, 294 
Minn. 161, 170-71, 199 N.W.2d 6!19, 645-46 (1972): Pickard v. City Be County of Honolulu, 
51 Hawaii 184, 185-!16, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (1969); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 
116, 44!1 P.2d 561, 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1968). 
TO The plaintiff also alleged unseaworthiness of the vessel, but the dismissal of this 
claim by. the district court was upheld by the Supreme Court, although on different 
grounds. 858 U.S. at 629. 
Tl Id, at 682. 
'fll Potts v. Amia, 62 Wash. 2d 777, 787, !184 P.2d 825, 851 (1965). 
Ta Id. at 778, !184 P .2d at 826. 
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care on the part of the defendant but had held for the defendant none-
theless, since, according to the common law rules, the occupier has no 
obligation to exercise reasonable care towards the licensee.74 
Then, in 1968, a progressive American court, that of California, mani-
festing dissatisfaction with the half-hearted compromises of so many other 
courts, decided to revise radically the norms governing this part of the 
law of negligence. In Rowland v. Christian,'11i the Supreme Court of 
California rejected the traditional requirement that the status of the 
plaintiff be determined before any evaluation of his allegations of negli-
gence: 
We decline to follow and perpetuate such rigid classifications. The 
proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land 
..• is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a 
reasonable man i:p. view of the probability of injury to others, and, 
although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee 
may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some 
bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.78 
The plaintiff in Rowland was a social guest of the defendant; it was 
alleged that the plaintiff was injured by a defective faucet handle in the 
defendant's apartment, and that the defendant was aware of the defect. 
The trial court had granted a summary judgment for the defendant on 
the basis of the old rule that a social guest is a licensee. The state supreme 
court reversed, on two grounds, one statutory.,., and the other judicia1.78 
Although the action in Rowland was brought by a social guest, the 
'74 Id. 
'71i 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). The case has received wide-
spread attention. See especially W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §62, at !198-
99 (4th ed. 1971): Comment, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 62!1 (1972): Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 
426 (1969); Note, 49 B.U.L Rev. 198 (1969). 
'76 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. 
'7'7 The statutory grounds were the provisions of Cal. Civil Code §1714 (West 197!1): 
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an 
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of his property or person except so far as the latter has willfully or by want 
of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself •••• 
Because of the existence of this old but long ignored statute in Californa, it might 
be argued that the result in Rowland v. Christian could not have been obtained in a 
jurisdiction which had no similar statute. However, a close reading of Rowland reveals 
that the court based its holding on §1714 and on its judgment that the common law 
classifications had become socially disfunctional; in other words, it is probable that 
the California court would have reached the same result even without §1714. See Com-
ment, 44 N.Y.U.L Rev. 426, 4!12 (1969). 
78 The decision criticizes the great number of complex distinctions and exceptions, 
which have made the traditional system highly unwieldy, and it maintains that the 
common law distinctions are irrelevant and counterprod!Jctive in modern society. 69 
Cal 2d at 117, 44!1 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at lOll. 
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decision did not limit itself to abolishing the licensee-invitee distinction, 
but also declared that the land occupier shall have no special immunity 
in an action for negligence brought by a trespasser.79 In every instance, 
status may help to determine whether the defendant has complied with 
the reasonable man standard, but status will not be automatica:Ily deter-
minative of the quantum of care owed. In essence, Rowland calls for a 
case-by-case evaluation of all the relevant factors in every negligence 
action brought against a land occupier.8o 
Since 1968, several other American jurisdictions have followed the lead 
of Rowland v. Christian and have either wholly or partially abrogated 
the common law classification scheme. The year after Rowland v. Chris-
tian, the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Pickard v. City & County of Hono-
lulu81 reached a similar conclusion as to the irrelevancy of the common 
law categories in modern society. In a brief decision, the court expressed 
its belief that "the common law distinctions between classes of persons 
have no logical relationship to the exercise of reasonable care for the 
safety of others"82 and held that the occupier owes a duty of reasonable 
care to "all persons reasonably anticipated to be upon the premises, 
regardless of the legal status of the individual."8s The plaintiff in Pickard, 
who had been injured while using a restroom in a courthouse with 
permission, was at least a licensee according to the traditional system; 
but the language of the court in Pickard would seem to suggest the 
abolition of all the common law categories. However, a later decision 
of the Supreme Court of Hawaii implies that the Pickard decision abol-
ished only the licensee-invitee distinction.84 
Colorado is another jurisdiction where "[a] person's status as a trespas-
ser, licensee or invitee may ... have some bearing on the question of 
79 Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. Since the plaintiff in Rowland 
was clearly a social guest, the court's abolition of the trespasser category is dictum. 
It is dictum, however, which indicates the mind of the majority of the justices of the 
California Supreme Court in 1968; whether a future court will one day abolish the 
trespasser category in negligence, as a specific holding, remains to be seen. Ironically, 
if the Rowland decision had been less sweeping, the court might well have been pre-
sented with a negligence case involving a trespasser and would have been able to hold 
that a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances is owed the trespasser. The effect 
of the dictum in Rowland is to make it unlikely that such a case will present itself 
as long as the majority in Rowland continues to constitute a majority of the court. 
See Note, 49 B.U.L. Rev. 198, 204-05 (1969). 
80 In addition to status, the Rowland court lists the following as some of the poten-
tially relevant factors in determining liability: "the closeness of the connection between 
the injury and the defendant's conduct, the moral blame attached to the defendant's 
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, and the prevalence and availability of 
insurance .... " 69 Cal. 2d at ll7, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103. 
81 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969). 
82 Id. at 135, 452 P .2d at 446. 
88 Id. 
84 Gibo v. City &: County of Honolulu, 52 Hawaii 299, 301, 459 P.2d 198, 200 (1969). 
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liability, but it is only a factor-not conclusive."811 The supreme court's 
opinion iii Mile High clearly indicated that the plaintiff's legal status 
was not irrelevant in the determination of liability, but at the same time 
it stressed that status was not to be conclusively determinative. 
In Peterson v. Balach,86 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the 
plaintiff's status as an invitee or licensee87 is not determinative of the 
occupier's liability, but is one factor among others to be considered in 
determining whether the occupier exercised reasonable care under the 
circumstances.88 The court reversed the trial court's directed verdict for 
the defendant, because the directed verdict was based on a finding that 
the plaintiff's decedent had been a social guest (and, therefore, a licensee) 
to whom the defendant owed no duty of inspection or of care to make 
the premises safe. 
In 1972 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided the 
case of Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., and thereby abolished the 
common law classification system in its entirety.s9 The case involved 
injuries sustained by a Health Inspector when he allegedly fell on 
slippery metal steps while inspecting the defendant's restaurant in the 
course of his official duties. Rather than decide whether the plaintiff 
should properly be classified as a business invitee or as a licensee, the 
court decided to follow what it termed "the modem trend" and held: 
Rather than continue to predicate liability on the status of the 
entrant, we have decided ... to apply ordinary principles of negli-
gence to govern a landowner's conduct: A landowner must act as 
a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe 
condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood 
of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden 
of avoiding the risk.DO 
The decision abolished the special immunities which depend on the 
entrant's status. The court does require that "the circumstances of the 
visitor's entry have some relation to the question of landowner liability,"91 
especially because of its relation to foreseeability. However, it is the 
holding in Smith that "the status of an entrant onto the property is not 
solely determinative of the duty of care owed him."92 
811 Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 808, 814-15 (Colo. 1971). 
81 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 689 (1972). 
87 The Peterson oourt specifically declined to rule on the viability of the tres-
passer category because of its oonception of judicial restraint and its desire that such 
a decision be made only in an adversary context. Id. at 164, 199 N.W .2d at 642. 
88 Id. at 167, 178-75, 199 N.W .2d at 648-44, 647-48. 
89 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
90 Id. at 100. 
91 Id. at 106. 
92 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Mounsey v. Ellard is a less sweeping decision than those of the courts 
of California and the District of Columbia in that it mandates a duty 
of reasonable care on the part of the land occupier only towards lawful 
visitors.oa The court made it clear that it wished to leave undisturbed 
the category of trespasser and the concomitant duty of the land occupier 
to refrain only from wilful, wanton or reckless conduct with respect to 
unlawful visitors: 
We feel that there is significant difference in the legal status of 
one who trespasses on another's land as opposed to one who is on 
the land under some color of right-such as a licensee or invitee. 
For this reason, among others, we do not believe they should be 
placed in the same legal category. For example, one who jumps over 
a six foot fence to make use of his neighbor's swimming pool in his 
absence does not logically belong in the same legal classification as 
a licensee or invitee.94 
The Massachusetts court, by preserving the trespasser classification, is 
precluding the application of the reasonable-care-under-the-circumstances 
standard to cases where the plaintiff is a trespasser; in those cases the 
old mechanical rules will still be operative.911 But one may conjecture that 
the legal reasoning which underlies the decision in M ounseyoo will one 
98 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 885, 297 N.E.2d at 51. The Occupiers' Liability Act in 
England likewise leaves unchanged the trespasser category and the very restricted 
liability of the land occupier towards the trespasser. See 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. lll (1957). See 
also Payne, supra note 63, at 359-60. The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Peterson v. 
Balach specifically refrained from ruling on the status of the trespasser. 294 Minn. 161, 
164, 199 N.W .2d 639, 642 (1972). However, the Minnesota court specifically stated that 
it was refraining because of its conception of judicial restraint; it would prefer to delay 
ruling on the trespasser category until it is confronted with a case involving that 
specific issue, with full adversary argument as to the merits and defects of the common 
law rules regarding trespassers. Id. Unlike the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
the Minnesota court did not in any way intimate its present attitude concerning pos-
sible changes in negligence law regarding trespassers. 
94 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 885 n.7, 297 N.E.2d at 51-52 n.7. The court mentions and 
clearly rejects that portion of Rowland v. Christian which places trespassers on the same 
level before the law as licensees and invitees. "[W]e are not persuaded as to the logic 
and reasoning in Rowland v. Christian ••• in placing trespassers in the same legal 
status as licensees and invitees." Id. 
911 The court does suggest, however, that the harshness of the old rules regarding 
trespassers may one day be somewhat mitigated, at least in some circumstances: "The 
possible difference in classes of trespassers is miniscule compared to the others. These 
differences can be considered when they arise in future cases." Id. But the general tone 
of this portion of the opinion would not seem to indicate that an early abolition of the 
trespasser category in its entirety should be expected. 
96 The following is a good example of the jurisprudential considerations which are 
the ultimate basis of the Mounsey decision: 
The problem of allocating the costs and risks of human injury is far too complex 
to be decided solely by the status of the entrant, especially where the status ques-
tion often prevents the jury from ever determining the fundamental question 
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day lead to a realization that a trespasser should not be automatically 
denied recovery (except in the event of wilful, wanton or reckless con-
duct) simply because he is a trespasser, but rather that all the relevant 
facts of each case should be scrutinized-including, of course, the fact 
that the plaintiff's presence on the land was or was not reasonably 
foreseeable by the land occupier,97 Justice Kaplan's concurring opinion 
in Mounsey voices the belief that the court's preservation of the tres-
passer category "seems unfaithful to the rest of the opinion."9S He con-
tends that the trespasser category, like the two categories which are 
abolished in Mounsey, frequently serves to prevent an evaluation by the 
trier of fact of the actual circumstances of each individual case. "[I]t is 
sometimes just as hard to distinguish trespassers from licensees or invitees, 
as to distinguish licensees from invitees .... The very effort at dry classifi-
cation and differentiation puts the emphasis at the wrong places."99 
On the other hand, since the plaintiff in Mounsey was certainly not 
a trespasser,100 if the court had abolished the trespasser category along 
with the other two, that aspect of its decision would arguably have been 
mere dictum. In any event, the court makes it clear in footnote 7 of its 
decision that the present court is not prepared to hold that a trespasser 
is owed the duty of ordinary care under the circumstances. 
The Mounsey decision will doubtless provoke debate as to whether 
it reflects a proper exercise of the judicial function. In this regard, two 
questions must be considered: first, should not such fundamental changes 
in the common law be reserved to the legislative branch; and second, was 
so sweeping a ruling necessary and appropriate in this case. Chief Justice 
Tauro's opinion carefully points out that the decision in no sense repre-
sents an arbitrary ukase on the part of the Supreme Judicial Court. In 
addition to citing statutory and judicial modifications of the common 
law distinctions in other jurisdictions,101 the opinion underlines the 
whether the defendant has acted reasonably in the light of all the circumstances 
in the particular case. 
197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 885, 297 N.E.2d at 51. There does not appear to be any inherent 
reason why considerations of this nature should not apply with equal cogency to the 
situation of the trespasser. 
97 Chief Judge Bazelon, in Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., has noted how 
artificial the "trespasser" label frequently is: 
With urbanized society comes closer living conditions and a more gregarious popula-
tion. The trespasser who steps from a public sidewalk. onto a private parking lot 
today is not the "outlaw" or "poacher" whose entry was both unanticipated and re-
sented in the nineteenth century. It is contrary to reason to accept as a settled 
principle of law that a parking lot owner actually varies his conduct according to 
the status of those who walk across his boundaries. · 
469 F.2d at 102-0!1. 
98 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 896, 297 N.E.2d at 57-58. 
98 Id., 297 N.E.2d at 57. 
100 Id. at 875, 297 N.E.2d at 46. 
101 Id. at 884-88, 297 N.E.2d at 51-5!1. 
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rational basis for the significant change in the law of negligence which 
it is effecting. It emphasizes that the invitee-licensee distinction must be 
seen against an evolving historical and sociological background; while 
the distinction may have been appropriate in an earlier and very different 
society, the court says, it "cannot be justified in an urban industrial 
society."l02 In so deciding, the court is not usurping the Legislature's 
function. The Legislature of the Commonwealth could have enacted a 
statute to change the former common law classification system, and the 
Legislature remains free to alter, if it chooses, what the court has done 
in Mounsey v. Ellard. All that the court has done in the instant case 
is to correct what it perceives to be a grievous defect in the common law 
of negligence, and the common law is by its very nature of judicial 
origl.n.1oa 
The second question was in fact posed and responded to, in the nega-
tive, in the partially dissenting opinion of Justice Quirico (with whom 
Justice Reardon joined). The dissenters would have held that a land 
occupier owes a public official who must use the access routes to the 
occupier's house in the performance of his official duties the duty of 
keeping those access routes in reasonably safe condition; in this perspec-
tive the public official is tre!J.ted as an implied invitee of the occupier. 
On these narrow grounds, they would have granted the plaintiff in the 
instant case a new trial, since the plaintiff-police officer had been classified 
as a licensee by the trial court. Since, as the court's opinion concedes,lO<& 
the case could have been decided simply by holding that the plaintiff was 
an implied invitee to whom was owed the duty of ordinary care, the 
dissenters maintained that it should have been decided on those narrow 
grounds; they contended that the court's opinion exceeded the neces-
sities of the case at bar,101S and that therefore its abolition of the invitee-
, licensee distinction is mere dictum. The majority opinion, however, 
anticipated objections of this nature, saying that the real issue presented 
by the Mounsey case was the plaintiff's status and that therefore the court 
was not exceeding the necessities of the case in its holding that status was 
no longer to be the sole determinant of the degree of care owed by the 
land occupier: "We are not here dealing with 'general expressions.' On 
the contrary, we are deciding the sole issue raised, namely, the legal 
102 Id. at 884, 2f1] N.E.2d at 51. 
lOB See Pede., The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 
48 Minn. L Rev. 265 (196!1). This is a good discussion of the criteria for determining 
whether a given problem area is best remedied by legislative or by judicial intervention. 
The author specifically indicates that the reform of the law relative to occupier liability 
is appropriate for judicial action, and he adds that the courts have been "woefully 
inadequate" in responding to the call for reform in this area. Id. at ll09. See also 
Sideman v. Guttman, liS App. Div. 2d 420, 4!10, lll!O N.Y.S.2d 26ll, 272-7!1 (1972); Fried-
mann, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 Colum. L Rev. 821 (1961). 
1M 197ll Mass. Adv. Sh. at 878, 297 N.E.2d at 47. 
lOIS Id. at 889-91, m N.E.2d at 54-55. 
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status of the plaintiff. We do this by abolishing the distinction between 
licensees and invitees .... "1°6 The court's opinion said that to resolve 
the case by simply classifying this plaintiff as an invitee would by that 
very fact perpetuate the myth that the invitee-licensee distinction is a 
valid and just judicial tool, whereas the court has come to view it as 
outmoded and unnecessarily harsh, unworthy of an enlightened legal 
system. toT 
It may be objected that in abrogating the former strict standards for 
classification as an invitee and by greatly extending the group to whom 
a duty of reasonable care is owed, the court's decision will induce many 
people to arrange collusive suits, in order to profit from insurance 
coverage. There may indeed be an increase in the number of fraudulent 
claims as a result of the Mounsey decision. However, it is suggested that 
such a possibility should not prevent the judiciary from making a judg-
ment which it considers just and necessary; the judiciary may properly 
look to the law enforcement agencies of government to combat abuses of 
this sort. Moreover, the old system was by no means insulated from collu-
sion and mendacity. As the Supreme Court of Minnesota observed, with a 
judicial smile: "In states following the financial benefit theory [for deter-
mining invitee status], the percentage of people injured in a depot rest-
room who had 'intended to buy a magazine' is phenomenal."lOB 
The Mounsey decision specifically disclaims an intention to make land-
owners and occupiers the insurers of their property against injuries 
incurred by visitors.1oo However, it seems probable that the availability 
of insurance in contemporary society has removed a major obstacle from 
the path of those who favor abolishing the traditional immunities and 
replacing them with a duty of reasonable care.uo 
It is difficult to predict just what will be the ultimate effect of the 
Mounsey decision. Certainly, it will give greater prominence to the jury's 
role in the resolution of negligence cases;111 there will no longer be 
directed verdicts based simply on the plaintiff's status (with the significant 
106 Id. at 886 n.9, 297 N.E.2d at 52 n.9. 
107 Id. at 878-81, 297 N.E.2d at 47-49. 
108 Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 170, 199 N.E.2d 639, 645 (1972). 
109 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 887, 297 N.E.2d at 53. 
no See Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Reevaluation, 68 
Yale L.J. 633, 690-91 (1959), and the numerous references cited there; see also W. 
Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society 126-64 (1959). 
111 Although directed primarily at the question of duties owed to the trespasser, 
Hughes' comments about the jury's function in negligence cases are of wider relevance: 
No amount of cautionary tales can ultimately obscure the realization that we must 
either trust the jury or get rid of it. One cannot afford to sympathize for long with 
the view that a legal system must carry the burden of fictitious and obscurantist 
doctrine in order to keep vital issues away from that tribunal which was consti-
tuted to decide them. 
Hughes, supra note llO, at 700 (footnote omitted). See also Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 
426, 430-31 (1969). 
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exception of trespassers, for whom the law is as yet unchanged in Mas-
sachusetts). It will be for the jury to apply contemporary community 
standards to the facts of each individual case. 
We believe that the reasonable care standard will give the jury the 
flexibility they need to assess the burden of liability on the facts 
of each case and in accordance with community standards as to what 
constitutes acceptable behavior on the occupier's part.112 
The Mounsey decision will not leave the jury without any norms by 
which to determine whether the defendant has exercised reasonable care 
under the circumstances; it merely eliminates the former mechanical 
system according to which the land occupier's duty was determined 
uniquely on the basis of the entrant's status. To some extent status will 
still be relevant in the determination of liability, even if the magic words 
of "licensee" and "invitee" are no longer used. 
Our decision merely prevents the plaintiff's status as a licensee or 
invitee from being the sole determinative factor in assessing the 
occupier's liability. However, the foreseeability of the visitor's pres-
ence and the time, manner, place and surrounding circumstances of 
his entry remain relevant factors which will determine "in part the 
likelihood of injury to him, and the extent of the interest which 
must be sacrificed to avoid the risk of injury."US 
In the light of this language, it is clear that the visitor's status has not 
become an irrelevant factor in determining liability. It is no longer 
determinative, per se, of the degree of duty owed, but it remains one of 
the elements which must be considered in a determination of what con-
stitutes reasonable care under the circumstances. 
The basic jurisprudential significance of Mounsey v. Ellard is that it 
represents a vigorous judicial reaction to mechanical rules of jurispru-
dence. The common law tradition has always shown readiness to confront 
reality and to consider the unique characteristics of each case that presents 
itself for resolution. The common law has traditionally avoided sweep-
ing, abstract generalizations and preferred instead a more concrete, case-
by-case approach. Seen in this light, Mounsey is a re-affirmation of this 
basic characteristic of the common law. As the court suggests, the entrant 
classifications and the land occupier immunities may have been justified 
in an earlier day and in a simpler society, but they "cannot be justified 
in an urban industrial society."114 Implicit in this observation is the 
112 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 887-88, 297 N.E.2d at 58. 
118 Id. at 887, 297 N.E.2d at 52-58, citing Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 
F.2d at 106. 
114 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 884, 297 N.E.2d at 51. Cf. Marsh, The History & Com-
parative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. Rev. 182, 198 (1953): 
Even if in the nineteenth century it was held on particular facts that in the absence 
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premise that as social conditions change, the law must change accordingly 
or risk becoming mechanistic, harsh, and irrelevant. Mounsey v. Ellard 
represents a significant effort by an important American court to free 
itself from the domination of intellectual abstractions in the form of 
legal categories and to focus instead on the real facts of each individual 
case. nil 
Perhaps the best concluding comment on Mounsey v. Ellard and the 
evolutionary view of the common law which the Supreme Judicial Court 
adopted in that opinion is provided by an observation of Judge Bazelon 
in the .Arbaugh's Restaurant case: 
It is the genius of the common law that it recognizes changes in 
our social, economic, and moral life. Legal classifications . . • are 
judicial creations which should be cast aside when they are no 
longer useful as controlling tools for the jury. The principle of 
stare decisis was not meant to keep a stranglehold on developments 
which are responsive to new values, experiences, and circumstances. us 
Wn.u.AM P. RoBINSON III 
§11.18. Governmental immunity from tort liability: Private nuisance 
actions: Morash iY Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth.1 A landowner, Morash 
8e Sons, Inc. (Morash), filed a petition in superior court seeking to enjoin 
the Commonwealth from storing road salt at a Department of Public 
Works (DPW) storage depot, and seeking to recover damages resulting 
from contamination of the corporation's water supply.a Petitioner's land 
abuts three parcels maintained by the Commonwealth on which the DPW 
has stored salt for nearly fifty years.a Morash alleged that the road salt 
from the depot had infiltrated the subsoil so as to pollute its water supply 
and damage its plumbing systems:' The DPW refused to acknowledge 
responsibility and failed to take corrective action.ll 
of an act of commission there was no liability, a duty may nevertheless arise in 
the very different social and economic conditions of a century later. 
1111 Criticizing the tendency of legal SJStems to let quarrels about labels replace 
serious analytical examination of the complexities of the real world, Leon Green has 
observed: 
Word ritual under one guise or another has always been one of the primary 
methods of law administration, and the development of the uses made of words 
is one of the most puzzling of studies. We can scarcely realize the part which sacred 
words, taboo words, magic words, continue to play in our law. 
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 1014, 1016 (1928). 
118 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d '17, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1'172) (footnotes 
omitted). 
§11.18. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 785, 296 N.E.2d 461. 
2 Id. at 785, 296 N.E.2d at 462. 
3 Id. at 785-86, 296 N.E.2d at 462. 
' Id. at 786, 296 N.E.2d at 462. 
II ld. 
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Morash contended that the Commonwealth's use of the land constituted 
a private nuisance and that the Commonwealth should consequently be 
held liable in tort. The argument was based on three separate theories: 
(1) that the Commonwealth had abrogated its sovereign immunityG in 
tort as well as in contract by the provisions of section 1 of chapter 258 
of the General Laws;'~' (2) that municipalities in the Commonwealth are 
liable for maintaining private nuisances and there is no logical reason 
why the Commonwealth should not, similarly, be held liable for its 
nuisances;& and (3) that as a matter of sound public policy, the common 
law doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort liability should be abolished 
in Massachusetts.& The Commonwealth raised the affirmative defense of 
sovereign immunity, and it further asserted that sovereign immunity 
could be abrogated only by statute and that section 1 of chapter 258 of 
the General Laws did not allow a tort, as distinguished from a contract, 
claim against the Commonwealth.to The trial court ruled as a matter of 
law that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was an absolute defense in 
answer to the Morash complaint.u Morash appealed and the Supreme 
Judicial Court reversedt2 
The court adhered to the traditional construction of the statute under 
which Morash brought its action and consequently denied the petitioner's 
contention that the statute waived the Commonwealth's sovereign im-
8 The Morash case is strictly an attack on the sovereign immunity of the Common-
wealth. The rourt, however, focused ita attention on the merit of governmental im-
munit~vereign immunity of the state and municipal immunity-since the two are 
inextricably related. See Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Mass. 28, lll, 
24 N.E. 854, 856 (1890). For purposes of this note, "municipal immunity" will refer 
to the immunity ronferred upon a political subdivision of the state, "sovereign im-
munity'' will refer to the immunity of a state or federal government, and "governmental 
immunity" will enrompass both municipal and sovereign immunity. 
'l 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at '186, 296 N.E.2d at 462. G.L c. 258, §1 provides: 
The superior rourt, except as otherwise expressly provided, shall have jurisdic-
tion of all claims at law or in equity against the rommonwealth. Such claims 
may be enforced by petition stating clearly and concisely the nature of the claim 
and the damages demanded . • • . 
Whether this statute is merely jurisdictional or whether it incorporates a litnited waiver 
of sovereign immunity is irrelevant, since the providing of a forum to hear claims 
against the Commonwealth would be a meaningless gesture unless it assumed that 
the Commonwealth is not immune in at least some suits. 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at '18'1, 
296 N.E.2d at 46!1. 
8 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at '186, 296 N.E.2d at 462. 
9 Id., 296 N.E.2d at 462-6!1. 
10 Id., 296 N.E.2d at 46!1. The Commonwealth based ita defense on earlier decisions 
which had construed G.L. c. 258, §1 as pertnitting only rontract actions to be brought 
against the state. See text at note ll9 infra and cases cited in note 45 infra for examples 
of these earlier decisions. 
11 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at '185, 296 N.E.2d at 462. 
12 Id. at '196, 296 N.E.2d at 468. 
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munity in tort as well as in contract.1s However, in a bold step, the court 
discarded an assumption, which had pervaded Massachusetts common 
law dating back to 1879,14 that the Commonwealth's consent to be sued 
must be obtained from the Legislature; the court then asserted that it 
had the power to abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity.111 Most 
importantly, the court found persuasive the petitioner's argument that 
since there was no logical reason to hold a municipality liable for private 
nuisances maintained on its land and not to hold the Commonwealth 
liable for nuisances maintained on state lands, an exception ought to be 
created to the rule of sovereign immunity.1G It was therefore HELD: since 
the court has the power to limit or abolish the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, it has decided to create an exception to the rule of sovereign 
immunity, which renders the Commonwealth liable in tort if it maintains 
a private nuisance which causes injury to the real property of another.n 
Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Judicial Court, asserting that 
it preferred that the Legislature accomplish reform of the governmental 
immunity doctrine by a comprehensive statute, chose to carve out an 
exception to the sovereign immunity rule only in cases such as the case at 
bar-that is, cases in which the complained-of action of the Common-
wealth can be classified as a private nuisance.1s 
The Morash decision is significant because the court, for the first time, 
created a judicial exception to the rule of sovereign immunity in Mas-
sachusetts. In addition, the court sounded the death-knell of sovereign 
immunity by vigorously condemning the doctrine,19 and calling for its 
total abrogation by the Legislature.2o 
Initially, this note will examine governmental immunity in Massachu-
setts, looking first at the development of sovereign immunity, that is, 
the immunity of the state, and then at the history of municipal immunity. 
Withi this development of governmental immunity as a backdrop, the 
18 Id. at 788, 296 N.E.2d at 465. 
14 Troy Be Greenfield R.R. v. Commonwealth, 127 Mass. 4S (1879). For a discussion of 
this case, see text at note 52 infra. 
111 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 796,296 N.E.2d at 468. 
16 Id. at 788, 296 N.E.2d at 464. 
1T Id. at 786, 296 N.E.2d at 465. 
18 Id. at 791, 796, 296 N.E.2d at 465, 468. 
19 The oourt is relentless in its criticism, finding that "the immunity doctrine is 
logically indefensible." Id. at 791, 296 N.E.2d at 465-66. In addition, the oourt stated: 
The judge made exceptions [to the sovereign immunity doctrine) reflect a 
partial and piecemeal adjustment by the oourts of a doctrine that, if applied in 
all cases indiscriminately, would bring about some unjust results. We have shown 
that the exceptions ••• are not based upon sound legal principles or sound public 
policy. 
Id. at 795, 296 N.E.2d at 467-68. 
20 Id. at 795-96, 296 N.E.2d at 468. 
.. 
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action of the Morash court, in carving out an exception to the immunity 
doctrine ·and, ,next, in deferring to the Legislature as to the work oif 
further reform of governmental immunity, will be analyzed. Finally, this 
note will conclude by proposing that the court, by prospectively over-
ruling the doctrine of governmental immunity, would have enhanced 
the possibility of achieving a timely and comprehensive reform of that 
doctrine. 
While the concept of sovereign immunity is of uncertain origin21 it 
certainly had become a vital doctrine in England by medieval times.22 
The idea underlying the doctrine seems to have its roots both in the 
theory that "the King can do no wrong,"23 and in the feeling that it is 
a contradiction in terms to allow a sovereign to be sued as a matter of 
right in his own courts.24 Clearly, the immunity of the King from juris-
diction in his own courts was purely personal. Consequently, sovereign 
immunity would seem incompatible with a democratic system of govern-
ment where sovereignty rests in the people. Despite the difficulties in 
reconciling this royal prerogative with a democratic system of govern-
ment,211 the immunity notion was adopted from the English crown by the 
American states.2e 
21 See Parker, The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadministration, 5 Vand. 
L. Rev. 167 (1952). 
21 See Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 Yale L.J. I, 17 (1926). 
23 I W. Blackstone, Commentaries 245-46 (T. Cooley lid ed. 1884). 
24 See Borchard, supra note 22, at 38; Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against 
the Crown, 38 L.Q. Rev. 141, 142 (1922). 
211 It has been suggested that the unstable financial position of the states following 
the Revolutionary War was a factor in the adoption of sovereign immunity by the 
states. Gellhom Be Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal GOvernment, 47 Colum. 
L. Rev. 722 (1947). 
28 The United States Supreme Court led the American states in the adoption of 
sovereign immunity by recognizing that the concept was implicit in the Eleventh 
Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in 1798 in reaction to the contro-
versial Supreme Court decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). In 
Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina brought a contract action in the United States 
Supreme Court against the state of Georgia to recover a debt. The Court, confronted 
with the issue of whether such a suit would lie against a state, construed Art. III, §2 
of the United States Constitution (which provides that the "judicial Power shall extend 
to • • • Controverises • . • between a State and Citizens of another State • • • .'') so as 
to allow the suit. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420. Widespread dissatisllaction with this decision 
prompted the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, which limited the judicial 
power of the United States by prohibiting suits by citizens of one state against another 
state. U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although the amendment was confined to action in 
federal courts and to suits by citizens of one state against another state, its effect seems 
to have been to establish the sovereign immunity of the states. See Cohens v. Virginia, 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821). The Court throughout the nineteenth century 
upheld the immunity of sovereignty from suit when the suit was brought against the 
United States. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850). Similarly, 
the Court upheld claims of sovereign immunity when actions were brought against 
individual states. See, e.g., Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858). The 
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The idea of the immunity of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
first appeared in the case of Sewall v. Lee,21 decided in 1812. There a 
widow had brought an action against a grantee of the Commonwealth to 
recover her dower interest in her husband's property, which had been con-
fiscated by the state under a conspiracy law.zs Without expressly referring 
to the concept of sovereign immunity, the court suggested that the 
widow had no remedy at law against the Commonwealth, since the state 
was immune from suit.29 The first explicit reference to the sovereign 
immunity enjoyed by the Commonwealth came later, in 1865, in the case 
of Briggs v. Light-Boat Upper Cedar Point.so In Briggs, the court was 
confronted with the asserted immunity of the federal government when 
it was asked to enforce a lien upon a vessel of the United States to recover 
the cost of labor and materials used in its construction. Dismissing the 
petition, the court made the following statement, technically dictum: 
In the United States, it has always been held an essential attribute 
of sovereignty in a state not to be liable to be sued without its own 
consent; and that consent has not usually been given except in special 
cases. The law of this commonwealth affords sufficient examples. The 
general principle that the state cannot be sued, at law or in equity, 
is perfectly well settled.s1 
The notion of sovereign immunity was authoritatively confirmed in 1879 
by Chief Justice Gray in Troy & Greenfield Railroad v. Commonwealth.82 
The Commonwealth lent the railroad $2,000,000 to enable it to construct 
a tunnel and required the railroad to mortgage its system to secure pay-
ment of the loan. Later, at the request of the Commonwealth, the railroad 
surrendered the property to the state, so that the state could complete 
the urgently needed tunnel. This surrender was qualified by the rail-
road's retention of a "right to redemption" in its property. Upon com-
pletion of the tunnel, the railroad sought to redeem its property by 
influence of the Eleventh Amendment on the establishment of sovereign immunity 
was rhetorically expressed by Justice Bradley in 1890: 
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was under-
stood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal 
courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states . . . was indignantly 
repelled? 
Hans v. Louisiana, 1!14 U.S. I, 15 (1890). 
27 9 Mass. !16!1 (1812). 
28 Id. at !164. The property was confiscated under the provisions of an act which 
authorized the confiscation of the property of several named persons (including the 
husband of the plaintiff in Sewall) because of conspiratorial acts committed by them 
in connection with the Revolutionary War. 
29 Id. at !169-70. 
80 9!1 Mass. (11 Allen) 157 (1865). 
81 Id. at 174. 
82 127 Mass. 4!1 (1879). 
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bringing a bill for an accounting of the debt owed by the railroad to the 
state, and offered to pay such a sum. Declaring that "[i]t is a fundamental 
principle of our jurisprudence, that the Commonwealth cannot be im-
pleaded in its own courts, except by its own consent clearly manifested 
by act of the Legislature ... ," the court dismissed the bill.83 This state-
ment has been cited over a period extending nearly a century for the 
view that sovereign immunity is surrendered only by an expression of 
legislative consent.84 
Subsequent to the finding of sovereign immunity in the Troy & Green-
field R.R. decision, there have been legislative enactments whose effect has 
been to impose liability upon the Commonwealth under specified cir-
cumstances. In 1893 an enactment was passed which allowed recovery 
against the state for injuries sustained as a result of certain highway 
defects,85 Earlier, in 1879, the Legislature passed a bill that imposed 
liability upon the state for claims "founded on contract for payment of 
money."86 Following passage of this act, disputes arose over the construc-
tion of the statute, in which the breadth of the requirement, "contract 
for payment of money," was tested.37 The court refused to allow claims 
for damages against the state where the claim did not arise out of an 
actual contract for the payment of money. Consequently the statute was 
amended in 1887 (which amendment will hereinafter be referred to as 
the 1887 Amendment) to provide that "[t]he superior court shall have 
jurisdiction of all claims against the Commonwealth, whether at law or 
in equity ... ,"88 The latitude of this amendment was soon established. 
In 1890 the court decided Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Commonwealth,B9 
a tort action against the Commonwealth brought pursuant to the 1887 
Amendment. An agency of the Commonwealth had leased a storage room 
situated directly above plaintiff's place of business. The weight of the 
88 Id. at 46, 50. 
84 See, e.g., George A. Fuller Co. v. Commonwealth, 303 Mass. 216, 220, 21 N.E.2d 
529, 531 (1939); Public Serv. Comm'rs v. New Eng. Tel. 8c Tel. Co., 232 Mass. 465, 471, 
122 N.E. 567, 569 (1919); Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Mass. 28, 29, 
24 N.E. 854, 855 (1890); Wesson v. Commonwealth, 144 Mass. 60, 61, 10 N.E. 762, 765 
(1887). 
85 Acts of 1893, c. 476, §13 (now G.L. c. 81, §18). 
86 Acts of 1879, c. 255, §1. 
37 In Wesson v. Commonwealth, 144 Mass. 60, 10 N.E. 762 (1887), the Commonwealth 
had contracted to provide pauper labor, supervision and a work area at an almshouse. 
After the house was destroyed by fire, the Commonwealth did not replace the facility, 
and plaintiff sued on the contract. The court held that the contract, not being for 
the "payment of money," did not fall under the coverage of the statute. Id. at 62, 10 
N.E. at 765. Later, a town brought an action under c. 255, §l seeking to recover for 
the support of a state pauper. The court refused to construe the statute as supporting 
a claim founded on a statutory duty. Inhabitants of Milford v. Commonwealth, 144 
Mass. 64, 65-66, 10 N.E. 516, 517 (1887). 
88 Acts of 1887, c. 246 (now G.L. c. 258, §1). 
89 152 Mass. 28, 24 N.E. 854 (1890). 
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items stored in the room caused the floor to settle, and plastering on 
plaintiffs ceiling to fall, resulting in damage to his goods and an interrup-
tion of businessfo The court decided that the statute, despite its ap-
parently comprehensive language, did not permit the institution of an 
action in tort against the Commonwealth upon the rationale that if the 
Legislature had intended to extend the Commonwealth's liability to tort 
claims it would have done so in express terms.41 Rather, the Murdock 
court held that the 1887 Amendment, conferring jurisdiction on the 
superior court for claims against the Commonwealth, applied only to 
contractual claims.42 
In summary, the Troy and Murdock decisions became the comer-
stones of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as established in Massachu-
setts. For eighty-three years they were continually followed in the Com-
monwealth as precedent for denying recovery. The Troy decision has 
been recognized for the proposition that sovereign immunity bars recovery 
against the Commonwealth, unless the Legislature has consented to suit.48 
Correspondingly, the Murdock result-that, aside from highway defect 
legislation,44 the Legislature has consented only to contract actions 
brought against the state-has been consistently followed.411 
A parallel study of the development of municipal, as distinguished from 
sovereign, immunity from tort liability reveals a judge-made rule that 
originated in an early English case, Russell v. Men of Devon.46 In Russell 
an action was brought against the inhabitants of the county at large for 
damage which was done to a wagon of the plaintiff due to a county 
bridge being out of repair. The court held that the action would not lie 
because: (I) the legislature had not organized defendants into a corpora-
tion; (2) even if the defendants are considered a corporation, there is no 
fund out of which to satisfy the claim; and (3) although there is a legal 
principle which permits a remedy for every injury resulting from the 
neglect of another, a more applicable principle is that it is better that an 
individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an 
inconvenience.47 
40 Id. at 28, 24 N.E. at 855. 
41 Id. at !12, 24 N.E. at 856. 
42 Id. at !11, 24 N.E. at 855. 
43 See, e.g., George A. Fuller Co. v. Commonwealth, !10!1 Mass. 216, 220, 21 N.E. 2d 
529, 5!11 (19!19); William J. McCarthy Co. v. Rendle, 222 Mass. 405, 406, Ill N.E. !19, 
40 (1916); McArthur Bros. Co. v. Commonwealth, 197 Mass. 137, 1!18, 83 N.E. !1!14 (1908); 
Nash v. Commonwealth, 174 Mass. 335, !1!18, 54 N.E. 865, 866 (1899). 
44 See note 35 supra. 
411 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 619, 627, 142 N.E.2d !147, !152 
(1957); Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. Commonwealth, 318 Mass. 88, 92, 60 N.E.2d !164, 
367 (1945); Benjamin Foster Co. v. Commonwealth, 318 Mass. 190, 192, 61 N.E.2d 147, 
149 (1945); Glickman v. Commonwealth, 244 Mass. 148, 150, 138 N.E. 252, 253 (1923); 
Burroughs v. Commonwealth, 224 Mass. 28, 29, ll2 N.E. 491, 492 (1916). 
46 100 Eng. Rep. !159 (K.B. 1788). 
41 Id. at !162. 
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In 1810 municipal immunity from tort liability was introduced in 
Massachusetts in Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks b Canals on Merri-
mack River.'s In that case, the court dealt with the question of whether 
an action of trespass could be brought against a privately owned corpora-
tion. In disposing of the case, the court distinguished in dictum the 
liabilities of "proper aggregate corporations" from those of municipalities, 
so-called "quasi-corporations," by relying upon the rationale of the Russell 
decision.'e It was suggested that no private action could be maintained 
against a municipality for breach of its corporate duty, unless authorized 
by statute, since the municipality had no corporate fund to satisfy any 
judgment rendered against it.11o Two years later an opportunity was pre-
sented to apply the doctrine of municipal immunity as suggested in the 
Riddle opinion. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicesterlll involved a tort action 
brought against the town for damages to the plaintiff's horse which were 
caused by a fall on a defective town bridge. Referring to the Russell 
case, the court ruled that it was well-settled that municipalities, created 
by the Legislature for public purposes, are not liable for their neglect 
unless recovery is legislatively sanctioned,ll2 The Mower court, by thus 
adopting the dictum from the Riddle decision, firmly established the con-
cept of municipal immunity, though it suggested that the foundation 
for municipal immunity derived from the fulfillment of a legislative 
mandate.C1B 
The Mower rule of municipal immunity was applied and refined nearly 
fifty years later in Bigelow v. Inhabitants of Randolph.114 In this 1860 
decision, the town was sued for negilgence in maintaining a dangerous 
excavation in a school yard which resulted in injury to a pupil,llll The 
court, in finding no liability, distinguished municipal acts which are 
immune from liability for resulting harm from those which incur liability. 
Duties which are imposed on a municipality by the Legislature and which 
are exclusively for public purposes-"governmental" duties-were found 
to be immune from liability for the reasons given in the Mower decision. lis 
48 7 Mass. 169 (1810). 
49 Id. at 186-87. 
IIO Id. at 187. 
Ill 9 Mass. 247 (1812). 
112 Id. at 249. 
liB The reasoning behind the Russell decision was never applicable in Massachusetts. 
The defendant town in Mower, unlike that in Russell, was inoorporated, had a oorporate 
fund providing for raising of funds for town purposes and the means of enlarging it 
by taxation. See Fuller Be Casner, Municipal Tort Liability In Operation, 54 Harv. L. 
Rev. 4!17, 438 (1941). One explanation for the language in Mower might be that 
municipalities had no funds that oould legally be used to pay tort judgments since 
the expenditure of municipal funds is limited to legislatively sanctioned purposes. 
Cf. Coolidge v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 114 Mass. 592, 599 (1874). 
114 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 541 (1860). 
1111 Id at 541-42. 
116 See text at note 52 supra. 
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On the other hand, duties which the municipality assumes for its own 
private benefit-later identified as "commercial" duties-were found to 
be subject to liability for resulting harm,ll7 While the test for determining 
what constitutes a governmental as opposed to a commercial duty has 
been modified over the past century, the distinction first enunciated in 
Bigelow remains as the basic criterion in determining municipal im-
munity or liability.118 
117 80 Mass. (14 Gray) at 54!1. 
118 The test for determining the governmental versus commercial character of a muni-
cipal function or act has, generally been modified over the past century by incorporating 
two additional elements into the test as set forth in Bigelow. In Hill v. City of Boston, 
122 Mass. !144, !177 (1877), the court, in dicta, suggested that the pecuniary consequences 
of an act are important in determining whether the act is commercial or governmental 
in character. This criterion was refined in Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225 Mass. !187, 
114 N.E. 722 (1917), where the court, confronted with the question of whether a small 
fee charged at public baths changed their character to commercial, explained that the 
fact that a charge is made in connection with a public enterprise is not always conclu-
sive that the enterprise is commercial. The question in each case is whether the mone-
tary aspect changes the character of what would otherwise be a purely governmental 
function. Id. at !192, 114 N.E. at 724. A second modification to the Bigelow test was 
handed down in Tindley v. City of Salem, 1!17 Mass. 171 {1884). Until Tindley, munici-
pal immunity was conditional on whether the Legislature had imposed a duty on the 
municipality. In Tindley the City had voluntarily undertaken a function with legislative 
approval. The court discarded the distinction between legislatively imposed acts and 
legislatively permitted acts and held the municipality immune. Id. at 175. 
Thus the present test of municipal immunity from tort liability is whether the act was 
done in the performance of a public function, imposed or permitted by the Legislature, 
without the element of special corporate profit or pecuniary gain. Orlando v. City of 
Brockton, 295 Mass. 205, 207-08, 5 N.E.2d 794, 796 (19!16). 
Application of this test to the complex interrelationships of municipal functions has 
inevitably led to decisions grounded in factors relating to municipal management, 
finance and accounting, rather than on accepted principles of tort law. For instance, the 
municipal management of an officer may be determinative of liability in a tort action. 
A municipality escapes liability for the wrongful acts of its officers when it permits 
them to exercise their own judgment in executing their governmental powers. If, how-
ever, a municipality takes the work out of the hands of its public officers upon whom the 
duty is imposed by law, then the persons who are selected to do the work become agents 
of the municipality, and the municipality is liable for their torts. Ryder v. Town of 
Lexington, 30!1 Mass. 281, 289, 21 N.E.2d !182, !187 (19!19). Liability for carrying on a 
particular enterprise can tum on the financial gain derived from it. An injured person 
may recover against a municipality because of the fortuitous circumstance that the 
injury was caused by the activities of the water department, which is operated for a 
profit, rather than the fire department, a non-profit activity. Compare D'Urso v. Town 
of Methuen, 558 Mass. 75, 155 N.E.2d 655 (1958), with Pettingell v. City of Chelsea, 
161 Mass. 568, !17 N.E. 580 (1894). Accounting factors have been found to be crucial in 
a determination of liability. If a single municipal officer, whose work is divided between 
performing the governmental functions and commercial functions of the town, injures 
someone, the liability of the municipality will depend on which hat the officer was 
wearing at the time of the injury. Ryder v. City of Taunton, !106 Mass. 154, 158, 27 
N.E.2d 742, 745 {1940). 
Determinations of liability upon these principles have created extreme difficulty in 
borderline cases in charging a tort to a particular activity, and have led to many ir-
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Aside from the exception to the rule of municipal immunity pro-
pounded by the Bigelow decision, both legislative and judicial exceptions 
have developed which have imposed liability on municipalities regardless 
of whether the complained-of municipal conduct was governmental or 
commercial in character. The Legislature has imposed liability on the 
municipality for damages caused by certain defects in streets and ways,119 
for damage caused by riots8o and for unlawful exclusion from school;81 
and there are several statutes permitting municipalities to indemnify 
certain officers or employees.82 
The courts, on the other hand, have created another basic exception 
to the doctrine of municipal immunity-that of private nuisance. The 
development of this exception began as early as 1855, when the Supreme 
Judicial Court allowed recovery against a municipality in Lawrence v. 
Inhabitants of Fairhaven.88 There the town had maintained a bridge and 
a dam across a stream bordering plaintiff's land in such a condition as to 
cause flooding of his property. Without discussing municipal tort im-
munity, the court found that the town had a duty to maintain its bridge 
and dam in a condition so as to allow free flow of the stream; the court 
imposed liability for failure to meet that duty. The nuisance exception 
to municipal immunity was again invoked in 1891 in Miles v. City of 
Worcester,84 where the court clarified the reasoning behind the nuisance 
reconcilable and inequitable decisions. For example, liability usually follows negligence 
of a municipality in the construction or maintenance of sewers. See Green v. Town of 
West Springfield, !12!1 Mass. !1!15, 81 N.E.2d 819 (1948). But see O'Hearn v. Town of 
Adams, 288 Mass. 185, 192 N.E. 524 (19!14). Ordinarily there is liability for water depart-
ment work. See Sloper v. City of Quincy, !101 Mass. 20, 16 N.E.2d 14 (19!18). But see 
Reynolds Boat Co. v. City of Haverhill, !157 Mass. 668, 260 N.E.2d 176 (1970). Ordinarily, 
no municipal liability arises out of negligent maintenance of a traffic light pole. See 
Whalen v. Worcester Elec. Light Co., !107 Mass. 169, 29 N.E.2d 76!1 (1940). However, work 
relating to street lights can incur liability. See Dickinson v. City of Boston, 188 Mass. 
595, 75 N.E. 68 (1905). For a thorough presentation of many of the refinements and 
exceptions made to the rule of municipal tort immunity, see Hardy, Municipal Law 
and Practice, in 18A Massachusetts Practice §§ 1051·62, at !146-58 (2d ed. 1971). 
119 Acts of 169!1-94, c. 6, §6 (now G.L c. 84, §15, c. 229, 11). 
80 Acts of 18!19, c. 54, 1§2-!1 (now G.L c. 269, §8). 
81 Acts of 1845, c. 214 (now G.L c. 76, §16). 
82 A number of indemnity provisions have been passed by the Legislature which 
permit a municipality to indemnify its officers and employees upon whom liability might 
be imposed in their individual capacities, which would ordinarily-in the absence of 
municipal immunity-be imputed under the principle of respondeat superior to impose 
liability on the municipality. For instance, G.L c. 40, 15(1) permits towns to purchase 
insurance policies to indemnify employees against loss from certain claims against them; 
G.L c. 41, §§lOOA, lOOD permit cities and towns to indemnify officers and employees 
against claims against them arising from their operation of municipal vehicles; G.L. 
c. 41, §lOOC permits cities and towns to indemnify school department employees against 
claims arising out of acts performed within the scope of their employment. 
88 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 110 (1855). 
84 154 Mass. 511, 28 N.E. 676 (1891). 
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exception. The city had built a restraining wall between a schoolhouse 
lot and plaintiffs property. Over the course of several years the wall 
encroached upon the plaintiffs land. Plaintiff sued the city on a nuisance 
theory.611 In Miles liability was imposed upon the city despite the fact 
that the wall had been built pursuant to performance of a governmental 
function and under the authority of the general laws.66 The court rea-
soned that the public use and general benefit will not justify the physical 
invasion of the property of another. If more land were needed it must 
be taken by eminent domain and compensation must be paid. But if a 
city unintentionally encroaches upon private property, the encroachment 
becomes a nuisance for which the city is liable in a private action.&7 
This nuisance exception to the municipal immunity rule was created 
because the strong common law policy of protecting the use and enjoy-
ment of privately owned property was thought to outweigh considerations 
underlying the general theory of municipal tort immunity.6s This case 
crystallized the nuisance exception to the municipal immunity rule. 
Thereafter municipalities were held liable for their nuisances regardless 
of whether they were created as a consequence of commercial or govern-
mental acts. 
The same legal arguments, though imposed on a different fact situation, 
were made in a recent nuisance case, Kurtigian v. City of Worcester.69 
Kurtigian was a tort action brought on a nuisance and a negligence theory. 
The plaintiff, while working in his yard, was injured when struck by a 
limb blown from a tree on the adjoining premises.7o The City of Worces-
ter was considered the owner of the premises, since it had taken that 
property for the nonpayment of taxes. The Supreme Judicial Court 
rejected the argument that the city could not be held liable since title to 
the property was held incidental to the city's governmental function of 
collecting taxes,n on the grounds that: 
[P]ublic policy in a civilized community requires that there be some-
one to be held responsible for a private nuisance on each piece of 
real estate, and, particularly in an urban area, that there be no oases 
of nonliability where a private nuisance may be maintained with im-
punity.Tll 
As a result of the Kurtigian decision, the nuisance exception to municipal 
immunity retained its vitality, and the policy arguments espoused in 
611 Id. at 512, 28 N.E. at 676. 
86 Id. at 51!1, 28 N.E. at 677. 
61 Id. 
68 See Fuller &: Casner, supra note 5!1, at 44!1-44. 
69 !148 Mass. 284, 20!1 N.E.2d 692 (1965). 
70 Id. at 285, 20!1 N.E.2d at 69!1. 
11 Id. at 287-88, 20!1 N.E.2d at 694. 
7ll Id. at 291, 20!1 N.E.2d at 696. 
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K urtigian in support of the exception loomed as an invitation for exten-
sion of the exception into the sovereign immunity area. As a consequence 
of this development, the reach of municipal immunity from tort liability 
extends only to those municipal acts which are governmental in character 
or are not subject to liability under a statutory provision or under the 
nuisance execption. 
With this historical development of governmental tort immunity as a 
backdrop, the action of the Morash court will now be examined. The 
court, by drawing an analogy to municipal immunity, carved out an 
exception to the immunity of the Commonwealth from tort liability, and 
imposed liability on the Commonwealth for its private nuisances.7a In 
doing so, the court suggested that sovereign immunity might be further 
narrowed in the future by continued analogy to the doctrine of municipal 
immunity. Consequently, sovereign immunity might extend only to those 
actions of the Commonwealth which, if done by a municipality, would 
warrant municipal immunity. However, contrary to this suggestion, the 
Morash court limited its holding to the facts of the case74 and spoke 
disparagingly of the exceptions to the rule of municipal immunity,76 
implying that the tortious acts of the Commonwealth, aside from nui-
sances, will continue to enjoy sovereign immunity. A third suggestion 
regarding the future of sovereign immunity in Massachusetts can also be 
inferred from the opinion. By first establishing its power to abolish the 
doctrine of governmental immunity, and then harshly criticizing govern-
mental immunity and calling for its abolition by the Legislature, the 
court intimated that it might, itself, abolish the doctrine if the Legislature 
fails to do so in ·the near future.76 In summary, the Morash case registers 
a significant impact upon Massachusetts law. The court while recognizing 
the present vitality of sovereign immunity, established the power of the 
judiciary to abolish sovereign immunity and exercised that power in 
creating an exception to sovereign immunity which imposed liability 
on the Commonwealth for its private nuisances. In so doing, the Morash 
court left uncertain the future viability of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity in Massachusetts. 
78 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 786, 296 N.E.2d at 46!1. 7' The court declared that "governmental immunity • • • can be discarded by the 
courts and we do so now to the limited extent of holding that the Commonwealth is not 
immune from liability if it creates or maintains a private nuisance ••• ," Id. at 791, 
296 N.E.2d at 465. 
711 Id. at 791, 296 N.E.2d at 466. 
76 The court lays a foundation for the possibility of judicial overruling of governmen-
tal immunity in the future by announcing: "[W]e have no doubt as to our power to 
abolish that doctrine." Id. at 796, 296 N.E.2d at 468. Further, the court mentioned twice 
that "at this time" it should not abrogate the doctrine. Id. at 795-96, 296 N.E.2d at 468. 
As a further indication that it might later abolish sovereign immunity, the court 
stated that the legislature "should be afforded an opportunity'' to abolish the doctrine. 
Id. at 795, 296 N.E.2d at 468. 
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An analysis of the Morash decision revealS that it can be criticized for 
its determination that the court may properly abolish sovereign immunity, 
without a legislative expression of consent. It might be argued that the 
legislative enactments waiving sovereign immunity in only certain types 
of actions embody a legislative intention to retain immunity in all other 
types of actions. The only legislative expression of consent to suit, apart 
from the statute which imposes liability for damages arising out of certain 
highway defects, is the 1887 Amendment which, as interpreted in the 
Murdock decision77 and affirmed in Morash,1s imposed liability on the 
Commonwealth only in contract actions. Thus, it would not be unfair 
to draw the conclusion that the 1887 Amendment embodied the policy 
of preserving the immunity of the Commonwealth from tort liability. 
Under such an analysis, the court's finding that it had the power to 
abolish sovereign immunity-which was based on the contention that 
sovereign immunity was a judicially created doctrine-would be mistaken. 
Further, the partial abrogation of sovereign immunity in Morash could 
be viewed as being in direct conftict with legislative intent and, accord-
ingly, beyond the proper function of the judiciary.79 
Closer analysis, however, indicates that Morash can be supported in its 
determination that the court might properly abolish sovereign immunity. 
Over the past two centuries the General Court has waived sovereign im-
munity in only two specific areas-contract claims and claims arising out 
of certain highway defects. The last of these pronouncements from the 
Legislature came over eighty years ago. This does not clearly present a 
situation where the Legislature has adopted a judicial interpretation, but 
simply a situation where two separate statutes, each operating in a 
distinct area of sovereign immunity, have dealt with facets of the doc-
trine. The statutes mean only what they say, that is, in the specific areas 
indicated the immunity of the Commonwealth is waived. Legislative 
intent, where discernible, should govern. But in the 1887 Amendment 
the Legislature expressed no intent about the basic doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. That legislative silence should not require that the effect 
of the statute be felt beyond its clear bounds.so The Massachusetts legis-
77 See text at note !19 supra. 
78 See text at note l!J supra. 
79 The Florida Court of Appeals, in Buck v. McLean, 115 So.2d 764 (Fla. App. 1959), 
adhered to such a limited view of the role of the judiciary: 
[A] proper administration of justice invites respect for the admonition of Alex-
ander Hamilton, who once wrote that oourts "must declare the sense of the law: 
and if they should be disposed to exerc:ile Will instead of Judgmn&t, the oonse-
quences would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legisla-
tive body." If, therefore, a change in the long established rule of immunity 
prevailing in this State is to be made, it must oome • • • by constitutional amend-
ment, or by enactment of appropriate legislation, or both. 
Id. at 768. 
so See Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 218·19, 359 P.2d 457, 461, 11 
Cal. Rptr. 89, 9!1 (1961). 
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lators were at no point confronted with approval or disapproval of the 
whole doctrine. The manner- in which the Legislature dealt with a facet 
of sovereign immunity in the 1887 Amendment was entirely consistent 
with leaving the basic doctrine of sovereign immunity to the courts to 
resolve,81 Where the court acts without the benefit of discernible legisla-
tive intent, it· does not usurp legislative power. If courts could not so 
. act, the common law would stagnate. The court was, therefore, acting 
within its prerogatives in restricting the defense of sovereign immunity. 
It is therefore submitted that the court's determination that it was 
empowered to abolish sovereign immunity was justifiable. 
Next, the decision of the court to deny the affirmative defense of sov-
ereign immunity to the state in a private nuisance action might be at-
tacked substantively on the strength of the historical arguments in support 
of sovereign immunity. The earliest argument employed as a defense 
of the immunity doctrine rests on the theory that when the individual 
sovereign was replaced by the broader conception of a state government 
in the United States, the immunity idea persisted under the rationale 
that to allow a suit against a ruling government without its consent 
was inconsistent with sovereign power.n Under this reasoning no court 
can have jurisdiction over the sovereign, since jurisdiction implies superi-
ority of power. The Morash decision may therefore be criticized for 
impinging upon the Commonwealth's sovereignty by subjecting the state 
to the control of the courts. However, this argument is without merit. 
To blindly ascribe to a democratic government the prerogatives of medi-
eval monarchs disregards the very nature of a democratic system of 
government. If the notion . of sovereign immunity ever had a place in 
the Commonwealth, it certainly has none today. In general, courts have 
criticized the idea that "the King can do no wrong'' as an anachronism 
in a modem democracy.sa 
81 The Supreme Judicial Court has reoognlted that municipal immunity is simply 
an exercise of sovereign immunity by the municipalities as agents of the state. Murdodt 
Parlor Grate Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Mass. 28, !11, 24 N.E. 854, 856 (1890). Legislation 
restricting the immunity of municipalities has been enacted a: number of times. See 
notes 59-62 supra and acrompanying text. Concurrently, the judiciary has created many 
exceptions to the rule of municipal immunity, and has even imposed liability for acts 
arising out of governmental functions of a municipality. See note 58 supra and text at 
notes ·64-72 mpra. That in the field of municipal immunity-whie!h is analytically an 
arm of sovereign immunity-the court has work-ed alongside the Legislature in creating 
exceptions to the immunity doctrine fa persuasive in determining ·that in the field of 
sovereign immunity, the Legislature, by limiting _certain phases of sovereign immunity, 
did not intend to close the doors of the murt to judicial reforin of the doctrine. 
82 See te!Ct at note 2!1 supra. See ·also Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. !149, !15!1 
(1907), for a discussion of Justice Holmes' view of the sources of sovereign immunity. 
88 See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 1!10, 1!12 (Fla. 1957): 
Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 21I, 216, !159 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. 
89, 92 (1961). 
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A second traditional support of governmental immunity is the notion 
that it is better that scattered individuals suffer an injury than that the 
public in general be inconvenienced.S4 Implicit in this argument are the 
corollaries that there is no fund designated or available out of which 
claims against the state can be paid; that all funds to which the state 
has access have been earmarked and collected for specific purposes;sG 
and, consequently, that if funds could be diverted for the payment of 
damage claims, the important work of the government for the public 
benefit would be seriously impaired.ss Under this argument, the Morash 
decision can be attacked to the extent that it imposes financial burdens 
on the Commonwealth. 
Nevertheless, the idea that the loss should remain on the party suffering 
the injury so as not to impair the allocation of government funds has 
lost its persuasiveness. Certainly, a modern state government can obtain 
insurance or establish a fund to insure itself from such liabilities so as to 
avoid fiscal disruption of governmental activities. Moreover, this argu-
ment-that the loss should rest on the harmed individual-runs contrary 
to the policy of shifting loss inherent in tort law,87 and, a fortiori, the more 
84 See text following note 46 supra. In addition to the historical grounds on which 
sovereign immunity cases have been decided, at least one court has decided such a 
case on constitutional grounds. In Krause v. State, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 274 N.E.2d !121 
(Cuyahoga County Ct. 1971), a wrongful death action was brought against the state of 
Ohio by the administrator of the estate of a. victim of the Kent State killings. The 
court denied the defense of sovereign immunity to the state on equal protection 
grounds, holding that the distinction between individuals who were injured by private 
persons and those injured by agents of the state was a classification which violated the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
SIS See Coolidge v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 114 Mass. 592, 594 (1874). 
88 The United States Supreme Court subscribed to this view over a century ago, as 
it justified governmental immunity: "It is obvious that the public service would be 
hindered, and the public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be sub-
jected to suit at the instance of every citizen ••.• " The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 
154 (1868). 
87 The purpose of the law of torts is to shift losses sustained by one person arising 
out of the tortious conduct of another. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 
6 (4th ed. 1971). Historically, there have been a number of exceptions to this loss-
shifting premise, but in recent years many of these exceptions have been either limited 
or abandoned. For example, the General Court, in 1971, acted to allow recovery of 
damages against an operator of a motor vehicle by a guest on a showing of ordinary 
negligence. G.L. c. 2!11, §85L (Supp., 1972). In 1973, the Supreme Judicial Court en-
hanced the likelihood of a guest recovering from a negligent occupier of land by ex-
tending to the guest the right to a duty of ordinary care. Mounsey v. Ellard, 1973 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 871, 297 N.E.2d 43. Furthermore, other jurisdictions have indicated that the 
same right may soon be extended to trespassers. See, e.g., Pickard v. City of Honolulu, 
51 Haw. 1!14, 452 P.2d 445 (1969), Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). The doctrine of interspousal immunity has buckled under heavy 
attack in recent years. See W. Prosser, supra at 864. Contribution among tort feasors 
has eliminated the inequity of permitting the entire burden of a loss, for which sev-
eral tortfeasors were responsible, to be shouldered by one alone. See G.L. c. 2!11B, §1 
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recent movement toward the widespread application of loss distribution.ss 
Aside from its decision to impose liability on the Commonwealth with 
respect to private nuisances, the Morash decision might be criticized for 
its determination to leave the task of reform to the Legislature. This 
decision to await legislative action is unfortunate because, first, it creates 
uncertainty as to the current vitality of sovereign immunity in Massachu-
setts,s" and second, it ignores the history of legislative inertia surrounding 
such calls for legislative reform of governmental immunity. An examina-
tion of Massachusetts legislative history and the legislative histories of the 
several other states in which the courts have called for the abolition of 
governmental immunity exposes a marked legislative indifference to re-
form and points to the futility of waiting for such a response. 
For the past five years, legislation designed to impose tort liability on 
the Commonwealth and its subdivisions has been introduced in the 
Massachusetts General Court.11o Each year the bills have died, without 
thorough consideration by the Legislature-a clear expression of the 
Legislature's indifference toward reform of governmental immunity. Since 
the dramatic movement away from governmental immunity began in 
1957, ten state courts have taken the position of the Morash court and 
left the task of reform to the legislature.91 In these ten states only two 
{Supp. 1972). Charitable immunity has nearly disappeared in the United States. See 
Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 528, 254 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1969). The policy of 
granting relief to an innocent victim is thus firmly Implanted in our law. The con-
tinuation of the imulunity of government from tort liability derogates from that 
fundamental policy. 
ss A notable trend in tort law has been the widespread recognition of the social 
desirability of distributing individual losses over a wide "market." This development 
is evinced by the extensive use of liability insurance, the application of the "deep 
pocket" theory in imputing negligence to employers (see W. Prosser, supra note 87, 
at 459), the nearly universal acceptance of Workman's COmpensation and the recent 
strides made in allowing the consumer recovery based on strict liability (see id. at 
657-58). Loss distribution avoids both the injustice of leaving an injured party without 
compensation and the danger of burdening an unintentional tortfeasor with a crushing 
judgment. Oblivious of this policy, the doctrine of sovereign immunity leaves an 
injured victim without recourae. 
89 See text at notes 72·75 supra. 
IIO See 1969 Mass. Legis. Doc., House Nos. 1936, 5355; 1970 Mass. Legis. Doc., House 
No. 2498; 1971 Mass. Legis. Doc., House Nos. 2428, 6288, 6454; 1972 Mass. Legis. Doc., 
House Nos. 2808, 8570, 5462: 1978 Mass. Legis. Doc., Senate Nos. 586, 740, 1861, House 
No. 4952. 
Ill Since the beginning of the movement with Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 
So. 2d lliO (Fla. 19!17), the courta in nineteen states and the District of Columbia have 
severely limited governmental immunity, and ten state courts have considered over-
ruling the doctrine but have chosen to leave the task to the legislature. Citations and 
summaries of the cues abolishing or refusing to abolish in deference to legislative re-
form are listed in It. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 125.00, at 824-48 (Supp., 1970). 
Recent cues, not included in that text, in which the doctrine has been abolished are 
Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 Rl. 562, 261 A.2d 896 (1970), and Smith v. State, 95 Idaho 795, 
475 P.2d 987 (1970). A refusal to abolish in deference to legislative reform is Duncan v. 
Koustenis, 260 Mel. 98, 271 A.2d 54:7 (1970). 
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have responded with statutes.92 In the remaining eight states an average 
interval of nine years has elapsed since the legislatures were called upon 
to act.98 These instances of legislative indifference speak strongly for the 
desirability of judicial action. 
The criticism that the court acted too cautiously in deferring the work 
of reform of governmental immunity to the Legislature cannot be easily 
rebutted.H It is irrefutable that legislatures in general and the Massachu-
setts General Court in particular have, in the past, failed to respond to 
such calls for reform.911 Also undeniable is the criticism that the Morash 
decision leaves sovereign immunity in a state of uncertainty.oe Nonethe-
less, in support of the court's decision to leave the task of reform to the 
Legislature, there is the contention, recognized by the Morash court, that 
the Legislature is better adapted to accomplish a comprehensive reform 
of governmental immunity.oT Among the reasons cited by the court were: 
first, that the Legislature would be better suited to define limitations and 
exceptions to liability in a comprehensive statute; and second, that an 
avalanche of tort claims might follow a judicial abrogation of govern-
mental immunity.os Both of these grounds have validity and can serve 
to support the Morash approach. 
Clearly, abolition of governmental immunity by the Legislature is a 
more satisfactory method of changing the law. The flexibility of the 
legislative approach, allowing for hearings, studies and analyses of the 
principles and policies involved, lends itself to the formulation of a 
comprehensive statute. The legislative machinery could be set to work 
resolving a number of problems inherent in reform, such as: defining 
statutory limits on the amount of recovery: providing the administrative 
framework to implement the program; studying the feasibility of estab-
lishing a special court of claims; and deciding whether jury trials would 
be available. Similarly, the scope of governmental liability could be 
considered, resolving such questions as whether recovery of legal ex-
penses incurred in a successful criminal defense would be recoverable;" 
whether the government should be liable for the intentional torts of its 
92 See Iowa Code Ann. ch. 25A, 1§25A.1·.20 (1967); Utah Code Ann. ch. !10, 1§65-!10-1 
to -M (1968). 
98 The dates on which the various state courts requested legislative reform of 
sovereign immunity are listed in K. Davis, supra note 91, §25.00, at 856-43; K. Davis, 
Administrative Law Text, §25.02, at 468-69 (3rd ed. 1972). Since then, no legislation has 
been enacted, as evidenced by a survey of the states involved. 
114 For the substance of this criticism, see text following note 88 supra. 
1111 See text following note 89 supra. 
116 See text at notes 73-76 supra. 
97 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 796, 296 N.E.2d at 468. 
98 Id. at 795 n.6, 296 N.E.2d at 468 n.6. 
99 Traditionally, American law has required that the defendant bear the costa, yet 
some European countries provide that the government must compensate the successful 
defendant. K. Davia, supra note 91, §25.17, at 861-62 (Supp. 1970). · 
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officers and employees;too and whether a public entity should be immune 
from liability for the acts of an employee, if the employee himself is 
immune from liability. These questions can be resolved more properly 
by a lawmaking body, which is designed to study and hold hearings on 
the ramifications of all aspects of the issue before it and frame its answer 
carefully in a detailed statute, than by a judicial body, which must estab-
lish limits and exceptions by an attenuated case-by-case process.tot 
Another reason mentioned by the court as weighing against judicial 
abrogation was: the "potentially catastrophic financial burdens" which 
would follow a judic;:$al overruling of the immunity rule.102 These fears 
and the fears expressed by other writers103 that a judicial abrogation 
would besiege the courts with fraudulent claims have merit. For example, 
the California experience is illustrative of the chaos which can be un-
leased by ajudicial abolition of governmental immunity without proper 
safeguards. The abrogation in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District104 
was complete as to nearly all governmental immunities. What followed 
the Muskopf case was a torrent of tort claims, many of them frivolous 
and unfounded, .but all requiring the state's attention. The California 
Legislature was compelled to enact moratorium legislationtOII suspending 
the effect of the Muskopf decision and temporarily reenacting the doctrine 
for two years, while it addressed itself to the problem of reform. 
The superiority of the legislative approach in accomplishing the re-
form and the potentially disastrous consequences of judicial reform, con-
sidered together, support the restraint exercised by the court. However, 
since considerable indifference has surrounded the move for legislative 
reform of governmental immunity,tos both avenues of reform, legislative 
and judicial, are less than satisfactory. The court might have followed 
a third course, avoiding the problem of legislative inertia and uncer-
tainty in the law,. on the one hand, and the risk of unleashing a flood of 
litigation and bypassing the better-suited legislative process, on the other. 
The court could have established an effective date for prospective over-
ruling far enough in the future to give the Legislature sufficient time to 
enact a tort claims statute. 
1oo The Federal Tort Claims Act has preserved immunity for deliberate torts. 28 
u.s.c. §2680(h) (1970). 
101 But see Peck, The Role of Courts and Legislature in the Reform of Tort Law, 
48 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (196~). where the peculiar ineptness of the legislatures in re-
forming tort law is discussed. 
102 197~ Mass. Adv. Sh. at 795 n.6, 296 N.E.2d at 468 n.6, quoting from Gossler v. 
City of Manchester, 107 N.H. !llO, 211 A.2d 242 (1966). 
103 See, e.g., Note, 46 Ind. L.J. 544, 550 (1970). 
104 55 Cal. 2d 211, !159 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). 
105 Cal. Civil Code §22.~ (West Supp. 197!1). ,For a discussion of the problems raised by 
this sequence of events, see Van Alstyne, Governmental:Tort Liability: A Public Policy 
Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 46!1 (196!1). 
106 See text at notc:a 90-9!1 supra. 
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In the past the court has provided catalytic decisions that have sparked 
legislative enactments. For instance, the struggle to reform the charitable 
immunity doctrine, which continued for nearly half a century, was 
resolved by the creative efforts of the Supreme Judicial Court. Beginning 
in 1923 with Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital.t01 the Supreme Judicial 
Court intimated to the Legislature that while a change in the charitable 
immunity rule would be desirable, legislative, not judicial, action was 
needed. With the action of other jurisdictions in abolishing charitable 
immunity, the court in recent years reasserted its opposition to the 
immunity. In 1958 the court expressed its dissatisfaction with charitable 
immunity in Simpson v. Truesdale Hospital, Inc.tos and pressed for 
legislative action.109 During the next decade the court ·continued to await 
a legislative response. The Legislature had not overlooked the issue; 
repeatedly, bills were introduced. to limit charitable immunity,uo but 
they were consistently defeated. The Legislature had made it apparent 
that it would not act to reform the indefensible doctrine. In December 
of 1969, the court hapded down Colby v. Carney Hospital.m The court 
noted its continued opposition to charitable immunity and its frustration 
in awaiting legislative action, and announced that the time had come 
for the judiciary to act. Charitable immunity was prospectively over-
ruled. Before the court had the opportunity to overrule in the next case, 
the Legislature responded with reform legislation.112 
This lesson should have prompted the Morash court to prospectively 
overrule the doctrine of governmental immunity. The issue before the 
court should not have been legislative versus judicial reform, but how 
the judiciary could act to insure that reform is accomplished. To date, 
the Legislature has refused to act; it should have been incumbent upon 
the court to play a creative role and focus the Legislature's attention 
squarely on the governmental immunity issue. The charitable immunity 
struggle revealed that, given enough of a prod, the Legislature would 
respond, but given years of recommendations such as the one presented 
lOT 246 Mass. !163, 141 N.E. 113 (192!1). 
108 338 Mass. 787, 154 N.E.2d !157 (1958). 
109 "[T)he doctrine • • • has been firmly imbedded in our law for over three quar· 
ten of a century and we think that its 'termination should be at legislative, rather than 
at judicial hands.' Comeau v. Harrington, !133 Mass. 768, l!lO N.E.2d 554, 555.'' 338 
Mass. at 787·88, 154 N.E.2d at 358. 
110 See 1959 Mass. Legis. Doc., House No. 1248; 1960 Mass. Legis. Doc., Senate No. 
62; 1961 Mass. Legis. Doc., House Nos. 527, 535, 1578; 1966 Mass. Legis. Doc., Senate No. 
228, House No. 2462; 1968 Mass. Legis. Doc., Senate No. !159, House Nos. 367, 485, 712, 
726, 7!10, 2367, 3670, 4197. 
111 !156 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969). 
112 G.L c. 231, §85K (Supp. 1972). The Legislature incorporated into this act a 
ceiling liability of $20,000 as long as the complained-of tort was committed in the 
course of any activity carried on to accomplish directly the charitable purposes of the 
defendant corporation. Id. 
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in Morash, it would not. Prospective overruling would allow· for a judicial 
interplay with the Legislature in providing the momentum to achieve 
reform. Prospective overruling would have avoided the problems that 
the Morash court feared would result from a judicial abolition of govern-
mental immunity-bypassing the more suitable legislative reform process 
and incurring a flood of tort claims against the state-as well as the 
problems that the Morash decision created-uncertainty in the . law and 
the probability that because of legislative indifference the governmental 
immunity doctrine would not soon be reformed. It is therefore submitted 
that the Morash court should have prospectively overruled the rule of 
governmental immunity. 
In summary, the Morash decision is an important though indeci-
sive step towards reform of governmental immunity in Massachusetts. 
The court asserted the power of the judiciary to abolish the immunity, 
abrogated a fragment of sovereign immunity to allow recovery in the 
case before it, analogized the legal foundation of sovereign immunity to 
that of municipal immunity, and called upon the Legislature to reform 
the indefensible doctrine. The decision has had the impact of creating 
uncertainty over the future vitality of sovereign immunity in Massachu-
setts. One of three results may follow Morash if the Legislature refuses 
to heed the call for reform. The court may continue to carve away ex,. 
ceptions to sovereign immunity by continued analogy to municipal im-
munity. It may refuse to create any additional exceptions to sovereign 
immunity. Or the court may, itself, abolish the doctrine of governmental 
immunity. The viability of sovereign immunity in Massachusetts con-
sequently remains an open question at this time. 
The court approached the Morash case on two fronts. First, it looked 
to the limited question of allowing recovery in the case at bar. It cor-
rectly found that the judiciary was empowered to abrogate the sovereign 
immunity doctrine since legislative silence with respect to the judicially 
created immunity rule ought not imply a legislative preemption of the 
field. The court was also correct in creating an exception to the immunity 
rule in imposing liability on the Commonwealth if it maintains nuisances 
on its land. To allow the state to maintain nuisances to the detriment 
of its citizens runs contrary to the basic principles of tort law. Secondly, 
the court confronted the larger problem of reform of. the doctrine of 
governmental immunity, and posed two alternatives: legislative or judi-
cial reform. Analysis of these alternatives exposes shortcomings attendant 
on either choice. As the Morash court pointed out, judicial reform would 
bypass the more suitable legislative reform process and might inspire a 
flood of tort claims and bring about catastrophic judgments against the 
Commonwealth. However, the decision of the court to await legislative 
reform may be equally unsatisfactory since not only does it ignore the 
fact of legislative indifference to reform of the doctrine of governmental 
immunity, documented within and without the Commonwealth, but it 
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also introduces doubt as to the current viability of sovereign immunity 
in Massachusetts. A third approach, that of prospective overruling, would 
have minimized the adverse consequences of the two courses considered 
by the court and would have enhanced the possibility of achieving the 
court's objective-comprehensive reform of governmental immunity. 
JAMES M. WHALEN 
§11.19. Damage to marital relationship: Cause of action for loss of 
consortium recognized: Diaz v. Eli Lilly~ Co.1 In the instant case, the 
plaintiff, whose husband had allegedly sustained serious physical injury 
from his use of the defendant corporation's fungicidal drug,2 brought 
suit for loss of her husband's consortium "including his 'services, society, 
affection, companionship, [and] relations.' "8 The defendant demurred, 
claiming that the plaintiff's declaration had failed to state a cause of 
action. The superior court sustained the demurrer without leave to 
amend. Upon appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court, reversing the order 
of the superior court and overruling a long line of decisions,4 HELD: 
each spouse has a cause of action for an invasion of the consortium right 
against a tortfeasor whose negligence caused personal injuries to the 
other spouse.~> 
The Supreme Judicial Court's ruling in Diaz is clearly a landmark 
decision in Massachusetts law because it enunciates for the first time the 
rule that whenever a spouse suffers a personal injury due to the negli-
gence of a tortfeasor, the other spouse has a cause of action for injuries 
to the marital relationship which he or she has sustained. This comment 
will first trace the history and development of the concept of consortium 
and the treatment which that concept has received from the Massachusetts 
courts. Various criticisms of the consortium cause of action which have 
arisen in other jurisdictions will then be examined, as will the responses 
which other courts have offered to refute these criticisms. Finally, the dis-
§11.19. 1 197!J Mass. Adv. Sh. 126!J, !102 N.E.2d 555 (197!J). 
2 Plaintiff's husband had previously brought suit for his own personal injuries. He 
attempted to have his wife joined as a party plaintiff. When that motion was denied, 
apparently because the lower oourt felt that she had no cause of action, she brought 
the present suit. It has been oommunicated to the present writer by the plaintiff's 
attorney that the injury sustained by Mr. Diaz rendered him sightless. 
8 197!J Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1264, !J02 N.E.2d at 556. The court quoted from the plain-
tiff's declaration. 
4 Lombardo v. D.F. Frangioso &: Co., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873, 269 N.E.2d 8!J6; 
Thornton v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 340 Mass. 222, 163 N.E.2d 264 (1960); Rodger! v. 
Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 52 N.E.2d 576 (194!J); Gearing v. Bergson, 22!J Mass. 257, 111 
N.E. 785 (1916); Whitoomb v. New Yor1t, New Haven &: Hartford R.R., 215 Mass. 440, 
102 N.E. 66!J (1913); Bolger v. Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910); 
Feneff v. Boston Be Maine R.R., 196 Mass. 575, 82 N.E. 705 (1907). 
II 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1278, 302 N.E.2d at 564. 
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cussion will focus on certain practical problems which the Diaz decision 
has either raised or left unanswered. 
Before discussing the merits of this decision, it would be valuable to 
examine the evolution and meaning of "consortium"; it has been a 
source of confusion to judges and commentators alike, primarily due to 
the fact that "[t]his particular branch of matrimonial law is, for historical 
reasons, intimately related to the law of master and servant."6 It is diffi-
cult to fully understand the current status of the law in this area without 
first discussing its historical underpinnings. 
In marriage, the law imposes certain duties and obligations upon the 
husband and grants both husband and wife certain rights. He is required 
to support his wife, each of the spouses is ·entitled to engage in sexual 
relations with the other,' and each is entitled to the other's consortium. 
Traditionally, the latter entailed "the mutual rights of the parties to 
the society, companionship and affection of each other, and the right of 
the husband to the services of the wife."& The husband could sue a 
person who intentionally interfered with the marriage relationship by 
carrying off the wife or by "alienating her affections." Upon the occur-
rence of such an event, the husband had a cause of action in trespass,9 
due to the wife's incapacity at law to consent to such acts.10 This action 
was separate and distinct from the wife's personal injury action in which 
both the husband and wife had to be joined as plaintiffs, since the wife 
lacked the requisite capacity to sue in her own name.11 At the core of 
the trespass action lay the notion that the husband had a definite eco-
nomic interest in the services and society of the wife, as if she were merely 
another household servant. Thus, the husband was directly wronged by 
the conduct of a third person which in any way interfered with her ability 
to render those services. As a result, "the loss of services, even in the 
case of a wife, became the gist of the legal wrong."12 The husband's 
cause of action was extended gradually to include the situation in which 
the wife became unable to perform her domestic functions due to the 
negligent acts of a third person.1a 
The wife, of course, had no parallel rights. If the husband were injured, 
he could obviously bring suit in his own name for those physical injuries. 
6 Brett, Comortium and Servitium: A History and Some Proposals, 29 Australian 
LJ. 521 (1955). 
1 See Southwick v. Southwick, 97 Mass. 527 (1867). 
s Lippman, The Breakdown of Comortium, 50 Co1um. L.Rev. 651 (1950). 
9 F. Harper Be F. ]antes, The Law of Torts 607 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Harper Be 
James]. 
10 8 W .S. Holdsworth, History of English Law 450 (1926). 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1264, 502 N.E.2d at 556. 
12 See note 9 supra. 
18 Barnes v. Hurd, 11 Mass. 59 (1814). 
66
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/14
§11.19 TORTS 571 
"But could she [the wife] sue a wrongdoer for injury to him? A servant 
sue for the loss of services of the master? Clearly not."14 
The legal subservience of the wife, however, purportedly changed 
with the passage of the Married Woman's Acts.111 Typical is the provision 
of the Massachusetts Act which states that "[a] married woman may sue 
and be sued in the same manner as if she were sole."16 She could there-
fore maintain her own personal injury action and claim as an element 
of her damages her resultant inability to render household services. The 
question thus arose: if the husband no longer had to claim his loss of 
those services, had the actiQn for loss of his wife's consortium been elimi-
nated? The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that his action 
still survived:11 "As her husband is bound to provide for her support, 
he may maintain an action in his own name to recover the expenses to 
which he was put .•• as well as for his loss of consortium."18 Further, 
the court stated: 
"The husband's right to compel his wife to work for him is 
abridged, but he still has a right to her society and assistance . . • . 
A married woman may now perform any labor or services on her 
sole separate account, as her husband may; nevertheless each owes 
certain duties to the other which are not annulled by the statutes. 
These duties are included in the word consortium .... 10 
But did the legal emancipation of married woman give to a wife the 
analogous right to enforce a consortium claim? In an action by a wife 
for criminal conversation against her husband's paramour, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that "this [the alleged act of criminal conservation] 
is distinctly a wrong •.. depriving her [the wife] of the consortium of 
her husband, for which she can, by force of our laws, maintain an 
action."20 However, three years later, in Feneff v. N.Y. Central b Hudson 
River R.R.21 the same court denied a wife recovery when injuries to her 
husband were negligently inflicted. The court apparently reached that 
conclusion by erroneously reading earlier cases to characterize the action 
as being almost totally for .loss of services;22 no recovery was thought 
14 Montgomery v. Stephan, 559 Mich. 5!1, 40, 101 N.W.2d W, 2!10 (1960). 
1G See, e.g., G.L c. 209, §11-1!1. 
te G.L c. 209, §6. 
11 See Kelley v. New York, New Haven lc Hartfotd R.R. Co., 168 Mass. !108, 46 N.E. 
106!1 (1897). 
18 Duffee v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 191 Mass. 56!1, 564, 77 N.E. 10!16, 10!17 (1906). 
19 168 Mass. at !111-12, 46 N.E. at 106!1. 
20 Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 28!1, 289-90, 77 N.E. 890, 892 (1906). 
21 20!1 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 4!16 (1909). 
22 Id. at 280, 89 N.E. at 4!17. The court reasoned that there could be no allowance 
to the wife for her loss of ability to earn wages and at the same time an allowance to 
the husband for loss of consortium "for the same diminution of the [wife's] ability 
to be helpful." Id. at 281, 89 N.E. at 4!17. 
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to be available when the sole effect of the husband's injury upon the wife 
was that "the companionship [of the husband] is less satisfactory and 
valuable than before the injury."28 The court indicated that the emphasis 
in negligence actions is placed upon material loss, while an action for 
intentional tort aims at compensating injured feelings. By viewing con-
sortium primarily as the right to services, and by correctly recognizing 
that either spouse could recover in his or her own name for diminution 
in the ability to render services (the husband for his loss of earning 
capacity and the wife for her inability to perform household functions), 
the court found that the consortium action had lost its usefulness. There 
was no longer a need, thought the· court, to permit the other spouse to 
institute an action for loss of the injured spouse's ability to render ser-
vices, since the latter could do so in his or her own right. By denying 
the right to recover for "relational"2' damages, the court once again 
barred the wife from maintaining an action for negligent invasion of the 
consortium right. This opinion had the additional effect of abrogating 
the husband's action for negligent invasion of his consortium right as 
well.211 Although the Married Woman's Act did not abolish the duty 
of the husband to support his wife, nor did it eliminate the duty of the 
wife to render household services, the Act was seen as enabling the 
injured spouse to recover on his or her own account for the loss of 
ability to perform those marital duties. · 
Although abolishing all consortium claims grounded in negligence, 
the court nevertheless continued to recognize the action when the injury 
to the marriage relationship was "intentionally" inflicted. Thus, actions 
by either spouse for alienation of affections or adultery survived.28 It 
28 Id. at 280, 89 N.E. at 4!17. 
lN "Relational" damages include the loss· of "love, companionship, affection, society, 
sexual relations, solace and more." Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 
498, 5p2, 2ll9 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1968). 
211 See, e.g., Lom))ardo v. D.F. Frangioso Be Co., Inc., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 87!1, 269 
N.E.2d 8!16 (1971). ·Massachusetts was one of only five jurisdictions which interpreted 
the Married Women's Acts as withdrawing the oonsortium action from the husband. 
See Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 112 S.E.2d 611 (1945); Gallagher v. 
Peguot Spring Wat~ Co., 2 Conn. Cir. !154, 199 A.2d 172 (196!1); Black v. United States, 
26!1 F. Supp. 470 (D. Utah 1967); Va. Code §55-!16 (1950). 
Given the initial jUdicial misoonception of the nature of the oonsortium action, the 
Massachusetts Court was oorrect in extinguishing the negligent oonsortium action since 
each spouse was personally capable of recovering for his or her own loss of ability to 
render material "services." 
28 Herein lies a basic inoonsistency. If the oourt refused to recognize "relational" 
injuries in the case of negligent invasions of the marital relationship, then why should 
there have been continued judicial reoognition of intentional invasions of that same 
relationship? In the case of intentional invasions, there was no impairment of the 
ability to render "services"; thus, the entire basis of the action was "relational." 
Certainly it cannot be said that the quality of the relational injury is any different in 
negligent invasions than in intentional invasions. 
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was upon this seeming inconsistency that the court relied in the present 
case to redirect the course of the common law. The court first dealt with 
what they felt to be the only possible rationale for the apparent dichotomy 
which developed between intentional and negligent invasions of the 
consortium right, namely, that in intentional cases, if the third party 
were not held liable on the "consortium" claim, he or she would escape 
all civil liability. This is necessarily so, went the argument, as the "par-
ticipating" spouse has no grounds of his or her own on which to base 
an action against the third person; that spouse would be barred due 
to his or her own contribution to the alleged injury-producing act. More-
over, even if the "participating" spouse had such a cause of action, he 
or she would invariably be unwilling to pursue it. However, as the 
court in Diaz properly recognized, this particular explanation is spurious 
for several reasons. First, the "intentionalness" of the tortfeasor's act is 
often lacking. The defendant in an alienation of affection or criminal 
conversation action might well be "in truth the seduced rather than 
the seducer."27 Further, the injury is often more real and more in need 
of compensation in the case of the negligent tort than it is where the 
act is intentional. Hurt feelings are more easily endured than are perma-
nent and disabling injuries to the spouse.2s Moreover, the court disagreed 
with the notion expressed in Feneff that the consortium claim in a negli-
gence action is "remote."29 How can it be said, asked the court, that the 
injury to the marital relation is more remote in the negligence claim 
than in the case of an intentional tort?30 Finally, the court underscored 
the fact that the major drawbacks of the availability of claims for criminal 
conversation and alienation of affections-i.e., blackmail and extortion 
-are not present in the negligence action.31 
The only projected shortcoming of a change in the common law rule 
that made any impression upon the court was the expressed fear of 
double recovery. Either spouse can now recover for loss of the ability 
to render services (the husband through his claim for loss of earning 
capacity). The ability to render services, although not the sole element 
of the consortium claim, nevertheless remains as one of its components. 
Therefore, it was feared that if, after the husband recovers for his loss 
of earning capacity, and the wife were allowed to recover for the loss of 
27 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1270, !102 N.E.2d at 559. 
28 It might also be noted that where the husband intentionally fails to support the 
other spouse or where either spouse engages in criminal conversation, the other spouse 
has grounds for an action of divorce. This is not true where the marital relation is 
injured by the negligent deeds of a third party. Although not in reality a means of 
compensation for injury to the marital relationship, the divorce action is a separate 
method of assuaging hurt feelings not available to the spouse whose husband or wife 
is injured negligently. 
29 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1270, !102 N.E.2d at 559. 
so Id. 
81 Id. 
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the husband's consortium, the "service" portion of the combined recov-
eries would be duplicated. In other words, the husband's award in his 
main action would include compensation for his loss of earning capacity, 
part of which necessarily goes to support his wife, while at the same 
time, the wife's claim for loss of consortium would include as one of 
its elements loss of her husband's services. There would thus be some 
overlapping. 
The court, however, correctly emphasized that services is merely one 
element of the cause of action; "in fact [it has progressively] been emptied 
of the element of services or earning capacity."82 It has become emptied of 
the "service" element because each spouse could recover that aspect 
of the injury in his or her own personal injury suit. Further, the prac-
tical, rather than the theoretical, considerations involved in the problem 
of duplication of recovery for services can be easily alleviated by joinder 
of the consortium action with the personal injury action. 
Although basing its decision upon the inconsistency in the law which 
distinguished between negligent and intentional invasions of the con-
sortium right, the court did recognize the validity of the interest sought 
to be protected, namely, the marital relationship itself. It said: "The 
marital interest is quite recognizable and its impairment may be definite, 
serious, and enduring, more so than the pain and suffering or mental 
or psychic distress for which recovery is now almost routinely allowed in 
various tort actions."88 Finally, the court rejected the contention that 
any such change should be made by means of legislative enactment. It 
correctly noted that the state of the law prior to its decision in the 
instant case was a result of judge-made changes in the common law.84 
The court invited the legislature to change the rule expressed in its 
decision if that body determines "that we have mistaken the present 
public understanding of the nature of the marital relation."SII 
The right of consortium has become subject to judicial scrutiny and 
revision in many other jurisdictions. Prior to 1950, no state court had 
held that the wife had a cause of action for loss of consortium due to 
negligent injury to the husband,S6 although all but five jurisdictions 
82 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1271, !102 N.E.2d at 560. To emphasize this point, the court 
pointed to the allowed recovery in intentional invasions where there is no impairment 
of ability to render services, and the total recovery goes to other aspects of the injured 
marital relationship. 
88 Id. at 1276, !102 N.E.2d at 56!1. 
u Id. 
811 Id. at 1277, !102 N.E.2d at 564. 
86 North Carolina did allow the wife recovery in Hipp v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
& Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. !118 (1921). However, that case was subsequently overruled 
in Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925). Clearly 
troubled, the Supreme Court of North Carolina finally abolished the cause of action 
in Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945). 
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(including Massachusetts) allowed recovery to the husband.87 In 1950, 
in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,ss the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, believing that the disparity in the treatment 
given to husbands and wives in regard to the consortium action was 
inconsistent with the supposed "emancipated" status of women, extended 
to a wife the same consortium right that husbands had enjoyed for many 
years. Several jurisdictions have followed the pioneering step taken in 
Hitaffer. Presently, the number of jurisdictions which deny the right to 
the wife while allowing it to the husband is almost equalled by the 
number of jurisdictions which have extended the right to both.89 It is 
interesting to note that of those jurisdictions which denied the right to 
both spouses, Massachusetts is the first to have totally reversed its position 
to allow either spouse to pursue a consortium action. 
The extention of consortium rights to women has not been without 
criticism. The merits of the Diaz decision can be better evaluated by an 
examination of the criticisms raised in courts in other jurisd~ctions when 
the issue of recognition of the consortium right was presented to them 
for decision. 
Some courts and individual justices have expressed the belief that the 
consortium action is simply an antiquated relic which has no place in 
modern law. In Illinois, the husband had traditionally retained the 
consortium action while the parallel cause had been denied the wife. 
When the Illinois Supreme Court recently extended the consortium right 
to the wife, Chief Justice Schaeffer voiced his dissatisfaction with the 
majority's decision by stating that: "It is no more than an historical 
accident that the husband's common law action survived the enactment 
of the Married Women's Act .... The husband's action has survived 
in theory by acquiescence and not because it has withstood critical 
analysis."40 Pennsylvania, in denying the extension of the cause of action 
to the wife stated: 
If ... the husband's right to recover for loss of consortium is based 
upon the wife's lowly status as a servant or as a chattel, then to grant 
the wife a right to so recover does not lift the wife to the status of 
her husband, but it reduces the husband to the outworn concept of 
the wife's lowly status. . . . [T]he logical solution would be to ter-
minate the husband's claim on the theory that the wife is no longer 
the servant and chattel.41 
87 See note 25 supra. 
38 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950). 
89 See cases cited in Restatement (Second) of Torts §695, at 18-21 (Tentative Draft 
No. 14, Apri115, 1969). 
40 Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 432, 170 N.E.2d 881, 893-94 (1960) (dissenting 
opinion). 
41 Neuberg v. Bobowir.z, 401 Pa. 146, 155, 162 A.2d 662, 666 (1960). 
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Admittedly, the concept of consortium has long been taken to mean 
the right of the husband to the services of his wife. Whether this inter-
pretation in itself was incorrect, or whether modern courts have errone-
ously construed the concept as embodying other aspects of the marriage 
relationship, should not be crucial in weighi~g the merits of the con-
sortium right. Rather, the question for modern courts should be whether 
there is a valid interest which the law should protect. If courts discover 
that the societal objective of protecting the marriage relationship out-
weighs the desirability of limiting the extent of a tortfeasor's liability, 
they should not feel constrained by notions of what the medieval concept 
once meant. As the Michigan court stated: "The question . . . is not 
whether such a right existed but whether it exists today."42 Moreover, 
the leading commentators have found consortium to mean more than 
a right to services. "[The view that consortium means services] leaves out 
of account the loss of companionship and society."43 The Hita[Jer court 
noted that consortium "also includes love, affection, companionship, 
sexual relations ... all welded into a conceptualistic unity."44 Analyzing 
that decision, Professors Harper and James stated: 
This devastating attack upon the older rule is a realistic approach 
to the problem and a recognition of the obvious fact that the often 
hypothetical "services" may and frequently are the least valuable 
aspect of the incidents of the marital relation . . . . [C]ertainly the 
problem is not well handled by refusing protection to either 
[spouse]-411 
Opponents of the concept of consortium have argued that apart from 
services, recovery for loss of consortium is compensation for emotional 
injury, upon which the law of torts does not look with favor,46 that it 
is in the nature of "parasitic" damages,47 that it is too "personal, intan-
gible, and conjectural,"48 or that the common law does not recognize 
"sentimental" injuries.49 However, as the New York Court of Appeals in 
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co.M pointed out: "[these views are] 
not in accord with the growing recognition that the law of torts must 
42 Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. at 45, 101 N.W.2d at 233. 
43 Harper & James, supra note 9, at 638. Dean Prosser has referred to the labelling 
of consortium as "services" as an "outworn fiction." W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 704 
(2d ed. 1955). 
44 Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814. 
45 Harper & James, supra note 9, at 643. 
46 See, e.g., Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 50!1, 293 
N.Y.S.2d !105, !108, 2!19 N.E.2d 897, 902 (1968). 
47 See, e.g., Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 32!1 F.2d 257, 261 (2d Cir. 196!1). 
48 Id. at 264. 
49 HitafJer, 18!1 F.2d at 814. 
110 22 N.Y .2d 498, 29!1 N.Y .S.2d !105, 239 N.E.2d 897 (1968). 
72
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/14
§11.19 TORTS 377 
recognize the interests of persons in the protection of essentially emotional 
interests."111 That opinion pointed to the fact that actions are now 
allowed for negligently induced fright and for an infant's loss of parental 
care due to the wrongful death of its parents.112 One commentator has 
remarked: "It is hardly to be denied that this sort of harm is real rather 
than illusory, and that it is substantial rather than trivial."li3 Given 
the fact that the trend in other areas of tort law has increasingly been 
to.recognize claims for emotional injury, the argument against consortium 
loses its force, since the injury suffered by a spouse who must live with 
a husband or wife incapacitated by personal injury is clearly real and 
deserving of compensation. 
Some criticis have expressed doubt as to the ability of juries to com-
petently measure the loss of consortium in monetary terms. However, 
juries have been entrusted with similar responsibilities in other types of 
actions. For instance, they must arrive at a figure for the pain and suffer-
ing element in a personal injuries case. Similarly, juries are relied upon 
to exclude any pecuniary award for the plaintiff's grief and anguish 
in a wrongful death action. Needless to say, there is no formula by which 
juries may come to ari exact determination of the correct amount of the 
plaintiff's recovery in a consortium action, but this same problem is 
present in many other types of action as well. Indeed, this shortcoming-
if it is a shortcoming-lies at the very heart of the legal system. As the 
Millington court believed: 
Money ... cannot truly compensate a wife [or husband] for the 
destruction of ... [the] marriage, but it is the only known means 
to compensate for the loss suffered and to symbolize society's recog-
nition that a culpable wrong-even if unintentional-has been 
done.11' 
Several jurisdictions have been confronted with the argument that to 
allow a consortium recovery would be to ignore the rules of causation1111 
or that a corsortium claim is not a direct consequence of the wrong.116 
In other words, the injury to the spouse who suffers a loss of consortium 
does not flow directly from the tortfeasor's negligence which caused the 
other spou&e to suffer personal injuries. The Hitaffer court rejected this 
argument with the following rationale: 
Ill Id. at 507, 29! N.Y.S.2d at !11, 239 N.E.2d at 902 (emphasis added). 
112 Id. 
118 Clark, The Wife's Action for Negligent Impairment of Consortium, 3 Family 
LQ. 197, 198 (1969). Justice Tauro, dissenting .in Lombardo v. D.F. Frangioso v Co., 
1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 87!, 883, 269 N;E.2d 8!6, -842, expressed his view that courts are 
generally quite capable of weeding out speculative claims. 
114 22 N.Y.S.2d at 507, 293 N.Y.S.2d at !11, 2!9 N.E.2d at 902. 
1115 Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 86, 215 A.2d 1, 4 (1965). 
116 See Hitaffer, 18! F.2d at 815. 
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We are committed to the rule in negligence cases that where in the 
natural and continual sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, 
an injury is produced which, but for the negligent act would not 
have occurred, the wrongdoer will be liable. And it makes no dif-
ference whether or not that particular result was forseeable.117 
Clearly, there is no independent intervening cause where, for example, 
the husband is incapacitated by physical injury and the wife is forced 
to become a nurse and caretaker rather than a partner in the marriage 
relationship. Moreover, if an independent cause does arise, there is noth-
ing to deter the defendant from alleging it as a defense to the consortium 
action. In New Jersey, which, significantly, is a jurisdiction which limits 
defendant's liability to only forseeable consequences of his actions, the 
court answered: "[T]hose losses were immediate and consequential rather 
than remote and unforseeable and, there being no sufficient countervail-
ing policy, the law now rightly views them as remediable by responsible 
tortfeasors."IIS It appears that one more element will be added to the 
traditional caveat to the tortfeasor: he not only bears the burden of 
taking the plaintiff as he finds him, but he also runs the risk of finding 
him to be married 
Critics have often expressed fears that this judicial recognition of a 
relational interest will result in a superfluity of cases claiming relational 
damages upon physical injury to a parent, child, or sibling, and that 
this will result in placing unbearable financial burdens on future tort-
feasors. Logically, an argument can be made that the child who loses 
the active guidance and supervision of a parent due to a crippling injury 
to that parent has a claim of at least equal validity to the husband's or 
wife's consortium claim arising out of that same injury. The New Jersey 
court cogently answered this argument in a manner which appears dis-
positive of the issue: "[P]olicy rather than logic is the determinative 
factor and ... the reciprocal recognition of the wife's claim may readily 
be rested on its own footing . . . without any compulsion of going 
further."1111 The Massachusetts court has declared that injuries to the 
marital relationship will not go uncompensated and that decision, it 
appears, rests on firm ground. While other relational interests may, in 
the future, be found to be in need of similar protection, the Diaz decision 
does not necessarily imply that the floodgates will be opened to all types 
of relational suits. 
Some critics have argued that since courts will take heed to insure 
that the services element will not be duplicated in the spouse's con-
sortium action, and since the injured spouse can recover for his or her 
117 Id. 
118 Ekalo v. Conatructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 95, 215 A.2d 1, 8 (1965). 
1111 Id. at 92,215 A.2d at 7. 
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loss of sexual capacity, there is nothing left for which compensation is 
needed in the other spouse's consortium action.60 There are two answers 
to this criticism. First, consortium is not limited to services and sexual 
relations; consortium also includes the companionship, love, and affec-
tion which a husband and wife share.61 Secondly, as one commentator 
described the negligent, injury-producing actions of a defendant in the 
consortium context: 
This is an example of a single tortious act which harms two people 
by virtue of their relationship to each other. The husband's loss of 
sexual capacity is his injury and the damages he receives to com-
pensate for it have nothing to do with the wife's deprivation of 
the right to have sexual relations with her husband.62 
In jurisdictions that retained the husband's common law consortium 
right but refused to extend the right to the wife, arguments have been 
raised that there is a valid basis for allowing the wife to sue for inten-
tional invasions of the marital interest while denying her that same 
right when the invasion occurred through "mere" negligence. 68 Propo-
nents of this view have argued that the intentional cause of action is 
punitive in nature, and there is no place for punitive damages when 
the defendant's actions are only negligent.64 Others, however, are of 
the view that 
allowance of exemplary damages does not widen the range of action-
able wrongs. In other words, no state of facts exists upon which a 
claim for exemplary could be based, which would not be actionable 
if the claim for examplary damages were omitted." 
The claim must be based first on a compensatory element. Further, 
the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected the argument that a valid 
distinction exists between negligent and intentional torts in this area 
60 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 5!1, at 202. 
61 See text following note 4!1 supra. 
62 Clark, supra DOte 5!1, at 202. 
68 The fl!,ct that the consortium right was available in many jurisdictions to the 
husband but DOt to the wife has prompted numerous equal protection claims. The 
Maryland court seized upon this inconsistency to · extend the right to the wife, but 
refused to reach the constitutional issue. Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 
95, 2!11 A.2d 514 (1967). In Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 219 Tenn. !17, 406 S.W.2d 
166 (1966), cert. denied, !186 U.S. 970 (1967), the Tennessee Supreme Court held tliat 
there were sufficient differences in the position of the husband and the wife to 
justify allowing the husband's action while denying it to the wife. The United States 
Supreme Court declined to review the case. Still other jurisdictions have relied upon 
the equal protection . argument to extend the consortium right to the wife. See, e.g., 
Clem v. Brown, ll Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d !198 (1965). 
64 See generally Hitsffer, 18!1 F.2d at 816-17. 
611 C. McCormick, Damages 29!1 (19!15). 
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by underscoring policy considerations. They reasoned that if the interest 
sought to be protected by the availability of the intentional cause of 
action is the community's interest in the protection of the family, then 
social policy requires that injury to that relationship be compensable, 
whether intentionally or negligently inflicted. In either case, the societal 
interest outweighs the importance of insulating the defendant from 
further liability.66 It is submitted that the Diaz decision can adequately 
withstand any of these criticisms, and that the court will be praised in 
the future for recognizing the need to protect so vital a social relation-
ship from negligently caused injury. 
Besides inviting theoretical analysis, the Diaz decision raises several 
questions of practical importance. First, must a spouse join his or her 
consortium action with the other spouse's action for personal injuries? 
Other jurisdictions, ostensibly for the purpose of eliminating the dangers 
of duplication of the service element6T have required joinder as a con-
dition precedent to maintenance of the consortium action.68 The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized the danger of double recov· 
eryee and therefore prescribed several procedural rules for. bringing a 
consortium claim. As a matter of practical convenience to both plaintiffs 
(i.e., husband and wife) the consortium claim will, under Rule 20(a) of 
the new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, usually be joined with 
the personal injury claim.T0 "Such joinder is of course permitted and 
invited by the procedural rules."Tl If, for some reason, the two actions 
are brought separately, the court announced that the defendant may 
have the two actions consolidated for . trial under the consolidation 
provisions of Rule 42(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.12 
66 Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 48, 101 N.W.2d 227, 234 (1960). 
8T See, e.g., Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis.2d 542, 150 N.W .2d 137 
(1967). 
68 See, e.g., Id. at 558, 150 N.W.2d at 145. See also Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. 
of America, 46 N.J. 82, 95,215 A.2d 1, 8 {1965). . 
89 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1272, 302 N.E.2d at 560. 
TO The new Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure which were modeled ·upon the 
Federal Rules, and which came into effect on July 1, 1974, state in Rule 20(a): 
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief .•. 
severally • • • in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common 
to all these persons will arise in the action. 
Clearly, the consortium claim arises· out of the same ocx:urtenee and will turn on the 
common question of fact and law-i.e., defendant's negligence vis·a-vis the spouse who 
incurred personal injury. 
'11 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1272, !102 N.E.2d at 560. 
72 Id., 802 N.E.2d at 560-66. Rule 42(a) reads: 
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before 
the court, • • . it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in 
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make 
such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs 
or delay. 
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These two provisions. are practical as well as logical. Both plaintiffs 
may be represented by the same attorney, thus· limiting preparation for 
trial and reducing attorneys' fees by eliminating double court appear-
ances. If the consortium action and the personal injury action are both 
pending, the defendant can have the two actions consolidated for trial 
in order to avoid the unnecessary duplication which would otherwise 
inhere in separate trials concerning the same basic set of operative facts. 
However, the Diaz court did not stop there. It also intimated that a 
defendant might be able to insist that the spouse holding a consortium 
claim be joined in the main negligence action, so that the consortium 
claim would not be outstanding when the negligence action was disposed 
of.73 The Court pointed to new Rule 19(a) as a potential mechanism for 
defendant's compelling such joinder. That rule states in pertinent part: 
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a 
party in the action if . . . (2) he claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and. is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in his absence may . . . (ii) leave any of the persons already 
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double . . . obliga-
tions by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, 
the court shall order that he be made a party.74 
Since both husband and wife will usually share the same domicile, 
there will seldom be any problem of service of process on the spouse 
who has refused to assert the consortium claim. Because the court views 
. the spouse's consortium claim as "an interest relating to the subject of 
the action," and because the danger of "incurring double ... obligations" 
does, arguably, exist, it would seem that all of the conditions precedent 
are met so that the defendant can demand that the spouse with the 
consortium claim "shall be joined." Moreover, this demand can be made 
even if the spouse holding the consortium has not instituted an action. 
While the court in Diaz purported to stop short of the rule enunciated 
by courts in other jurisdictions which require joinder with the· personal 
injury action as a condition for bringing the consortium claim,711 Rule 19 
does go that far and in fact appears to go even further. If a spouse with 
a consortium claim refuses to be joined in the other spouse's personal 
78 Id. at 1272-73 & n.29, 302 N.E.2d at 561 & n.29. 
74 Mass. R. Civ. P. 19(a). 
711 "We would leave open the possibility that in appealing circumstances the con-
sortium claim might be held to be lost if not asserted by the time the negligence 
action is tried." Id. at 1273 n.30, 302 N.E.2d at 561 n.30. The court also referred in 
footnote 30 to the New Jersey rule that "In all future actions the wife's consortium 
claim may be prosecuted only if joined with the husband's action." See Ekalo v. 
Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 95-96, 215 A.2d I, 8 (1965). The New 
Jersey rule is identical to the Wisconsin rule adopted in Moran v. Quality Aluminum 
Casting Co., 34 Wis.2d 542, 558, 150 N.W.2d 137, 145 (1967). 
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injury action in accordance with a proper request by the defendant pur-
suant to Rule 19(a), it is not only conceivable, but in fact likely, that 
when the consortium action is brought at a later time the court will 
refuse to hear it. Furthermore, if the spouse could not be joined as a 
party, and refused to join voluntarily, Rule 19(b) requires that "the 
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the [per-
sonal injury] action should proceed among the parties before it, or should 
be dismissed .... " Thus, if the consortium claim is not asserted, not only 
may it be lost but the spouse holding the personal injury claim faces the 
possibility that his or her claim will be dismissed. 
In most caSes, Rule 19 will work no injustice. Either the husband and 
wife will bring the two actions together, or else the two actions, although 
brought separately, will be.consolidated for trial. Further, the compulsory 
joinder of the consortium claim will be equitable where the second 
spouse has failed to assert his or her consortium claim due to oversight. 
It might even apprise a potential plaintiff of a right which he or she 
did not even know existed. It is equally true that the court is within its 
rule-making power to prescribe such a procedure. However, it is not 
clear that the possibility of double recovery should be obviated at the 
price of so rigid a rule. Hypothetically, a situation -could arise wherein 
the value of the injured spouse's consortium is not in any way diminished 
at the time he or she institutes his or her personal injury action; yet, 
at a time subsequent to the final adjudication of that claim, the value 
of his or her consortium could be diminished due to medical complica-
tions or the psychic stress caused by long-term psysical incapacity. If one 
spouse were compelled to assert th~ consortium claim while the other's 
personal injury aetion was pending, he or she would have lost, since it 
could not have been proved that the consortium had been diminished. 
Moreover, if he or she refuses to bring the consortium action at the 
same time as the personal injury action, he or she will, no doubt, under 
Rule 19(a) be precluded from doing so at a later time. Thus, it is quite 
likely that although he or she has suffered a legally compensable loss, 
there will be no recovery for that loss. Additionally, there is the pos-
sibility that the personal injury action will itself be dismissed because 
of the refusal to assert the consortium claim while his action was pend-
ing. It is submitted that the rules· allowing the joinder of parties and 
consolidation of actions involving common questions of law or fact strike 
a sufficient balance between protection of the defendant from double 
liability and preservation of the other spouse's individual consortium 
claim. 
This is especially true in light of the fact that the court's interpreta-
tion of Rule 19 may in itself be erroneous. One court disapproved of 
the application of Rule 19(a) to a consortium claim on the grounds that 
"[p]laintiff's wife has no legal interest in her husband's cause of action 
78
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and he has none in hers."78 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has said: 
"[H]er claim is not for his personal injuries but for the separate and 
independent loss she sustained Consistent with her statutory right to 
assert her claim . . . she should be able to pursue it individually if 
necessary."" It would seem if the trial courts heed the advice of the 
Supreme Judicial Court that "there should in all events be plain instruc-
tions to the jury describing and distinguishing the different elements of 
compensable damage,"78 this, when taken in conjunction with option of 
consolidation for trial and the availability of the special verdict,79 will 
afford the 9efendant sufficient procedural safeguards to avoid the danger 
of incurring double obligations. 
Another problem which might arise as a result of the Diaz decision 
involves the right of one of the spouses to maintain a consortium action 
when the other spouse has previously recovered for his or her personal 
injuries under the Workmen's Compensation law. This very problem 
was raised in the Hita[Jer case, in which the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit held that recovery by the husband under 
the act did not bar the wife's action for loss of consortium even though 
the statutory language indicated that the husband's recovery "shall be 
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the 
employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents [or] depen-
dents . . . ,"80 Conceding that the literal language of the statute could 
be applied to bar any other recovery flowing from the compensable 
injury, the court nevertheless found that this would not comport with 
the legislative intent, and therefore they ruled that when a third person 
sues in his or her own right on account of the breach of some independent 
duty owed them by an employer, even though the operative facts out 
of which this independent right arose are the same as those out of which 
the injured employee recovers under the Act, the Act does not bar the 
third person's cause of action.81 The court found an additional basis 
for its decision in the fact that the Act made no distinction in the amount 
of the damage award between married and unmarried workers. Thus, they 
concluded, the Act made no provisions for the injuries suffered by the 
78 Wright v. Schebler Co., S7 F.R.D. !119, '320-21 (S.D. Iowa 1965). It is true that 
Federal Rule 19(a) has been changed since that decision. Nevertheless, the language 
"claims an interest," upon which that court based its decision, has been retained in 
the new version of the rule. 
77 Fitzgerald v. Meissner Be Hicks, Inc., S8 Wis.2d 571, 581, 157 N.W .2d 595, 600 
(1968). 
78 197S Mass. Adv. Sh. at 127'3, !102 N.E.2d at 561. 
79 See new Mass. R. Civ. P. 49(a) which provides for verdicts in the form of a 
special written finding upon each fact. 
80 ss u.s.c. §905 (1970). 
81 Hitaffer, ISS F.2d at 819-20, 
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claimant's spouse and it could not be Congress' intention to have her 
independent cause of action barred. 82 
However, this aspect of the Hitaffer decision was subsequently over-
ruled in Smither b Co. v. Coles.sa Relyirig upon the policy consideration 
that "Congress was necessarily interested in the employers' immunity to 
suits as well as in the employees' right to recovery,"8' the court held 
that "[u]nder this statute, as indeed under the statutory scheme of such 
statutes everywhere, all the rights of 'husband and wife' are merged into 
the exclusive remedy provided by the Act ... ,"811 This appears to be 
the dominant view,86 and in light of the gradations in recovery for 
married and unmarried claimants in Massachusetts,87 it might be argued 
that tlie result in the Commonwealth should follow the reasoning in 
Smither. On the other hand, however, neither spouse's consortium action 
was recognized at the time the present Massachusetts Workman's Com-
pensation statute was enacted. This being so, the Massachusetts legislature 
could not have contemplated the effect of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act upon the consortium recovery. Therefore, an argument contra 
can be made that "the independent cause of action of the spouse . . . 
simply was not dealt with by the statute" and that "[i]ts judicial recog-
nition might warrant further legislative consideration. . . ."88 It is not 
known whether or not the Massachusetts judiciary will recognize the 
continued existence of a consortium action brought by one spoqse after 
the other spouse has recovered for personal injuries through Workmen's 
Compensation. It is likely, however, that they will follow the reasoning 
of most other jurisdictions and hold that the consortium action is barred. 
It has generally been held that since one spouse's consortium action is 
derived from the other spouse's personal injury claim and is dependent 
upon the injured spouse's right to recover, a valid defense, i.e., con-
tributory negligence, to one action will bar the other.89 One commentator, 
82 Id. at 818. 
88 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, !154 U.S. 914 (1957). 
84 Id. at 22!1. 
811 Id. at 225. 
86 See, e.g., Ziegler v. United States Gypsum -Co., 251 Iowa 714, 102 N.W.2d 152 
(1960); Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 295, 102 N.E.2d 444 (1951); Ellis v. 
Fallert 209 Ore. 406, !107 P.2d 28!1 (1957). 
87 See G.L c. 152, §!l5A. 
88 Smither, 242 F.2d at 227 (dissenting opinion). 
89 See Harper &: James, 640 (1956). This should not be confused with the fact that 
judicial resolution of one claim will not operate as res judicata insofar as the second 
claim is concerned. Since the Supreme Judicial Court apparently requires joinder of the 
two parties asserting claims, see text at notes 69-74 supra, it will usually be of little 
consequence. However, if the two actions are tried separately, a judgment in the first 
action will have no effect upon the second. In Duffee v. Boston Elevated Ry., 191 Mass. 
56!1, 77 N.E. 10!16 (1906), wherein a husband sued for loss of consortium· arising from 
personal injuries sustained by his wife. The Massachusetts court held that 
the liability of the defendant depends upon the same facts in each case; but the 
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however, has argued that this reasoning "has certain illogical aspects to it. 
If there are different interests invaded by different wrongs, it might be 
thought irrelevant to the husband's cause of action [for loss of consortium] 
that the wife has been barred by her contributory negligence."9o In this 
regard, Restatement (Second) of Torts declares that "negligence is not 
'imputed' to a plaintiff unless his relationship to the person whose 
[contributory] negligence is involved is such as to make him-[the plain-
tiff] liable for that person's negligence if it resulted in injury to a third 
person."91 Clearly, one spouse is not liable for the torts of the other. And 
"to state that there is but one cause of action which is divided ... is not 
accurate, since the nature of the husband's interest is different and distinct 
from the wife's."92 Nevertheless, courts in other jurisdictions have gener-
ally held that if the spouse's personal injury claim is invalid because of 
his or her contributory negligence, the other spouse has no right to re-
cover for loss of consortium.9B 
The fact that the holding in Diaz was based upon the availability of 
a consortium action where the invasion of the marital relationship was 
intentional and where the non-suing spouse is often more responsible for 
the tort than is the defendant, seems to militate against a rule which 
imputes contributory negligence to the plaintiff in a loss of consortium 
action based on negligence. Further, if the husband were negligent and 
the wife sustained personal injuries partly due to the negligence of her 
husband and partly due to the negligence of a third party, she could 
recover from the third party even though her husband might be barred 
from asserting his own consortium claim because of his own contributory 
actions are as independent of each other as are two actions founded on a collision 
of two teams, caused by the negligence of the defendant, one brought by the 
driver ... to recover for his personal injuries, and the other by the owner, to 
recover for damages to his horses and wagon .•.. Each is enforcing an indepen· 
dent right. 
Id. at 564, 77 N.E. at 1037. 
In McGreevey v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 232 Mass. 347, 122 N.E. 278 (1919), an 
action was brought by a father for personal injuries suffered by his son, against the 
defendant who had already been held liable in a negligence action brought by the son. 
The court held: 
The rights of each although springing from the same wrong are independent, 
and the judgment in the son's case is no bar to the maintenance of the present 
action .•.. 
(T]he plaintiff, who was not a party or a privy to the former judgment, must 
prove every essential allegation of the declaration as if his son's action had not 
been brought. . • . 
ld. at 350, 122 N.E. at 279. 
90 Harper Be James, supra note 89, at 640. 
91 Restatement (Second) of Torts, §485. 
92 Harper Be James, supra note 89, at 640. 
93 See, e.g., Ellmore v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 301 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. App. 1957); 
Peters v. Bodin, 242 Minn. 489, 65 N.W.2d 917 (1954). 
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negligence.&' Nevertheless, despite these apparent inconsistencies, the 
contributory negligence of one spouse will most likely be imputed to 
the spouse claiming the consortium right. For example, in Thibault v. 
Poole,DI in which the husband brought an action to recover expenses for 
injuries suffered by his wife in a collision between his car and the car 
driven by the defendant, it was held that "the husband cannot recover 
compensation for expenses . . • where the negligence of the wife con-
tributed to her injuries."88 The court reasoned that although each plain-
tiff has a separate cause of action and must prove his own case, 
[ n ]evertheless, an essential element of the part of the cause of action 
vested by the law in the husband is that the compensation recover-
able by him for expenses ftows from a personal injury for which the 
wife was under the law entitled to recover compensation. Proof of 
that factor is an essential prerequisite to recovery.DT 
It appears, therefore, that in Massachusetts the contributory negligence 
of one spouse will be imputed to the other spouse in the latter's con-
sortium action. 
Finally, there is the possibility that the Massachusetts Legislature will 
unconsciously abolish the cause of action for loss of consortium. The 
ratio decidendi of the Diaz decision is based upon the availability of 
civil actions for intentional interference with the marital relationship 
and the incongruity of denying recovery when the interference is negli-
gent in nature. Many states have enacted "Heart Balm" statutes88 
eliminating civil actions for criminal conversation and alienation of 
affections. This is attributed to the fact that "[the law has been] sub-
jected to grave ·abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrasment, hu-
miliation and pecuniary damage to persons wholly innocent • . . and 
such remedies have been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their 
unjust enrichment."88 If ~uch a repeal were to take place in Massachusetts 
the argument could be made that the cause of action for loss of con-
sortium due to negligence was likewise abolished. In a jurisdiction 
wherein the above intentional torts were abolished by statute, one 
justice was prompted to remark that "actions for dire.ct invasion . . . of 
consortium do not now exist under the statute cited .... [To allow 
H Harper &: James, supra note 89, at 640. Dean Prosser ascribes these inconsistencies 
to the fact that conso~um ia a historical exception to the general mle that one person 
may not recover for injury to another. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 916 (lid ed. 1964). 
81 285 Mass. 480, 186 N.E. 652 (1955). 
88 Id. at 487, 186 N.E. at 6!15 (emphasis added). If the consortium right existed at 
that time, the husband's action for loss of his wife's consortium would similarly have 
been barred. 
8T Id. at 485, 186 N.E. at 654. 
88 See, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. §25.191 et seq. (1957). 
88 Harper &: James, supra note 89, at 629. 
I 
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the right for negligent invasion] would be inconsistent with the legislative 
action.''100 It should be noted, however, that the basis for abrogating the 
intentional tort-fear of collusion and baseless suits-is lacking when 
loss of consortium arising out of a personal injury action is claimed. 
This is necessarily so since a negligent injury to the marital relation-
ship cannot occur without a simultaneous physical injury to either the 
husband or the wife. The participating spouse in an alienation of affec-
tions or a criminal conversation suit, however, never suffers any such 
injury. As the Maryland court concluded, the abrogation of such rights 
was "for practical reasons unrelated to legal principle. . . .''101 
To summarize, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has granted 
to the spouse of a victim of personal injury a cause of action for the 
diminution in value of the marital relationship arising out of that injury. 
Thus, recovery will be allowed when it can be established that the tort-
feasor's negligence has inflicted injuries which reduce the victim's ability 
to render affection, companionship and emotional reinforcement, those 
qualities which society recognizes as inherent in the normal relationship 
between husband and wife. 
MARSHALL F. NEWMAN 
§11.20. Tort liability of non-judicial public officers: Acts performed 
within scope of authority: Gildea v. Ellershaw.1 In this case, the 
Supreme Judicial Court was confronted with the question of whether a 
public official acting within the scope of his authority or jurisdiction can 
be held liable in a private negligence suit. Plaintiff Gildea sought special 
damages for loss of reputation, credit and community standing against five 
Brockton city council members for injuries suffered as a result of their 
wrongful termination2 of his employment as city manager of Brockton. At 
the trial of the damage suit, Gildea did not allege malice or bad faith 
in the defendants' termination of his employment. The defendants offered 
100 Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. !IS, 6!1, 101 N.W.2d 227, 242 (dissenting 
opinion). 
101 Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 107, 2!11 A.2d 514, 525 (1967). 
§11.20. 1 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sb. 991, 298 N.E.2d 847. 
2 Id. at 992. 298 N.E.2d at 848. The case at bar arose following a successful manda-
mus action brought by Gildea contesting the validity of his removal by the councilmen. 
In that action, the trial court found the removal wrongful and hence void, since no 
written statement of the reasons for removal bad been adopted by a regular meeting 
of the full council as required by G.L. c. 4!1, §89, which reads in pertinent part: "The 
city manager may be removed for cause by the city council •.• but be shall, prior to 
his removal, upon his request, be given a written statement of the reasons alleged 
for his removal .••. " 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sb. at 994-95, 298 N.E.2d at 849. The writing 
received by Gildea was drafted at an informal conference of four council members 
and therefore was not a statement written by the city council. 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sb. at 
99!1-94, 298 N.E.2d at 849. 
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evidence of good faith in their actions; but this evidence was excluded 
by the trial court. A subsequent motion by the defendants for a direCted 
verdict raised the issue of the sufficiency of Gildea's allegations and 
proof, thus squarely presenting the question of whether malice was a 
prima facie element of plaintiff's case. The trial court denied defendants' 
motion, and the jury found· for Gildea. 
Defendants' appeal presented the question to the Supreme Judicial 
Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and HELD: where 
a non-judicial public officer is authorized to use judgment and discretion 
in reaching a decision, and the decision is within the scope of his au-
thority or jurisdiction, such officer is not personally liable in a private 
negligence suit. However, the court limited the application of this rule 
to officers acting in good faith, without malice or corruption.a 
In Gildea, Massachusetts recognized for the first time a broad principle 
of public officer immunity4 affecting all non-judicial11 public officers whoSe 
duties require the use of judgment and discretion in making decisions. 
The rule is expressly limited to civil suits for negligence6 and thus has 
no effect on actions for intentional torts or criminal actions. 
This note will first discuss the issue of an officer's jurisdiction to act 
as the determinative test of his immunity by· comparing the prior juris-
dictional facts approach to the question with the new outer perimeter 
standard as adopted by the court. There will then be an analysis of the 
court's rejection of analogizing from the judiciary and its adoption of a 
standard based on an officer's use of discretion in determining which of-
ficial activities are to be immunized. The type of immunity which the 
. court has adopted and the difficulties which that rule presents will then 
be discussed. The note will conclude by presenting an alternative ap-
proach to public officer immunity which meets the problems which the 
Gildea immunity rule creates. 
The Supreme Judicial Court followed past precedent in limiting the 
application of the Gildea immunity rule to officers acting within the 
scope of their authority, duty, or jurisdiction.7 However, the court sig-
nificantly altered the definition of that scope by expressly overruling 
the much criticized "jurisdictional facts" rule, which was formerly the 
a Id. at 1010-11, 298 N.E.2d at 858-59. 
4 Prior Massachusetts cases do not deal squarely with the immunity issue with 
respect to non-judicial officers. Instead, the officer is said to· perform a quasi-judicial 
function. The suggested remedy is an extraordinary writ or direct appeal, not an action 
against the officer. See Alperin, Immunity of Administrative Officials from Tort 
Liability in Massachusetts, 56 Mass. L.Q. 79, 83-85 (1971), citing Barry v. Smith, 191 
Mass. 78, 77 N.E. 1099 (1906); Jaffarian v. Murphy, 280 Mass. 402, 183 N.E. 110 (1932); 
II Judicial officers are protected by their own immunity. Pratt v. Gardner, 56 Mass. 
(2 Cush.) 63 (1848). This is the reason they are excluded from the Gildea rule. 1973 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1010 n.l3, 298 N.E.2d at 858 n.l3. 
s 197!1 MaliS. Adv. Sh. at 1010-11 Be n.l4, 298 N.E.2d at 858-59 Be n.l4. 
7 Id. at 1010, 298 N.E.2d at 858. 
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law in Massachusetts,8 and adopting in its place the more liberal "outer 
perimeter" standard. The "jurisdictional facts" approach to the defini-
tion of the scope of an officer's authority is predicated on strict statutory 
construction. Basically, the rule required that all circumstances men-
tioned in the empowering statute must exist for an officer to be found 
to be within the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. He would be 
immune from civil suit only at that point.9 The existence of each ma-
terial fact mentioned in the statute operated as a condition precedent 
to the existence of the officer's authority or jurisdiction to act; thus, each 
statutory prerequisite became a "jurisdictional fact." 
Stiles v. Municipal Council,1° a case very similar to Gildea, illustrates 
the operation of the jurisdictional facts approach. In Stiles, the mem-
bers of the municipal council of Lowell were authorized to remove the 
city treasurer for cause but were required to act in accordance with civil 
service laws. One of the provisions of the civil service laws mandated that 
the person sought to be removed be notified of the proposed action and 
furnished with a copy of the reasons therefor. The defendants, however, 
adopted an order removing the plaintiff from office without notifying 
him of the proposed action or giving him a copy of the reasons for 
removal. The court held, therefore, that: 
[T]he defendants never acquired a jurisdiction to exercise their 
quasi-judicial functions respecting the removal from office of the 
plaintiff, because they never notified him and never gave him a 
copy of the charges against him . . . . The full performance of all 
conditions established by the statute are [sic] essential prerequisites 
to the jurisdiction of the municipal council over the subject-matter 
of the removal of the officer.11 
The councilmen were therefore held personally liable for their wrongful 
removal of the plaintiff since they were acting without authority. Since 
their actions were beyond their authority, the so-called cloak of officer 
immunity was denied them. 
The jurisdictional facts rule was based on the view that administra-
tive tribunals were inferior courts of special and limited jurisdiction, 
and therefore no presumption of jurisdiction attached to their deter-
8 Id. at 1014-15, 298 N.E.2d at 861, overruling Stiles v. Municipal Council, 2!1!1 Mass. 
174, 12!1 N.E. 615 (1919). 
9 See generally Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, 12 Ford. 
L. Rev. 1!10, 1!19 (194!1). 
10 2!1!1 Mass. 174, 12!1 N.E .. 615 (1919). 
11 Id. at 18!1, 12!1 N.E. at 616·17 (1919). See also Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 
N.E. 100 (1891) (health officer held liable for acts outside of his jurisdiction where em-
powering statute authorized the destruction of animals infected with glanders and 
horse in question was found not to have been infected). 
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minations or those of their officers.12 The procedural modes imposed by 
the empowering statute became the measure of administrative authority.18 
By making each fact mentioned in the statute a condition precedent to 
the attaching of jurisdiction to act, the power and effect of administrative 
actions and deci&ions were strictly controlled and limited. While this 
was desirable in an age when judicial safeguards had generally not been 
incorporated into administrative procedure,u the policy basis for such 
a rule is clearly non-existent today.u 
A further difficulty with the rule concerned the issue of plaintiff/ 
defendant liability and relief. As to the officer, the rule had the unreason-
able consequence of holding an officer strictly accountable for reaching 
a correct decision on the existence of such nebulous matters as the abate-
ment of nuisances· and the destruction of health hazards.18 Absent the 
existence of all required jurisdictional facts, the officer was liable irre-
spective of his good faith in reaching his decision. On the other hand, 
if the facts did exist, the officer was immune despite gross negligence 
or even malice in the conduct of his action.n From the point of view of 
both the officer and the injured party, the liability was too great on one 
side and too little on the other.1s 
The "jurisdictional facts" rule was also criticized on two policy 
grounds. First, a court accepting the rule would adopt the practice of 
narrowly construing the applicable statute in cases where it might be 
readily apparent that the legislature had intended· to grant relatively 
broad powers to the defendant officer to act according to his reasonable 
belief.19 Secondly, an officer's liability would result .from a trial court's 
ex post facto determination of the true state ·of the facts, while the 
officer might have made the decision at a time of crisis on the basis of 
12 See Jennings, Tort Uabllity of Administrative Officers, 21 Minn. L. llev. 265, 281 
(19!17). 
18 Id. See also Stiles v. Municipal Coundl, 2!1!1 Mass. 174, 182-8!1, 12!1 N.E. 615, 616-17 
(1919). 
u Jennings, supra note 12, at 281-82. 
111 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §1551 et seq.; G.L. c, !lOA, 11 
et seq. 
18 Jennings, supra note 12, at 282·8!1. 
11 Id. at 284-85. 
18 Id. 
19 See generally Davia, Administrative Officer's Tort Liability, 55 Mich. L. llev. 201, 
22!1-24 (1956). In analyzing the jurisdictional facts approach used by the court in 
Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891), the author notes: 
The [HMton] court's only reason for refusing to interpret the statute to mean 
that the officers bad power to kill a horse they reasonably found to have glanders 
was that the legislative body said " ••• cases of ••• glanders." The [Horton] 
court was not wholly unaware of the practical comequences of requiring the 
officers to act at their peril, for it expressly rejected the argument that "few 
people could be found to carry out orders on these terms." 
Davia, supra, at 22!1-24, quoting Miller ..-. Horton, 152 Mass. at 542, 26 N.E. at 100. 
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limited knowledge.20 Further, aware of this sort of liability, the officer 
might, in his reluctance to act, allow the public welfare to be injured, 
thus breaching his own public duty. 
Noting these criticisms, the Gildea court overruled the "jurisdictional 
facts" approach to the problem of scope of authority21 and adopted the 
more liberal "outer perimeter" standard used by the federal courts.22 
Basically, the "outer perimeter" standard requires only that the act of 
the officer have a "connection with the general matters committed by 
law to his control or supervision" and not be "manifestly or palpably 
beyond his authority."23 Where the act of the officer falls in the latter 
category, the act is within the officer's jurisdiction, and he is therefore 
immune from liability for the performance of that act.24 This liberal 
attitude towards an officer's scope of authority is an expression of policy 
designed to aid in the effective functioning of government.211 By re-
quiring that an officer's act be manifestly unrelated to any general mat-
ters within his supervision before liability is imposed, the rule protects 
officers who act reasonably and in good faith in determining whether an 
act is in furtherance of matters within their supervision.2tl The rule also 
20 Davis, supra note 19, at 22!1-24. The Horton court was apparently unaware of 
any problem resulting from the fact that the trial court probably did not examine the 
horse and was not trained in veterinary science, whereas the officers may have ex-
amined the horse and probably were trained in veterinary science. Moreover, the fact 
of the actual presence or absence of the disease really is determined by what the 
trial court says the facts were, not what the officer found them to be, even though the 
legislative body put the fact-finding power in the officer, not the court. Davis at 22!1-24. 
21 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1014-15, 298 N.E.2d at 861, overruling Stiles v. Municipal 
Council, 2!1!1 Mass. 174, 12!1 N.E. 615 (1919). 
22 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1015, 298 N.E.2d at 861, citing Barr v. Matteo, !160 U.S. 
564 (1959). 
23 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 48!1, 498 (1896). See Norton v. McShane, !1!12 
F.2d 858, 858-59 (5th Cir: 1964), where the court equated the Barr outer perimeter 
standard with the spalding rule. See also Scherer v. Brennan, 266 F. Supp. 758, 761 
(N.D. Ill. 1966), which follows Norton on this point. 
24 The critical issue in determining whether an act by an officer is within his scope 
of authority is the relation of the act complained of to matters committed by law to his 
control or supervision. Barr v. Matteo, !160 U.S. 564, 57!1-74 (1959). Thus, the privilege 
does not tum on the officer's title but on the relationship of the act in question to 
the matters which are committed to his supervision. Id. 
211 Id. at 57!1. 
2t1 A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the 
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly 
no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped au-
thority .••• But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law 
in the judge, .•. the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be ex-
ercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other ques-
tions, •.• 
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (Ill Wall.) !1!15, !151-52 (1871) (speaking with respect to the 
right of judges of general jurisdiction to determine the scope of their authority), cited 
with approval in Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 48!1, 49!1-94 (1896) (rationale applied to 
public officer). 
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affords greater latitude for honest mistake as to whether an officer has 
the power to act. This latter fact serves to at least avoid discouraging the 
officer from acting out of his fear of personal liability.27 To the extent 
that the officer is not discouraged from acting, the rule promotes the 
probable legislative intent in delegating the duty to the officer.28 More-
over, the greater latitude given the officer in determining his authority 
can allow him to develop innovative methods in the performance of his 
duties limited only by the requirement that his actions be reasonably 
related to the performance of matters within his general supervision. In 
this way, the rule can have the positive effect of encouraging an officer 
to do his duty, unfettered by fear that his good faith effort to carry out 
his duty might render him personally liable for the consequences. At 
the same time, the rule allows for the protection of the plaintiff's interest, 
since the validity of any act by the officer is still subject to a much nar-
rower test and hence voidable if all the statutory conditions are not met. 
A comparison of the Stiles case with Gildea amply demonstrates the 
relative merits of the two approaches to the scope of authority question. 
Under the rigid Stiles view, the councilmen's failure to satisfy the two 
statutory requirements of notice and a written statement of the reasons 
for the proposed action voided entirely their jurisdiction to act. Their 
attempted removal of the plaintiff was thus a usurpation of executive 
power, despite the legislature's general delegation of subject matter 
jurisdiction to the defendants and the broad authority given them to 
determine sufficient cause for removals. On the other hand, under the 
outer perimeter rule of Gildea, a more sensible result is achieved. The 
councilmen's failure to give a written statement of the reasons for the 
proposed action simply voided the effect of the subsequent removal, thus 
protecting the plaintiff from the proposed action. It had no effect on 
the issue of the councilmen's clear authority over removal of city man-
agers and hence the scope of their immunity. Thus, the interests of 
both the plaintiff and the defendant are given protection. 
Having adopted a liberal definition of the scope of an officer's au-
thority for the purposes of granting immunity, the Gildea court sought 
to establish what official activities are covered by the immunity rule. 
Historically, the immunity of public officers from tort claims existed only 
as an extension of judicial immunity, as developed at common law.29 
27 Cf. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949); see generally Spalding v. 
Vilas, 161 U.S. at 498-99. 
28 See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §26.05, at 532-33 (1958), 
citing Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80 (1883). If an officer feels that by acting he may 
risk liability, while by not acting he will avoid liability, he is apt not to act. This 
defeats the purpose for which the state hired the person, namely to have· him per-
farm a duty which they assigned to him. 
29 See Jennings, supra note 12, at 276-77. Generally, the justifications for judicial 
immunity were: (1) to avoid drains on judicial time caused by defending vexatious 
litigation; (2) to prevent undue influence upon judicial determinations through the 
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Administrative functions were viewed as analogous to judicial inquiries, 
in that they were designed to secure "a judgment on facts, law, or 
policy."80 As a result of this apparent similarity, early decisions tended 
to apply the doctrine of judicial immunity to administrative inquiries; 
one case specifically held that "administrative determinations were ju-
dicial in character, and that the officers making them [the inquiries] 
were protected by judicial immunity."Sl Because of this tradition, analy-
sis of public officer immunity focused on the similarity between the 
officer's duties and a judicial inquiry. The Massachusetts cases prior to 
Gildea simply never considered the creation of a separate immunity for 
public officers which would be grounded on policy goals independent of 
those employed to justify judicial immunity.s2 
With the overruling of the Stiles case,ss the Supreme Judicial Court 
turned to a theory of independent justification for public officer im-
munity. The court reasoned that in the modern governmental scheme 
many administrative officers exist whose duties are not really judicial in 
nature.s4 Attempts to extend judicial immunity to these officers would 
result in strained efforts to find sufficient judicial characteristics to argue 
that the public officer's duties were quasi-judicial. Such efforts had been 
allowed to become a substitute for examining whether policy reasons 
existed which would justify immunizing the officer irrespective of the 
judicial characteristics of his duties. With Gildea, the court has aban-
doned the search for judicial characteristics and has adopted a separate 
immunity for public officers. Rather than looking toward the quasi-
judicial nature of the public officer's duties, the court has chosen to 
emphasize the use of judgment or discretion by the officer as critical 
to the application of public officer immunity.s5 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the discretionary standard is a more 
satisfactory criterion for establishing immunity than the judicial analogy, 
that standard is still not sufficiently precise. Almost all administrative 
threat or possibility of subsequent damage suits; (3) to foster the independence of 
the judiciary, encouraging them to apply the law according to principles of justice, 
not according to personal consequences; (4) to insure that persons of property are not 
deterred from judicial service by the possibility of frequent or large liability judgments 
being entered against them. Jennings, supra note 12, at 270-72. See also Pratt v. 
Gardner, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 63, 70 (1848). 
30 Jennings, supra note 12, at 277. 
31 Id. See, e.g., Stiles v. Municipal Council, 233 Mass. 174, 123 N.E. 615 (1919). 
32 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1012-13, 298 N.E.2d at 859-60. See, e.g., Stiles v. Municipal 
Council, 233 Mass. 174, 123 N.E. 615 (1919). 
33 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1013, 298 N.E.2d at 860. 
84 See, e.g., New England Tel. &: Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 327 Mass. 81, 
85, 97 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1951), where the court noted that the fixing of utility rates 
was a legislative function not a judicial one. Were the court to now seek to immunize 
the DPU from suit on the basis of judicial immunity, the court would of necessity be 
contradicting itself as to the nature of the rate-making function. 
35 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1010, 298 N.E.2d at 858. 
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acts involve the use of some judgment or discretion.88 In addition, the 
use of the term "discretion" in describing legal acts has been criticPed 
as inevitably resulting in uncertainty and arbitrariness.87 
Despite this inherent ambiguity in the term the court used as the 
touchstone for its new test, the court offered no detailed explanation of 
how it intended to define or apply the standard in Massachusetts. In 
giving its reason for adopting an immunity rule for public officers, the 
court took judicial notice of the increasing number of officials charged 
with responsibility for making policy decisions which required the use 
of their judgment and discretion and cited the Commissioners of the 
88 Cf. Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468 (2d App. 
D. 1920). "[I]t would be difficult to conceive of any official act ••• that did not admit 
of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the 
driving of a nail." Id. 
ST See Parker, The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadministration, 5 Vand. 
L. Rev. 167, 171-72 (1952). This commentator indicates that: 
From a point of view of legal theory, • • • a sharp distinction between discre-
tionary and nondiscretionary [acts] cannot be drawn; more precisely, there is no 
function that does not involve the exercise of some discretion, however narrow. 
The duties of every government official consists in applying some law-statute, 
regulation, directive, court decision, individual instruction-which inevitably lends 
itself to various constructions of times. Even when a mere messenger is instructed 
to go to a certain place by the "shortest route" it is still open to question-and 
hence to his discretion-whether "short" means short in time or in miles. At least 
since Locke the criteria of functions that involve the "power to act according to 
discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law" have plagued 
the legal world. Of course, there is a factual difference between a very wide, a 
not so wide and a very limited discretion. The discretion involved in deciding 
whether the granting of a license is in the "public interest" is certainly wider than 
that of a government truck driver who must make up his mind which route to 
choose. But this difference is not a categorical one but rather amounts to a mere 
gradual transition. In other words, it is impossible to delineate "discretionary" 
functions from others in an a prjori fashion. The decision, therefore, as to what 
a discretionary function [means) (meaning, one that allows a relatively wide dis-
cretion) can never be reached with any degree of precision. The inevitably 
ensuing result will be uncertainty and arbitrariness of the law. Of course, it is 
not always possible to draw proper categorical definitions and thus a degree of 
uncertainty is at times inevitable. Who would ·deny that the transition from 
"solvent" to "insolvent" is but a gradual one? Yet in order to subject the latter, 
but not the former, to insolvency laws; the law must rely on just that criterion. 
In our case, however, the situation is somewhat different. There are definitely 
people who are insolvent and others who are not. The border cases lie in the 
middle. But there is no governmental function that cannot at all be said to be 
discretionary; and even if we construe the term to mean "wide" discretion, the 
transition will necessarily -be fluctuating and uncertain. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). For examples of uncertain and conflicting results in applying 
a standard based on the use of discretion, compare Fergus v. Brady, 277 Ill. 272, 115 N.E. 
!19!1 (1917) (duties of an auditor are purely ministerial), with Hicks v. Davis, 100 Kan. 
4, 16!1 P. 799 (1917) (duties of state auditor are too important and call for too much 
prudence, judgment and discretion to be characterized as merely ministerial). 
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Department of Public Utilities (DPU) as an example of officials deserving 
a separate immunity.ss 
The precise reason for the court's reliance on the Commissioners of 
the DPU as an example of officers deserving immunity but not performing 
judicial functions is not dear. The court notes that these officers are 
charged with responsibility for making broad policy decisions, thus 
rendering their duty "legislative" in character. However, the court goes 
on to note that it would be unthinkable to subject these officers to liabil-
ity to utility companies for erroneous rate determinations. Whether this 
is unthinkable because of the extreme size of the liability which would 
result in such a case or because the court deems it desirable to insulate 
their policy decisions from judicial review is not dear. But since such 
large liability would result from virtually any policy level decision, it is 
more likely that the controlling factor is the making of policy decisions, 
and the possibility of large liability is merely another justification for 
immunizing policy-making officials. The court simply observed that it 
was unnecessary to identify further other public officials whose position 
and responsibility are similar to those of the Commissioners of the DPU 
and to whom the Gildea immunity should apply.so 
It is difficult to concur in the court's statement that further clarifica-
tion of immunizable activities is unnecessary, in view of the diverse re-
sults encountered in other jurisdictions in construing standards based 
on the use of discretion and the ambiguity of the test itsel£.40 While the 
court clearly cannot be expected to list all the newly immunized activities, 
the court should have drawn a more definitive test. The court's failure 
to adopt a more useful standard and to elaborate more precisely how it 
intended to apply the standard is sure to generate uncertainty for both 
the officers41 and prospective plaintiffs.42 Nonetheless, in the absence of 
a dearly defined test governing the application of the new immunity 
rule, some preliminary analysis as to the apparent ramifications of the 
new rule is in order. The court's emphasis on the importance of the 
making of policy decisions and its reliance on the example of the Com-
missioners of the DPU in rationalizing the need for a separate immunity 
88 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1013·14, 298 N.E.2d at 860. 
89 Id. 
40 See note 37 supra. 
41 In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), Chief Justice Warren in a dissenting 
opinion noted that predictability was essential to any public officer immunity stan· 
dard. 360 U.S. at 585·86. Unless an officer knows in advance whether he is immune 
from liability, he can be intimidated by the threat or possibility of personal liability, 
causing him to reach the decision least likely to cause him the anguish of suit. 
42 If plaintiffs are uncertain as to the law on public officer immunity, the tendency 
will be to institute all types of suits in the hope of getting a windfall recovery. This 
will have two detrimental effects: (I) the number of suits against the officers will in-
crease; (2) court time will be wasted on suits without substantive merit. 
91
Smith: Chapter 11: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1973
396 1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §11.20 
for public officers may indicate that the principal issue in applying the 
immunity is whether the official is one to whom either the executive or 
legislative branch has chosen to delegate the authority for making broad 
policy decisions. If this is the issue governing the application of the im-
munity, then the determination of whether there has been a delegation 
of broad policy-making powers would turn on a number of factors, 
including statutory construction,4a employment of the officer due to his 
particular knowledge or expertise, and the specialization or complexity 
associated with the duties of the official.44 Each of these factors would 
need to be considered with respect to the larger question of whether it 
is desirable as a matter of policy to have the activity under scrutiny re-
main beyond the range of judicial inquiry45 and thereby avoid the pos-
sibility of a tort suit becoming a vehicle for reviewing the merits of a 
decision entrusted to a co-ordinate branch of government.46 Even if a 
particular suit is not instituted, there is the very real danger that the 
mere potentiality of such review might influence the decision-making 
process.47 
43 See generally Patterson, Ministerial and Discretionary Official Acts, 20 Mich. L. 
Rev. 848, 874 (1922). In construing any statute, the author suggests a consideration of 
the following factors in attempting to give effect to the purpose of the legislation: (I) 
mandatory language ("must") indicating ministerial functions as opposed to permissive 
language ("may'') suggesting discretion; (2) words denoting mental operations as in-
dicating the use of discretion ("satisfied that" or "in his opinion"); (3) the definiteness 
or indefiniteness of the statutory norm imposed (the former indicating that the legis-
lature has decided clearly when the officer should act, thus leaving only ministerial 
execution to the officer, the latter indicating that some judgment will be necessary in 
establishing a norm by one other than the legislature). Id. at 876·78. 
44 Cf. Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 488, 492 (1953). In discussing whether a particular 
activity should be immunized for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the article 
notes the relevance of these factors: 
Congress may choose to implement its legislation by delegating to administrative 
officers power to make broad policy decisions. Equipped with expertise in a com-
plex, specialized area, the official is asked to make value judgments in a manner 
which may be described as "legislative activity." This would seem to be the type 
of activity that Congress did not want courts to interfere with in tort actions. 
45 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §25.11 (1958). The opinion of a court as to 
the wisdom or correctness of an exercise of judgment is not to be substituted for that 
of the official empowered to make the determination. Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 488, 490 
(1953). 
46 Cf. Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 488, 489·90 (1953). If the official is charged with 
negligence in the making of his decision,. the court will be required to decide whether 
a reasonably prudent man in similar circumstances would have reached the same 
decision. Thus the court would be reviewing the wisdom of the policy which the 
officer has decided on. 
47 See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 793·94, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 
248 (1968), and authorities cited therein. If there is a chance of judicial review of a 
decision, the officer may take that fact into account in reaching his decision and there-
fore reach a result which he thinks the court will approve. In this way he avoids (1) 
the embarrassment of reversal by a court, (2) the possibility of being held personally 
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While the "discretion" test is useful in immunizing officers based on 
the desirability of insulating their decisions from judicial review, it is 
too narrow to identify other officials as to whom other justifications for 
public officer immunity apply. The potential of heavy personal liability 
not only may deter competent persons from entering public service but 
also can intimidate those who do so enter from exercising their judg-
ment freely. If the court considers the critical issue in applying the 
immunity rule to be the delegation of broad policy-making powers to the 
officer, it should bear in mind that an immunity test which focuses solely 
on policy-making power will fail to encompass fully all the relevant 
issues bearing on public officer immunity. It would therefore be helpful 
if the court explained in detail its definition of the· "use of judgment" 
standard and incorporated into that expanded definition careful con-
sideration of the justification for immunity. 
An additional problem created by the Gildea rule relates to the type 
of immunity which the court has chosen to apply once the initial deter-
mination is made that an officer's acts are to be granted immunity. 
Rather than adopt a rule of absolute immunity,48 such as the federal 
courts have done, the court opted for conditional immunity, that is, 
immunity conditioned upon the absence of bad faith or malice.49 Con-
ditional immunity has found favor among legal commentators110 and in 
a majority of jurisdictions111 due to the fact that it avoids the chief dis-
advantage of absolute immunity: the possibility of the office becoming 
a shield for the commission of malicious acts.112 It has been argued that 
to deny recovery where a malicious wrong has been committed works 
a gro~s injustice on the injured plaintiff and is incompatible with acting 
for the public good.11s While recognizing that such a denial of recovery 
would indeed be "monstrous," Judge Learned Hand nonetheless con-
cluded, in his famous decision in Biddle, that the balance of reason 
tipped in favor of the absolute immunity rule on the grounds 
that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded 
until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the 
innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the 
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all 
liable for the consequences of the decision, and (3) any threat of litigation with its 
concomitant risks . 
.a Absolute immunity is immunity irrespective of the presence of malice, corrup-
tion, or bad faith. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §132, at 987-88 (4th ed. 
1971). 
49 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1011, 298 N.E.2d at 859. 
110 See, e.g., Jaffe, Suits against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv. 
L. Rev. 209, 218-25 (1964). 
Ill Prosser, note 48 supra, at 989; see, e.g., Paoli v. Mason, 325 Ill. App. 197, 59 
N.E.2d 499 (1945); Tyrell v. Burke, 110 N.JL. 225, 164 A. 586 (1933). 
112 Cf. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949). 
liS 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §26.04, at 526 (1958). 
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but the most resolute . . . in the unflinching discharge of their 
duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which 
may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an 
official may find himself hard put to it .to satisfy a jury of his good 
faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who 
have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter 
from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone 
who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, -the answer 
must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either 
alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better 
to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officials than to 
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of 
retaliation.ll4 
After Biddle, the federal courts consistently followed the absolute im-
munity rule as applied to federal officers.1111 
While the Gildea court cited to Biddle and other absolute immunity 
cases throughout its opinion, it chose not to apply absolute immunity 
to the case, apparently because on the facts of the case no evidence of 
bad faith had been introduced and therefore adoption of conditional 
immunity was sufficient to decide the case before it. Indeed, the court 
emphasized that its present holding, limiting public officer immunity to 
acts committed without malice, was dictated solely by the facts before 
it, and the court warned against interpreting Gildea as a final position 
by the court on the question of whether it would ultimately adopt a 
conditional rather than an absolute immunity." 
Following this caveat, though, the court entered a directed verdict 
against the plaintiff under G.L. c. 231, §122. The court apparently rea-
soned that since the plaintiff had offered no evidence of malice at the 
trial, he had failed to present a prima facie case for recovery under 
conditional immunity principles, thus justifying a directed verdict against 
him. However, the court ignored the fact that Gildea had not alleged or 
offered proof of malice because under the then existing lawn malice 
was not a prima facie element for recovery. Indeed, the court explicitly 
M 177 F.2d at 581 (2d Cir. 1949). But see !I K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 
§26.04, at 529 (1958). It is there argued that the use of summary judgment procedure 
can serve as a screening device whereby the oourts can look to the affidavit to see if 
the claim of malice is substantial enough to warrant a trial on the issue. If eftective, 
such a device oould eliminate spurious claims without the burden to the officer of a 
full trial. But such an approach fails to consider that all the plaintiff must do is 
allege on information or belief that the motive behind the act was malicious to sth. 
vive a motion for summary judgment. 
1111 See cases collected in !I K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §26.04, at 527-28 
n.S (1958). 
116 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1011-12, 298 N.E.2d at 859. 
117 Stiles v. Municipal Council, 2!1!1 Mass. 174, 12!1 N.E. 615 (1919). 
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recognized11B that the trial court tried the case on absolute immunity 
principles, charging the jury that malice or its absence was irrelevant 
to the issue of liability. Since the directed verdict statute applied by the 
Supreme Judicial Court is permissive, not mandatory,llD it should only 
be exercised in a proper case. The statute has been held inapplicable 
to the situation where the case was tried on the wrong legal principles,8° 
as the court openly admits happened in the Gildea trial.81 It is therefore 
difficult to explain why the court, in reversing Gildea's jury verdict, 
directed a verdict for the defendants instead of granting Gildea a new 
trial at least on the issue of malice, especially in view of the court's ad-
mitted uncertainty as to which type of immunity it intended to ulti-
mately adopt. 
In sum, the Supreme Judicial Court has at last created a protective 
immunity for public officers. In delineating the scope of that immunity, 
the court liberated the doctrine of public officer immunity from the 
arbitrary limitations of the jurisdictional facts rule and the anachronistic 
concept of public officer immunity as dependent on judicial similarities 
sufficient to justify applying judicial immunity to the officer's acts. How-
ever, the court's laudable effort to protect public officers in view of the 
need therefor is doomed by the court's failure to solve two critical 
problems which are inherent with judicially created public officer im-
munity law: first, the court failed to delineate an adequate standard by 
which to determine the activities to which the immunity applies; and 
second, the court, in its effort to avoid some of the injustices of an 
absolute immunity rule, adopted conditional immunity, complete with 
the innate weaknesses of that rule noted in the Biddle decision. 
These problems exist because of the court's legitimate fear that any 
immunity rule will leave a party injured by an official's unjustified 
action without redress. Under Massachusetts law, an injured party must 
either sue and recover his damages from the officer involved or be left 
to bear the burden of the loss himself since the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity precludes a suit against the state itsel£.82 Thus, unless the 
victim can collect against the officer, he is left without redress for the 
injury suffered. 
In view of the foregoing, it is proposed that the Massachusetts Legisla-
ture step into the breach and enact a comprehensive legislative program 
to deal with the area of public officer immunity. California adopted 
such a programea in response to the judicial overruling of sovereign 
1111 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1015, 298 N.E.2d at 861. 
llB See Vallavanti v. Armour Be Co., 264 Mass. 557, !141, 162 N.E. 689, 690 (1928). 
80 See Archer v. Eldredge, 204 Mass. 525, 527, 90 N.E. 525, 526 (1910). 
81 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1015, 298 N.E.2d at 861. 
82 See generally §11.17 infra. 
88 Cal. Gov. Code §814 et seq. (West 1966). 
95
Smith: Chapter 11: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1973
400 1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §11.20 
immunity.64 First, the legislature statutorily re-enacted sovereign im-
munity except for stated statutory exceptions.611 Next, the state was made 
vicariously liable for the torts of its officers who were acting within the 
scope of their employment,66 including those performing ministerial 
functions,67 except where the employee would be immune.68 Finally, 
public officers performing discretionary acts were immunized from suit,69 
thus vicariously immunizing the sovereign. 
This type of scheme is advantageous to the interests of all three parties 
involved-the officer, the injured victim, and the state. With respect to 
the officer, he is effectively immunized from the possibility of a tort 
judgment being satisfied from his personal assets. The injured plaintiff 
has two courses of action which may be taken. He can sue the state 
directly, the more likely course since here there is no question of the 
sovereign's ability to pay any judgment the plaintiff can get, or he can 
sue the officer personally. If he selects the latter alternative, the officer 
has the right to implead the state as a defendant (if the request is made 
within ten days of the commencement of the action) so as not to be out 
of pocket at all if he is found liable,70 or, failing that, he can apply for 
indemnity for the judgment plus his costs at the end of the suit.71 In 
any event, the state ultimately bears the burden of the judgment, thus 
preventing any consideration of potential personal liability from in-
timidating the officer in reaching his decision or in any way discouraging 
him from diligent performance of the duty entrusted to him. Moreover, 
under the California system, the officers are free of any fear of retaliation 
by their superior and free of fear that the state will refuse to indemnify 
them except in certain specific instances: where the torts were intentional 
or where they were committed in bad faith.72 It would not be necessary 
for Massachusetts to adopt such an exception, since questioning an offi-
cer's motive in any circumstance might undercut the very goal of fearless 
performance which public officer immunity seeks to attain. However, if 
Massachusetts chose to adopt such an .exception, it could at least place 
the issue before an administrative board which would be familiar with 
the problems facing an officer in making decisions. In addition, Massa-
64 Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 
(1961) (overruling sovereign immunity). 
611 Cal. Gov. Code §815(a) (West 1966). 
66 Cal. Gov. Code §815.2(a) (West 1966). See also legislative comment thereto. 
67 Heieck 8c Moran v. City of Modesto, 46 Cal. Rptr. 692 (5th D. App. 1965). 
68 Cal. Gov. Code §815.2(b) (West 1966). 
69 Cal. Gov. Code §820.2 (West 1966). 
70 Cal. Gov. Code §825 (West 1966). 
71 Cal. Gov. Code §825.2 (West 1966). 
'12 Cal. Gov. Code §825.4 (West 1966) provides that as a general rule officers need 
not indemnify public entities who pay damages resulting from employee's act. Cal. 
Gov. Code §825.6(a) (West 1966) excepts from the general rule acts of employees which 
involve fraud, corruption, or malice. 
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chusetts could set for the officer clear categories of acts to which immunity 
will not apply. 
With respect to the victim, he will be sure to have an action against 
someone for any injury he suffers as a result of government decisions or 
activity. He will not be foreclosed either by the fortuity of his injury 
being caused by one who is performing his function as a government 
employee, or because the court or jury thinks it unfair to hold the officer 
personally liable in a particular situation. In addition, recovery of any 
judgment gained is virtually assured, since the execution will be against 
the state itself, as to which there is no risk of insolvency. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, should the legislature enact 
such a scheme, the state interest in insulating basic policy decisions from 
judicial review would still be protected. If an officer is performing a 
discretionary function involving policy decisions, there can be no re-
covery against either the officer or the state.n This approach has the 
advantage of tying the justifications for sovereign immunity to the ap-
plication of the rule, and making the justification for sovereign immunity 
the measure of it. Also, the courts need not hesitate to grant relief to 
an injured plaintiff out of a feeling that to impose liability on the officer 
in the particular situation would be unjust, since the state would, under 
this type of enactment, be required to meet its responsibilities to the 
public for injuries caused by the negligence of its agents, just as private 
industry is vicariously liable for the torts of its servants. 
While the Supreme Judicial Court in Gildea has recognized the need 
for reform in the law of public officer immunity, it must be admitted 
that the court's attempt to reform the area is far from conclusive. Indeed, 
the difficulties which the Supreme Judicial Court has encountered may 
well Sl.Jggest that judicial resolution of the law of public officer im-
munity, subject as it is to a case-by-case solution, is not feasible, and 
that resolution of the uncertainties must come from the General Court. 
JosEPH H. WALSH 
'1'8 Cf. Cal. Gov. Code §820.2 (West 1966), as construed in Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 
782, 79lJ-95, 447 P.2d lJ52, l$60-61, 7lJ Cal. Rptr. 240, 248-49 (1968). 
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